Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

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Robert Alan Roginsky was previously convicted in 2014 for violating the conditions of lifetime supervision imposed after he pleaded no contest to a charge of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. However, the Nevada Supreme Court later determined that his actions did not violate the statutory conditions, found him actually innocent of the supervision violation, and ordered the district court to vacate that conviction. Subsequently, Roginsky filed a lawsuit seeking compensation for wrongful conviction under Nevada’s statutory scheme, NRS 41.900, while he was in custody awaiting trial on an unrelated murder charge.The Eighth Judicial District Court considered the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Roginsky was not eligible for compensation because he was “currently incarcerated” at the time he filed his claim. The district court agreed, finding that his confinement in county jail awaiting trial on another offense rendered him ineligible under NRS 41.900, and granted summary judgment for the State.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. The court analyzed the statutory language and concluded that the term “incarcerated” in NRS 41.900 refers to confinement in general, not just imprisonment in a prison facility. The court found that the legislative use of different terms—“incarcerated” and “imprisoned”—in different parts of the statute suggested distinct meanings, and the plain meaning of “incarceration” supported this interpretation. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that Roginsky was not eligible to bring a claim for wrongful conviction compensation while he was in custody for another offense, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State. View "IN RE: CONVICTION OF ROGINSKY" on Justia Law

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An art educator working for a school district escorted a group of students between classrooms. During this process, a five-year-old student left the line without permission to retrieve crayons. The educator did not notice the child's absence and continued with the other students. Shortly thereafter, another teacher found the missing student unharmed. The school district cited the educator for violating its supervision policy and terminated her employment after a hearing. She subsequently applied for unemployment benefits.The Arkansas Division of Workforce Services denied her application, finding that she was disqualified for benefits due to misconduct connected with her work, specifically for leaving a child unattended. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed this denial, as did the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services Board of Review, which concluded that her negligence was sufficiently serious to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. The educator appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the Board’s decision. She then petitioned the Supreme Court of Arkansas for review.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the record did not contain substantial evidence that the educator’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514. The court clarified that statutory disqualification for unemployment benefits requires either a violation of behavioral policy with knowledge or willfulness, or intentional poor performance, neither of which was established by the evidence. The court reversed the Board of Review’s decision, remanded for an award of benefits, and vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion. View "MCCUE v. DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES" on Justia Law

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Several Medicaid enrollees in Florida, whose benefits were terminated due to income-based eligibility determinations, challenged the adequacy of the notices they received from the state. These notices, generated by Florida’s Department of Children and Families (DCF), typically stated that Medicaid benefits would end because “household income is too high,” but did not include essential individualized information such as the household size used, the countable income figure, the income threshold applied, or the specific Medicaid eligibility category considered. In some cases, the notices also included contradictory or confusing information about which household members were affected. Many recipients later learned that their coverage had been terminated or restored in error, but the notices did not provide enough detail for them to understand or contest the agency’s decisions.The case was brought as a class action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, focusing on whether the notices met the requirements of due process. After a bench trial, the district court found that the written notices were confusing, lacked sufficient individualized detail to explain the state’s decisions, and failed to enable recipients to understand or meaningfully challenge their benefit terminations. The court also found that other sources of information available to recipients, such as call centers or online resources, did not cure these deficiencies. The district court issued a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, requiring Florida to provide clear and case-specific information in future notices before terminating Medicaid benefits for income ineligibility.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Florida’s notice system, considered as a whole, did not satisfy due process because it was not reasonably calculated to adequately inform recipients of the reasons for benefit termination or enable them to decide whether to contest the action. View "Chianne D. v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administ" on Justia Law

