Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Appellants, on behalf of their disabled daughter, appealed the district court's finding that the Fort Osage R-1 School District ("school district") offered the daughter a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400, et seq., for the 2006-2007 school year. Appellants sought reimbursement for their costs of placing their daughter at a private facility during the school year. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the school district offered the daughter a FAPE and that the Individualized Education Plan put forward by the school district did not suffer from any procedural error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff received disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., between September 1994 and March 2004. After an investigation, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") notified plaintiff that she was ineligible for disability benefits because her employment income had exceeded SSA limits and determined that she was required to repay more than $60,000 in over paid benefits. At issue was whether the district court properly entered judgment for the SSA and denied plaintiff's waiver of over payment recovery and affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that it lacked authority to consider plaintiff's new argument contesting the amount of the overpayment itself. The court held that plaintiff failed to meet the administrative exhaustion requirement because she did not timely challenge her overpayment. Accordingly, since no final decision was made, the district court lacked jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g) to consider plaintiff's challenge to the overpayment. The court also held that plaintiff was not entitled to a waiver of overpayment recovery because substantial evidence showed that she was not without fault in causing the overpayment and that the ALJ properly found that plaintiff knew or should have known that her work information was material because of her agreement to report such work in her benefit applications. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Claimant appealed the district court's judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance. Appellant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that a certain physician's post-hearing letter did not contain any additional information and was not relied upon in the decision making process, and its receipt did not violate claimant's due process rights; that the ALJ did not err in finding claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform certain kinds of low-stress work; that there was no error in the decision not to order a consultative examination regarding claimant's mental impairments; and that a hypothetical question posed to the Vocation Expert adequately addressed impairments supported by the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment where substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the ALJ's decision.

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) determined that Darline Liddell-Toney was required to participate in a self-sufficiency program in order to receive benefits under the Welfare Reform Act, despite her documented disability. The district court affirmed the DHSSâ determination. Ms. Liddell-Toney appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the DHSS provided sufficient evidence to prove she was not entitled to an exemption from participating in the program. The Supreme Court found that the evidence clearly indicated that Ms. Liddell-Toney was prevented from working for a substantial period due to her disability. The Court held that the district court erred when it affirmed DHSSâs determination that Ms. Liddell-Toney did not qualify for an exemption from participating in the self-sufficiency program. The Court reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jessica Cohon sought funding through New Mexicoâs Medicaid program. She qualified for the âMi Via Waiverâ program, and submitted budget requests which were partly granted, partly denied. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, she filed suit, alleging that the administration of the Mi Via Waiver program discriminated against severely disabled persons like herself. The State moved to dismiss Plaintiffâs complaint, arguing that not only was it the wrong entity being sued, but that Plaintiff had no statutory basis to support her suit. The district court dismissed Plaintiffâs claims based on federal law, but remanded her state-law claims to the administrative agency for further proceedings. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her federal law claims to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found Plaintiffâs federal claims âinsufficient in substance,â and affirmed the judgment of the district court that dismissed her claims.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, alleging that defendants discriminated against them in administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section 8") program in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, 100.204. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, and 100.204 could not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. 1983; in the analysis of plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim under the FHAA; in factual findings regarding the provision of Section 8 services to the class; in rulings on certain discovery issues; and in decertification. The court adopted the district court's findings and conclusions and held that the district court carefully considered and thoroughly discussed these issues. The court also considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit.

Plaintiffs, 54 residents of Ryderwood residential community, filed an action against the Ryderwood Improvement and Service Association ("RISA") alleging that the age restrictions imposed by RISA violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a)-(e), 3605, 3606, 3617, and that RISA had never satisfied the requirements of the Housing for Old Persons Act exemption ("HOPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-76, section 2, 109 Stat. 787. At issue was whether RISA was exempt from the FHA's prohibitions on familial status discrimination under one of the housing for older persons exemptions set out in section 3607(b). The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings holding that a residential community that had continuously operated as a retirement community for persons age 55 or older could qualify for the housing for older persons exemption from the FHA's prohibition on familial status discrimination by establishing that it currently satisfied the exemptions' three statutory and regulatory criteria at the time of the alleged violation, even if the community enforced age restrictions when it first achieved compliance with the exemption's age verification requirement.

Appellees, the parents of a child with moderate-to-severe autism, filed due process proceedings against the Sumter County School District #17 ("District") seeking a determination that the District did not provide a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") to the child as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that the District failed to provide the child with a FAPE and that the program established by the child's parents to educate him at home was appropriate. The court held that that the district court did not err in concluding that the District failed to provide the child with FAPE for the 2005-2006 school year where the district court considered the evidence of the child's small improvements in a few tested areas against the District's conceded failure to provide the hours of therapy required for the child, the evidence that the lead teacher and aides did not understand or use proper techniques, and the evidence that it took one teacher months of working with the child to correct the problems caused by the improper techniques. The court also held that the district court did not err by finding that the District was not capable of providing FAPE to the child where the District's evidence was not compelling enough to establish it's improved capabilities at the time of the due process hearing. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's findings that the home placement was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.