Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

After his employment with the town was terminated, the plaintiff sought benefits under the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act. The town opposed his claim, arguing that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he had constructively resigned “without good cause” by failing to obtain a commercial driver’s license within one year of starting work, a condition of his employment. The department agreed with the town. The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed. He then sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was fired in violation of his rights to due process of law and freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the claim as barred by collateral estoppel. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Illinois statute, 820 ILCS 405/1900(B), denies collateral estoppel effect to rulings in unemployment insurance proceedings. View "Council v. Village of Dolton" on Justia Law

The Hospital filed suit against various federal agencies and officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 4006(b)(1), where Congress has elected to impose the Medicare rate as full compensation for medical services rendered to federal detainees, is unconstitutional as applied. The court concluded that the Hospital voluntarily opted into the Medicare program and is, as a result, required to provide emergency services to federal detainees. Consequently, the Hospital was foreclosed from challenging this compensation scheme as an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court noted that the Hospital's most effective remedy may lie with Congress rather than the courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Baker County Medical Services v. U.S. Attorney General, et al." on Justia Law

Kathy Inwards was injured while employed as an assembler by Bobcat. WSI accepted liability for her claim and awarded Inwards vocational rehabilitation benefits to assist her in returning to work. In early June 2011, WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue benefits ("NOID") stating her disability benefits would end then convert to retraining benefits. She had 30 days to request reconsideration of the decision. WSI issued a formal order requiring Inwards to "enter into training at Hutchinson Community College, Hutchinson, Kansas, in the Business Management & Entrepreneurship AAS program." Inwards requested reconsideration of the vocational rehabilitation plan, but attended two college courses during the summer of 2011 in accordance with the plan. Inwards complained to her physician that she was having increased pain as a result of her course work. Although Inwards registered for fall courses at the college, she withdrew from them. In October 2011, WSI issued a NOID to Inwards stating "[t]here is no medical evidence that supports your professed inability to attend the classes as outlined in the administrative order dated June 27, 2011. You are now considered to be in non-compliance with vocational rehab." Inwards timely requested reconsideration of this NOID, and on January 13, 2012, WSI issued a formal order suspending Inwards' rehabilitation benefits based on her noncompliance with the rehabilitation plan. Inwards timely requested a hearing to challenge WSI's finding of noncompliance and suspension of benefits. The ALJ reversed WSI's January 13, 2012 order suspending benefits for noncompliance with the vocational rehabilitation plan. WSI appealed to district court and Inwards moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because WSI failed to serve the notice of appeal and specification of errors on Inwards and her employer. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding Inwards had no standing to object to defective service on her employer and there was good cause to excuse WSI's mistake about recently mandated court electronic filing requirements. The court reversed the ALJ's decision, concluding the finding of good cause was "not supported by law," and reinstated WSI's January 13, 2012 order of noncompliance. The Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred as a matter of law in ruling Inwards had good cause for failing to comply with a retraining program because WSI's previous order requiring Inwards to participate in the retraining program had been appealed and had not been finally resolved at the time she withdrew from the retraining program. The Court affirmed the district court judgment reversing the ALJ's decision and reinstating WSI's order of noncompliance. View "Inwards v. WSI" on Justia Law

The Attorney General for the State of Louisiana brought an action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies alleging, among other things, violations of the Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity Law (MAPIL). The district court entered a judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of the Attorney General, finding the defendants' alleged misconduct in marketing certain drugs had violated provisions of MAPIL as it read in November 2003, and awarding civil penalties of $257,679,500.00, $70,000,000.00 in attorney fees, and $3,000,200.00 in costs. The court of appeal affirmed the district court's judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Attorney General failed to establish sufficient facts to prove a cause of action against the defendants under MAPIL because no evidence was presented that any defendant made or attempted to make a fraudulent claim for payment against any Louisiana medical assistance program within the scope of MAPIL. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the Attorney General.View "Caldwell v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc." on Justia Law

