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The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision affirming the denial of plaintiff's application for supplemental security income (SSI). The court held that the ALJ erred by not sufficiently explaining the reasoning underlying plaintiff's residual functional capacity evaluation. Furthermore, the ALJ neither identified nor resolved an apparent conflict between the testimony of a vocational expert and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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Darrin, age 81, filed a Request for Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse Restraining Orders, alleging that her next-door neighbor Miller and Miller’s boyfriend harassed and intimidated her by taunting her, threatening her, twice removing a wire boundary fence between the properties, and trespassing onto her property where they destroyed a hedge and defaced and damaged a barrier fence. Miller argued that Darrin had no standing to seek an order against her under the Act because Miller had no care or custody arrangement with Darrin and no control over Darrin’s real or personal property. The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the suit. The plain language of the Elder Abuse Act authorizes a trial court to issue a restraining order against any individual who has engaged in abusive conduct, as defined by statute, toward a person age 65 or older regardless of the relationship between the alleged abuser and victim, Welfare and Institutions Code 15610.07(a)(1). View "Darrin v. Miller" on Justia Law

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Jerilyn Braaten, the personal representative of the Frederick Ardell Krueger Estate, appealed an order holding the Department of Human Services could recover 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of Krueger's home to pay for medical assistance benefits previously received by his deceased spouse. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling the Department is entitled to 100 percent of the net sale proceeds. For purposes of Medicaid recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, the Department's recovery from a deceased recipient's joint tenancy property is limited to the deceased recipient's fractional interest in the property. The matter was reversed and remanded fo the trial court to permit the Department to recover 50 percent of the net sale proceeds. View "Estate of Krueger" on Justia Law

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Murdock, an employee with the Tipton County Board of Education, received an email purporting to be from Dr. Bibb, Director of Tipton County Schools, requesting all 2016 employee W-2s and tax information. Murdock responded with a document containing information from the W-2s of every Board employee, including names, addresses, social security numbers, income information, deductions, exemptions, withholdings, tax payments and taxpayer identifying numbers. Murdock then learned that Bibb had not requested the information. The Tipton County Sheriff notified the U.S. Secret Service and the Internal Revenue Service. The Board notified employees of the information release. Smith, a Board employee, filed suit under 26 U.S.C. 6103 and 7431. Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits “any local agency administering a program listed in [§ 6103](l)(7)(D)” from disclosing “return information.” Smith argues that, because the Board works with the Tennessee State Board of Education to administer the National School Lunch Program, the Board provided a qualifying SNAP benefit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, finding that the Board does not administer a SNAP benefit in providing lunches to students as part of the National School Lunch Program. View "Smith v. Tipton County Board of Education" on Justia Law

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A 2014 statute and 2013 regulation re-defined which abortions qualified as “medically necessary” for the purposes of Medicaid funding. The statute defined medically necessary abortions as those that “must be performed to avoid a threat of serious risk to the life or physical health of a woman from continuation of the woman’s pregnancy” as a result of a number of listed medical conditions; the regulation was similarly restrictive. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest challenged both the statute and regulation as unconstitutional, and the superior court held that both measures violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that these measures imposed a “high-risk, high- hazard” standard on abortion funding unique among Medicaid services, and held that our 2001 decision striking down an earlier abortion funding restriction on equal protection grounds compelled the same result. The State appealed, arguing that the statute and regulation should be interpreted more leniently and therefore do not violate the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection clause. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision: the statute’s and the regulation’s facially different treatment of pregnant women based upon their exercise of reproductive choice required the Court to apply strict scrutiny, and the proposed justifications for the funding restrictions "did not withstand such exacting examination." View "Alaska v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest" on Justia Law

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Ray lives with diabetes, hypertension, obesity, kidney disease, degenerative disc disease, anxiety, and depression. When his conditions worsened, he began working gradually easier jobs, from janitor to forklift operator to bus monitor for children with special needs, until eventually, he gave up his employment entirely. An ALJ denied Ray’s application for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits, finding that Ray was severely impaired by most of his physical conditions, but that the ALJ erroneously evaluated Ray’s symptoms and daily activities, misinterpreted medical evidence, and failed to ask why he skipped some appointments. he could perform his past relevant work as a school bus monitor. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The ALJ erroneously evaluated Ray’s symptoms and daily activities, misinterpreted medical evidence, and failed to ask why he skipped some appointments. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that Ray’s previous job was not a composite job. On remand, the ALJ should revisit her assessment of Ray’s mental impairment View "Ray v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for disability benefits, asserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially alleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications alleging this onset date were denied and deemed administratively final. Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, including degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety, mostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an industrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and an operating engineer. An ALJ denied benefits, finding that Winsted could work with certain limitations. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The ALJ did not adequately explain how the limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional capacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties; the ALJ did not consider Winsted’s difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace. View "Winsted v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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Tramble worked for various Kentucky coal companies from at least May 1963 until June 1985. Tramble’s 1987 claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901–944, indicated that he had stopped working due to a job-related back injury. That claim was denied although the parties stipulated to 17 years of qualifying coal mine employment. The ALJ found that medical evidence established that Tramble suffered from coal workers’ pneumoconiosis but was not totally disabled. After his 2008 death, Tramble’s widow sought survivor’s benefits. Reversing an award by an ALJ, the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board found that the ALJ failed to explain adequately how he calculated the 15.25-years of underground coal mine employment that justified application of the 15-year statutory presumption of entitlement to benefits. On remand, the ALJ again awarded benefits. The Board again reversed. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Further fact-finding is required to ensure that all relevant evidence has been considered. The court rejected Incoal’s argument that, in order to be credited with one year of coal mine employment, a miner must be on the payroll of a mining company for 365 consecutive days and have worked 125 of those days in or around a coal mine . View "Shepherd v. Incoal, Inc." on Justia Law

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On November 20, 2018, the Acting Governor of Idaho issued a proclamation that Proposition 2 had passed, and subsequently the Idaho Code was amended to add section 56-267, a statute to expand Medicaid eligibility in Idaho. Petitioner Brent Regan argued 56-267 violated Idaho’s Constitution by delegating future lawmaking authority regarding Medicaid expansion to the federal government. Regan requested the Idaho Supreme Court declare section 56-267 unconstitutional and issue a writ of mandamus to direct the Secretary of State Lawerence Denney to remove section 56-267 from the Idaho Code. Finding the statute constitutional, the Supreme Court dismissed Regan’s petition and denied his request for a writ of mandamus. View "Regan v. Denney" on Justia Law

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Procopio served aboard the U.S.S. Intrepid in 1964-1967. In July 1966, the Intrepid was deployed in the waters offshore the landmass of the Republic of Vietnam, including its territorial sea. Procopio sought entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus in 2006 and for prostate cancer in 2007 but was denied service connection for both in 2009. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the unambiguous language of the Agent Orange Act, 38 U.S.C. 1116, entitles Procopio to a presumption of service connection for his prostate cancer and diabetes mellitus. The term “in the Republic of Vietnam,” unambiguously includes the territorial sea under all available international law. Congress indicated those who served in the 12 nautical mile territorial sea of the “Republic of Vietnam” are entitled to section 1116’s presumption if they meet the section’s other requirements. View "Procopio v. Wilkie" on Justia Law