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A nonprofit church-based daycare center in Indianapolis, serving over one hundred children from underserved communities, participated in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) for more than twenty-five years. In 2015 and 2018, the Indiana Department of Education (DOE) found deficiencies in the daycare’s meal patterns and labeling, but allowed corrective action, which the daycare successfully completed. In 2022, after COVID-related delays, the DOE again found several deficiencies, including missing child-nutrition labels that were the responsibility of a third-party vendor. After submitting corrective plans and requests for technical assistance, the DOE temporarily deferred termination but warned that any recurrence would result in immediate termination without further opportunities for correction.A subsequent review in 2023 found recurring deficiencies, primarily due to the vendor’s failure to provide required labels. The DOE proposed termination and disqualification of the daycare and its administrators from CACFP for seven years. The daycare appealed administratively, taking further corrective steps, but the DOE refused to consider these efforts, adhering to a policy of not accepting corrective action after termination proceedings began. An administrative law judge affirmed the DOE’s decision, finding that the recurrence and pattern of deficiencies warranted termination and that the DOE had provided sufficient technical assistance.On judicial review, the Hamilton Superior Court reversed the administrative decision. The trial court found that the DOE’s unwritten policy of refusing further corrective opportunities and technical assistance after proposing termination was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to federal regulations and the CACFP Handbook. The court ordered the DOE to reinstate the daycare’s participation and provide technical assistance.The Indiana Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court, concluding the DOE was not required to offer further corrective opportunities or technical assistance. Upon transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and held that the DOE abused its discretion by not considering additional corrective action or providing sufficient technical assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s reinstatement of the daycare’s CACFP agreement. View "Indiana Department of Education v. Mt. Zions Loving Day Care Ministry" on Justia Law

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A group of plaintiffs filed suit in the Montgomery Circuit Court against the Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce, alleging that their applications for unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic were unreasonably delayed. They also claimed that the Department’s notices regarding the unemployment process were too difficult to understand, violating the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act. Their complaint sought various forms of injunctive relief, primarily to require prompt processing of applications and to mandate that notices be written at a level comprehensible to people with an eighth-grade education.The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had not exhausted the required state administrative remedies under Alabama law. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that federal law under Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida precluded the exhaustion requirement for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed this decision, but only on the narrow ground that, when a state’s exhaustion requirement effectively immunizes state officials from § 1983 claims of administrative delay, such claims cannot be denied for failure to exhaust. The case was remanded for further proceedings.On remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama directed the circuit court to determine if the case was moot, given that the Secretary asserted all plaintiffs had either been paid or received final denials. The circuit court found the case moot. Reviewing this determination, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the plaintiffs had not shown any remaining justiciable controversy, as their delay claims were moot and their arguments for relief on the notice claims were inadequately supported. The court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Johnson v. Reed" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a former web designer with an associate’s degree in computer programming, sought supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits, claiming that depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder rendered him unable to work. He had received both inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment prior to his application. During two administrative hearings, he described significant difficulty with social interaction, compulsive behaviors, and daily functioning, although he managed some tasks independently and engaged in therapy and medication management.After his application was denied, the plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found severe impairments, including depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, autism spectrum disorder, and ADHD, but ultimately concluded that the plaintiff did not meet the criteria for disability under the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. The ALJ determined that the plaintiff retained the mental capacity to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks with accommodations and could work in jobs available in the national economy. The ALJ discounted certain expert opinions that found greater limitations, concluding those were inconsistent with the overall medical evidence and the plaintiff’s activities. The plaintiff then challenged this decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, arguing that the ALJ failed to properly consider his OCD and related limitations. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo, applying a deferential standard to the ALJ’s findings. The appellate court held that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and complied with applicable regulations and precedents. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the treatment of his OCD and the weighing of medical opinions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Lewis v Bisignano" on Justia Law

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A Medi-Cal recipient resided in a nursing care facility from 2010 until her death in 2015. During her enrollment, the Department of Health Care Services paid $261,957.40 in capitation payments to her managed care plan, while the plan paid $106,672.71 to health care providers for services she actually received. The Department sought estate recovery totaling $407,774.41, which included the full amount of capitation payments, Medicare Part B premiums, and accrued interest. Her trustee and beneficiaries challenged the Department’s claim, contending that only payments for health care services actually received should be recovered.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County certified a class of Medi-Cal recipients and estates subject to similar estate recovery claims. After hearings on stipulated issues, the trial court determined that seeking recovery for capitation payments exceeding the actual cost of health care services received violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5 and federal law. The trial court entered judgment for the Department for the portion attributable to services actually received, and issued a declaratory judgment and writ of mandate in favor of the beneficiaries and the class, requiring the Department to reform its estate recovery practices and reprocess certain claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. It held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5 does not permit recovery of capitation payments in excess of the amounts paid for actual health care services received. The court also ruled that the Department’s regulation permitting recovery of excess capitation is void for conflict with the statute. The judgment by the trial court was affirmed. The Department cannot recover excess capitation from estates under section 14009.5. View "Phillip v. Baass" on Justia Law

