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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment upholding a hearing officer's decision that the school district deprived plaintiff, a high school student with a disability, of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to fulfill its Child Find duty in a timely manner. The court held that the district court did not reversibly err by concluding that taken together, the student's academic decline, hospitalization, and incidents of theft should have led the district to suspect her need for special education services by October 2014, at the latest. Therefore, the school district violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's Child Find requirements by failing to identify, locate, and evaluate students with suspected disabilities within a reasonable time. The court also held that the student was a prevailing party entitled to attorneys' fees because she received a FAPE and thus achieved some of the benefit she sought in requesting the due process hearing. View "Krawietz v. Galveston Independent School District" on Justia Law

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The Social Security Administration (SSA) reduced the payment of a back-award that it owed Berg by the amount of an earlier overpayment that Berg owed to SSA. Berg contested this setoff because it was taken during the 90-day period before the filing of her bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court concluded that SSA permissibly recovered $17,385 of overpayment but impermissibly improved its position by $2,015. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under 11 U.S.C. 553(b)(2), a debtor (Berg) may recover from a creditor (SSA) an amount set off by the creditor in the 90 days preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition only to the extent that the creditor improved its position during that 90-day period. The bankruptcy court correctly calculated the accrual of Berg’s benefits as occurring on the dates that she had a right to benefits--the last day of each month that she was eligible for benefits and survived to the end of the month. On May 9, 2014, 90 days before the filing of the petition, that amount was $17,385. Because Berg then owed SSA $19,400, the insufficiency on that date was $2,015. On July 30, the date the SSA took the setoff, Berg still owed SSA $19,400, but SSA owed her $20,307; SSA improved its position by $2,015 during the 90-day preference period. That is the amount that Berg may now recover. View "Berg v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

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In April 2009, E.O. visited a pediatrician for his six-month visit and received several vaccinations. That night, Mrs. Oliver found E.O. seizing in his bed and called 9-1-1. At the emergency room, E.O. presented with a fever, red eyes with discharge, and a runny nose. The next day, E.O.’s pediatrician diagnosed E.O. with “complex febrile seizure and conjunctivitis.” E.O. did not have any health issues or seizures for two months but had several seizures over the summer and began to experience prolonged seizures in March 2010. Each seizure resulted in an emergency room visit. A pediatric neurologist diagnosed E.O. with an SCN1A gene defect. E.O. exhibited developmental delay. A pediatric neurologist performed examinations, which demonstrated “intractable, symptomatic childhood absence and complex partial seizures of independent hemisphere origin secondary to SCN1A gene defect (borderline SMEI syndrome) and encephalopathy characterized by speech delay.” E.O.’s family sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-2–300aa-33, alleging that E.O. developed Dravet syndrome as a result of the vaccinations. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of their claim. The government’s expert provided strong evidence that Dravet syndrome will develop in children with the SCN[1]A mutation, whether or not they receive vaccinations; the Olivers failed to establish that their theory has garnered widespread acceptance, as evidenced by an extensive discussion of articles with contradictory findings. View "Oliver v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

