Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

A small convenience store in downtown Los Angeles, owned by an individual, participated in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and served many customers who used electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards. In early 2022, the Food and Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture detected suspicious patterns in the store’s SNAP transactions. Over six months, the store processed hundreds of unusually large transactions, nearly 200 transactions that depleted a household’s monthly benefits in one day, numerous rapid consecutive transactions by the same household, and many transactions for the same dollar amount. Following a physical inspection and review of these patterns, the Agency charged the store with trafficking in SNAP benefits, meaning exchanging benefits for cash or non-eligible goods.After receiving a charge letter and providing a response that generally denied wrongdoing and offered explanations for customer behavior, the store was permanently disqualified from SNAP by the Agency. The owner and the store sought administrative review and submitted additional documents, including affidavits and receipts, but the Agency upheld its decision. The plaintiffs then filed for judicial review in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The government moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs relied on much of the same evidence previously submitted. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether trafficking had occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the government’s evidence established suspicious transaction patterns supporting an inference of SNAP trafficking and that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to the legitimacy of the flagged transactions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. View "BROTHERS MARKET LLC NO. 2 V. USA" on Justia Law

An employee worked for Cowin & Company for nearly three decades, performing construction in coal mines and regularly being exposed to coal dust. Years after his employment ended, he filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, alleging total disability due to pneumoconiosis (“black lung disease”) caused by his coal mine work. The claimant relied on a regulatory presumption that applies to miners who have a disabling breathing impairment and at least fifteen years of qualifying coal mine employment. A key dispute in the case involved how to calculate a “year” of coal mine employment under Department of Labor regulations.An administrative law judge initially granted benefits, finding the claimant had at least fifteen years of qualifying employment, thus triggering the presumption. Cowin & Company appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which vacated the benefits award in part and instructed the judge to recalculate the length of coal mine employment, questioning the method used to credit years of employment. On remand, the judge again found more than fifteen years, but the Board disagreed with the method, holding that a claimant must prove both a 365/366-day period of employment and at least 125 working days during that period. Ultimately, after further proceedings, the administrative law judge found only 13.76 years of qualifying employment, and the Board affirmed the denial of benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that, under the plain text of the relevant regulation, a claimant establishes a “year” of coal mine employment by showing at least 125 working days in or around coal mines during a calendar year or partial periods totaling one year. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Director, OWCP" on Justia Law

A miner filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, asserting total disability due to lung disease following over two decades of coal mine employment. The miner had a significant history of cigarette smoking, but no evidence of clinical pneumoconiosis was present. The dispute centered on whether his disabling pulmonary impairment—despite his smoking history—was legally attributable to his coal mine dust exposure.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) first reviewed the claim and found that the miner had worked in coal mines for 27 years and suffered from a totally disabling pulmonary impairment. These facts entitled the miner to a statutory presumption that his disability was caused by pneumoconiosis. The ALJ determined that the mining company, as the responsible employer, failed to rebut this presumption. The ALJ discredited the employer’s medical experts, who attributed the impairment solely to smoking, because their opinions did not properly consider the additive effects of smoking and coal dust, as recognized by the Department of Labor’s Preamble to its Black Lung regulations. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ALJ correctly applied the law by requiring the employer to rebut the presumption, and properly evaluated the medical evidence in light of the regulatory guidance. The court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that there was no legal error in the treatment of expert opinions or the regulatory preamble. The Fourth Circuit denied the mining company’s petition for review, leaving the award of benefits to the miner in place. View "Wolf Run Mining Company v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

William Walls was found by an Illinois state court to be a sexually violent person in 2015, leading to his civil commitment under Illinois law. The commitment was based, in part, on statements he made or that were made by his treatment providers while he was incarcerated for a prior sexual assault conviction. Walls has argued that these statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. After his commitment, his case involved extensive delays, including a twelve-year period before the initial commitment decision and seven years before the state appellate court resolved the appeal filed by his counsel.After the 2015 commitment order, Walls—sometimes proceeding pro se despite being represented—filed a series of appeals and petitions. The Illinois Appellate Court eventually affirmed both the 2015 and a subsequent 2018 recommitment decision in a consolidated opinion. Walls’s first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois on procedural default grounds. He did not appeal that dismissal. After the 2018 recommitment proceeding, Walls filed a second federal habeas petition, which was dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) because it challenged the same 2015 order or did not raise new claims as required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Walls’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, to the extent Walls was once again contesting the 2015 commitment order, his petition was barred as a successive habeas application. Alternatively, if he was challenging later decisions, he had failed to raise or exhaust federal claims relating to those decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Walls’s petition. View "Walls v Posey" on Justia Law