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The appellant, a recipient of public housing benefits under the Section 8 voucher program administered by the Monroe County Housing Authority, was convicted for theft by deception and false swearing. The conviction was based on her failure to disclose ownership and operation of a business in her housing applications and annual recertification forms. The Housing Authority discovered the omission after a voicemail greeting revealed the existence of her business. Despite providing receipts and sales information once confronted, the appellant did not initially list her business or its income as required. However, at trial, there was no evidence that her business income or assets would have affected her eligibility for benefits or altered the amount she received.After a jury found her guilty of both theft by deception and false swearing, the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas denied her motion for judgment of acquittal on the theft by deception count and sentenced her to probation and restitution. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the conviction, reasoning that her omission prevented the Housing Authority from obtaining information that might have affected her entitlement to benefits and that the Authority paid out housing subsidies on her behalf.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish theft by deception. The Court held that, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922, the Commonwealth must prove that the false statement had pecuniary significance—namely, that the omission of business income actually impacted the appellant’s eligibility or the amount of benefits received. Since the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the appellant would have been ineligible or received reduced benefits had she properly reported her business, the Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and vacated the judgment of sentence, remanding for resentencing on the false swearing conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Gaspard" on Justia Law

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The City of Los Angeles received millions in federal housing grants over a period of years, certifying compliance with federal housing accessibility laws as a condition of those funds. Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that the City had falsely represented its compliance with accessibility requirements. The United States later intervened in the case. Separately, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) investigated the City for noncompliance and, after its own findings, entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) with the City. Under the VCA, the City agreed to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing, but the VCA explicitly excluded the FCA claims at issue in the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over years of discovery and litigation. Eventually, the United States, FHC, and the City agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district court approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and dismissed all claims against the City, with relators entitled to a statutory share of the settlement proceeds. Mei Ling appealed, arguing that the VCA constituted an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, which would entitle her to a share of the VCA’s value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the VCA was not an alternate remedy within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) because it did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement. The VCA addressed the City’s civil rights violations, not the alleged fraud underlying the FCA action, and expressly carved out the FCA claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA settlement. View "LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

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The claimant worked for over a decade as a hospital patient care technician, a physically strenuous job. She developed fibromyalgia, migraines, and degenerative disc disease as early as 2007, but reported that her symptoms worsened significantly in 2016, ultimately leading her to accept a voluntary layoff when she could no longer perform her duties. She applied for Disability Insurance Benefits, asserting that her conditions caused severe limitations, including constant muscle weakness, difficulty with fine motor skills, inability to stand for more than 15 minutes, and restricted lifting capacity. Her application included her own testimony, corroborating statements from family and a coworker, and opinions from treating physicians documenting her impairments.A Social Security Administrative Law Judge concluded that the claimant was not disabled under the Social Security Act. The ALJ found her eligible for benefits and recognized severe impairments but determined she could perform light work available in the national economy. The ALJ discounted the claimant’s testimony and third-party statements due to her prior work history, activities of daily living, treatment history, and objective medical evidence, and gave little weight to her treating physicians’ opinions, deeming them conclusory.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred in evaluating the claimant’s subjective testimony and the lay evidence. The Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ improperly relied on past work history and daily activities, failed to properly address medication effectiveness, and wrongly discounted lay testimony simply for being consistent with the claimant’s statements. However, the court concluded that the ALJ’s rejection of the treating physicians’ opinions was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "COLLARD V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law