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Walker has degrees in robotics and electrical engineering and worked for 21 years, primarily as an engineer, before suffering a stroke in 2008. Walker was not able to return to work after his stroke. Medical records show that his physical and cognitive condition has gradually worsened since 2008. In 2012, medical professionals documented his cognitive and memory deficits, and difficulty with balance and walking, dizziness. By 2013 Walker was unable to live alone and moved in with his mother. The Social Security Administration determined that Walker became disabled in December 2014. An ALJ, in a separate proceeding, determined that Walker was not disabled before that date. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ’s conclusion sweeps too broadly by not accounting for medical and other evidence strongly suggesting that Walker’s condition and residual functional capacity had worsened to such a degree that he became disabled by approximately the middle of 2012. View "Walker v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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Penrod applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income in 2010, at age 45, after having a heart attack. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. Penrod filed a second application for disability insurance benefits only, alleging that he was disabled because of arthritis, diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, short‐term memory loss, and asthma, from April 2012-June 2013. Medical evidence was sparse. After his heart attack, Penrod received a stent and regular follow‐up care. Penrod’s poverty and lack of health insurance complicated his treatment. After reviewing Penrod’s medical records, two consultative doctors agreed that he could perform light work, with postural and environmental limitations. At a hearing, Penrod focused on the difficulty of finding a job with his limited education, noting his inability to stand or sit for prolonged periods, limited grip, fatigue and dizziness from his medications, pain in his hips and back, and kidney stones. He had suffered another heart attack in 2014. After the hearing, Penrod died from cardiac arrest. The ALJ denied Penrod’s application, finding that although Penrod’s impairments could result in the types of symptoms he alleged, the medical evidence did not support his testimony about his limitations. The ALJ noted Penrod’s smoking and his frequent reports that he was unable to afford medications and recommended tests in assessing his credibility. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported a finding that Penrod retained the capacity to work through his last insured date. View "Penrod v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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Michigan’s Medicaid waiver program provides individuals with developmental disabilities community-based services. Washtenaw County changed its budgeting method in 2015. Notices sent to recipients acknowledged that recipients would have to pay service-providers less in order to maintain their approved hours of service. The Association, a nonprofit community organization assisting individuals with developmental disabilities, joined with three individual plaintiffs to filed suit, alleging due process violations and seeking a preliminary injunction. The Association’s CEO testified that 169 individuals, including the three named plaintiffs, had received notices and that the three were Association members. The district court concluded that the Association lacked associational standing because the 169 people for whom it claimed associational standing were not shown to be members; the named members, in their individual capacities, were not entitled to injunctive relief because they had appealed the reductions and received favorable decisions so “there can be no irreparable harm suffered by the named Plaintiffs as a result of the inadequate notice.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross.” An individual must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought; an association that relies upon an individual member for standing purposes must do the same. The Association has not shown that any named member had standing to seek fresh notices and hearing rights when it filed its complaint.. View "Waskul v. Washtenaw County Community Mental Health" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s order upholding an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) conclusion that although Appellant had previously been eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits as a child, Appellant was ineligible for SSI benefits as an adult, holding that the record before the ALJ was insufficient to conclude that Appellant was no longer disabled. When Appellant was twelve years old, the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that he was entitled to SSI benefits because he was found to have met the SSA's requirements for mental retardation. The Commissioner later found that Appellant was no longer disabled and that his benefits should stop. Appellant requested a hearing with an ALJ, who found that Appellant was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Upon de novo review, the First Circuit held that the record before the ALJ was not adequately developed enough to conclude that Appellant was no longer disabled, particularly in light of the fact that the ALJ was on notice, through both Social Security Administration filings and hearing testimony, that Appellant was undergoing psychiatric treatment. View "Torres-Pagan v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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Arthur served on active Army duty, 1940-1945, as a prisoner of war of the German government for 25 months. He was service-connected for several disabilities and had VA claims pending when he died in 2011. Winters pursued those as a substituted claimant and her own claims for accrued benefits as his surviving spouse. In 2013, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied some claims and granted service-connected benefits for others, found that the awards were inextricably intertwined with Winters’s accrued benefits claim, and remanded for initial disability ratings and to readjudicate the accrued-benefits claim. The Board determined that a subsequent letter in which Winters sought earlier dates “d[id] not constitute [a] motion for revision,” directed the letter to the Regional Office, but did not notify Winters of its determination so that the 120-day appeal period did not start to run. In 2014, the Board denied Winters’s claims for entitlement to an earlier effective date and for accrued benefits. In 2016, the Veterans Court dismissed an appeal of the 2013 decision for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the 2014 decision as premature because the 2013 decision was not final. Winters sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d) for that decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of her application. The court lacked jurisdiction to award EAJA fees relating to an appeal over which it did not have jurisdiction. With respect to the 2014 Board decision, Winters was not a “prevailing party.” View "Winters v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

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This matter stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the State of Mississippi against the defendant pharmacies. The State alleged deceptive trade practices and fraudulent reporting of inflated “usual and customary” prices in the defendant’s reimbursement requests to the Mississippi Department of Medicaid. The State argued that Walgreens, CVS, and Fred’s pharmacies purposefully misrepresented these prices to obtain higher prescription drug reimbursements from the State. Finding that the circuit court was better equipped to preside over this action, the DeSoto County Chancery Court transferred the matter to the DeSoto County Circuit Court in response to the defendants’ request. Aggrieved, the State timely filed an interlocutory appeal disputing the chancellor’s decision to transfer the case. After a thorough review of the parties’ positions, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that though the chancery court properly could have retained the action, the chancellor correctly used his discretion to transfer the case, allowing the issues to proceed in front of a circuit-court jury. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision. View "Mississippi v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision upholding the Social Security Commission's denial of plaintiff's applications for child insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that the ALJ did not elicit a reasonable explanation to resolve an apparent conflict between testimony from the vocational expert and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) when it determined that plaintiff's limitations did not prevent him from performing certain jobs in the national economy. In this case, the conflict was in regard to the DOT's listing related to the level of reasoning required for the job of hospital or industrial cleaner. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Stanton v. Commissioner" on Justia Law