The case concerns significant changes made by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to the Continuum of Care (CoC) program, which provides federal funding for homeless assistance projects. In November 2025, HUD issued a new Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) that rescinded a previously issued two-year NOFO and introduced new requirements, including a drastic reduction in renewal funding for core permanent housing projects and new eligibility conditions. These changes threatened to eliminate funding for many projects, risking increased homelessness in the affected communities. Two groups of plaintiffs, including states, cities, and advocacy organizations, challenged HUD’s actions, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and constitutional provisions.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island issued preliminary injunctions prohibiting HUD from rescinding the prior NOFO and from implementing the challenged conditions in the new NOFOs. The court found that HUD’s actions likely violated the APA, were arbitrary and capricious, and would cause irreparable harm by creating funding gaps and service disruptions for vulnerable populations. After Congress passed new appropriations legislation in early 2026—setting a structure for grant renewals to avoid funding gaps—HUD moved to dissolve the injunctions, arguing that the legislative changes eliminated any ongoing harm and affected the merits of the legal claims. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the risk of harm persisted and that the plaintiffs remained likely to succeed on their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed only the district court’s denial of HUD’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunctions. The court held that HUD failed to make a strong showing that the intervening appropriations law eliminated the plaintiffs’ risk of harm or undermined the basis for the injunctions. The First Circuit therefore denied HUD’s request for a stay pending appeal. View "National Alliance to End Homelessness v. Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

The United States brought a lawsuit against Florida alleging that the state was discriminating against children with medically complex conditions by failing to provide care in the most integrated setting as required under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The federal government claimed that Florida’s inadequate provision of at-home and group-home care forced some children into institutionalization and placed others at serious risk of institutionalization. Additionally, it argued that once children were institutionalized, Florida’s poor care coordination and deficient transition planning made it difficult for families to bring their children home.This litigation proceeded over many years, culminating in a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had determined that the United States had statutory authority to sue Florida under the ADA. After trial, the district court found that Florida’s Medicaid program failed to provide adequate private duty nursing (PDN) services and effective care coordination, resulting in unnecessary institutionalization of children or placing them at risk. The district court concluded that these failures constituted violations of the ADA as interpreted by Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, and issued a permanent injunction requiring Florida to improve its services, with specific mandates regarding PDN, care coordination, transition planning, data collection, and appointment of a monitor.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Florida challenged the findings and scope of the injunction. The Eleventh Circuit held that the United States may seek injunctive relief for systemic ADA violations affecting a group of children, not just those who individually filed complaints. The court affirmed the district court’s findings that the United States established the elements required under Olmstead, that the violations were widespread, and that system-wide injunctive relief was warranted. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s liability determinations and most provisions of the injunction, but vacated or modified some portions as overbroad. View "United States v. Florida" on Justia Law

Two high-ranking Kansas executive officials became embroiled in disputes stemming from federal government actions related to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and federal grant funding for state agencies. The federal government requested sensitive data from state SNAP programs and threatened to withhold funding if states did not comply. The Kansas Governor viewed these demands as unlawful and opposed compliance, while the Kansas Attorney General disagreed with the Governor’s legal position and asserted that only his office could represent Kansas in related legal challenges. This led to friction over which state official had authority to control litigation involving the state’s interests.The Governor filed a quo warranto petition directly in the Kansas Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that she had constitutional authority to litigate on behalf of the state or, alternatively, on behalf of her office and its agencies. The Attorney General took the position that only he could represent the state as a whole, but conceded there was no objection to the Governor representing her office or executive agencies when they, not the state as a whole, were the real party in interest. The dispute in the lower courts did not involve any jury findings, and the Kansas Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to consider the petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas concluded that, as the case developed, the parties narrowed their disagreement. Both agreed that the Attorney General speaks for the state when the state is the real party in interest, and the Governor speaks for her office or agencies when they are the real party in interest. Because the parties’ positions converged and the remaining dispute was not of significant public importance or suitable for resolution through quo warranto, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction and dismissed the Governor’s petition. View "Kelly v. Kobach " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a woman in her early sixties, stopped working in August 2015 due to chronic back pain related to degenerative spinal and hip conditions. She had a history of mental health issues, including previous disability benefits for bipolar disorder, but her primary complaint at the time was physical pain. After her pain worsened, she sought both physical and psychological treatment. Her treatment included various forms of physical therapy and pain management, as well as psychotherapy with a clinical psychologist specializing in pain management. This psychologist, after several months, opined that the plaintiff had significant mental limitations affecting her ability to perform complex work tasks. However, other medical experts who evaluated her found only mild mental limitations.The plaintiff applied for Social Security disability benefits in September 2015, alleging disability from August 2015. Her application was denied, after which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin remanded the case for further proceedings. Following a second remand from the Social Security Appeals Council, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the plaintiff was disabled beginning in September 2017, but not before that date. The ALJ determined that her mental impairments prior to September 2017 were non-severe, giving little weight to her treating psychologist’s opinion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the ALJ erred in discounting the treating psychologist’s opinion and in finding the plaintiff’s mental limitations non-severe. The Seventh Circuit held that the ALJ appropriately considered the relevant regulatory factors, offered adequate reasons supported by the record for discounting the opinion, and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the denial of benefits for the period before September 1, 2017. View "Yokosh v Bisignano" on Justia Law

A coal miner worked for more than fifteen years for a mining company in Virginia, performing various tasks that exposed him to coal dust. After his health deteriorated, he filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), which provides compensation to miners disabled by pneumoconiosis caused by coal mine employment. Following his death, his wife continued the benefits claim. The miner’s work history included several periods of layoff, resulting in years of both continuous and partial employment.The District Director initially awarded benefits, finding that the miner’s employment exceeded fifteen years based on Social Security records. However, the employer contested the award, and the claim was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ credited the miner with only 14.14 years of coal mine employment, using a calculation method that required a 365-day employment relationship for each credited year, and therefore denied the statutory presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis. On appeal, the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, holding that both a 365-day employment relationship and 125 working days were required for each year of credit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under the applicable Department of Labor regulation, a miner establishes a year of employment for BLBA purposes by demonstrating at least 125 working days in or around a coal mine within a calendar year or partial periods totaling one year, regardless of a continuous 365-day employment relationship. The court found the regulation unambiguous and rejected the contrary interpretation of the lower tribunals. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s order, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Baldwin v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

An elderly man, Jerome, experienced significant health decline and was moved into a nursing home, prompting his wife, Janet, to petition the Saginaw Probate Court for a protective order under Michigan law. She requested the transfer of all of Jerome’s assets and most of his income to her, citing her increased financial needs and Jerome’s inability to manage his affairs due to physical and mental health issues. Janet’s petition was filed before Jerome’s application for Medicaid was resolved, and the probate court granted the transfer and set a monthly support payment for Janet.The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in part but vacated the probate court’s order, relying on its earlier precedent in In re Estate of Schroeder, which prohibited consideration of Medicaid eligibility before a formal determination. The case was remanded for a new assessment of need and current valuation of assets. On remand, the probate court again ordered the transfer and support, applied retroactively, but the Court of Appeals vacated this order as well, citing reliance on outdated asset information and the same legal standard regarding Medicaid eligibility.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case after Jerome’s death, holding that the appeal was not moot because Medicaid benefits can be awarded retroactively, even to a deceased individual’s estate. The Supreme Court ruled that probate courts may consider the likely availability of Medicaid benefits before a final eligibility determination when assessing the needs of an individual and their dependents under MCL 700.5401(3)(b). The Court expressly overruled the contrary rule announced in In re Estate of Schroeder, reinstated the probate court’s 2022 protective order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In Re Estate Of Sizick" on Justia Law