Four cases challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill (SB) 822, which was passed by the 2013 Legislative Assembly during its regular session, and SB 861, passed during a special session in October 2013. Both bills changed certain statutory provisions of the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) and, in doing so, affected the retirement benefits of some current and former public employees. Central Oregon Irrigation District (the District), an intervenor in these proceedings, filed a motion to disqualify the sitting judges of the Oregon Supreme Court from hearing these cases. The District also filed a separate motion to disqualify the circuit judge appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as a special master for purposes of conducting evidentiary proceedings and preparing recommended findings of fact. Because disqualification would leave petitioners without a tribunal to decide their claims, and in light of the legislature's express grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to decide challenges to the 2013 PERS legislation, the Court concluded that the rule of necessity applied and that the members of Court were not disqualified from deciding these cases because of any interest in the proceeding. Further, the application of the rule of necessity in these circumstances was not a denial of due process. Central Oregon Irrigation District's motions to disqualify the members of the Supreme Court and the Special Master on this matter was denied. View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

After Defendants were charged with Medicaid fraud, the Commonwealth obtained search warrants to obtain and search designated e-mail accounts of Defendants' former billing director. Defendants moved for a protective order, claiming that the attorney-client privilege protected many of the e-mails. A motion judge amended the order to permit the Commonwealth to search the e-mails by using a "taint team," assistant attorneys general not involved in the investigation or prosecution of Defendants. Defendants filed a petition seeking relief from the order. The Supreme Court answered reported questions from the county court by holding (1) the Commonwealth may, by means of an ex parte search warrant, search the post-indictment emails of a criminal defendant; and (2) the "taint team" procedure was permissible under the Massachusetts Constitution. View "Preventive Med. Assocs. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Human Services appealed a district court order reversing and remanding the Department's order decreasing Plaintiff-Appellee Penne Nienow's monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits. The County determined Nienow received income from a prior mineral rights lease and, therefore, the 2011 payment was a recurring lump-sum payment. The County reduced Nienow's SNAP benefits to $16 per month. Nienow filed a request for hearing to the Department, and an evidentiary hearing was held. The County's representative testified Nienow stated that she leased the mineral rights and received income from the lease every five years and that she had leased the rights at least once before. After the hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") concluded the County correctly determined Nienow's income and properly reduced her SNAP benefits. The Department adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Nienow appealed the Department's order to the district court. The district court reversed and remanded, concluding Nienow's payment was a mineral leasing bonus, a nonrecurring lump-sum payment, and should not have been considered as income in determining Nienow's eligibility. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court order and reinstated the Department's final order reducing Nienow's SNAP benefits. View "Nienow v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Claimants appealed a district court judgment that affirmed Job Service of North Dakota's decision to deny them unemployment benefits. Upon review of the administrative record and the plain language of N.D.C.C. 52-06-02(4), the Supreme Court concluded that claimants were only disqualified from unemployment compensation for employee-initiated work stoppages due to labor disputes, not to locked out Claimants as in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case back to Job Service for further proceedings.View "Olson v. Job Service" on Justia Law

Three corporations, each of which owned a nursing home facility, requested a hearing with the Kansas Department on Aging, challenging new reimbursement rates for each facility, arguing that because the facilities underwent a change of ownership, the rates should be recalculated. The hearing officer rejected the corporations' arguments, finding that, by operation of law for Medicaid reimbursement purposes, there was no change of ownership. The Kansas Health Policy Authority upheld the ruling, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency orders were valid, did not violate equal protection or due process, and were not vague. View "Village Villa v. Kan. Health Policy Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Mattison, gave birth to twins who were conceived by artificial insemination after their father, Jeffery Mattison, had died. She sought social security survivors' benefits for the children based on Jeffery's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied her application, and an administrative law judge affirmed that decision. Plaintiff then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan challenging the decision. That court has asked the Michigan Supreme Court to rule on whether the children could inherit from Jeffery under Michigan intestacy law. Having heard oral argument, the Supreme Court granted the district court's request to answer the question and held that under Michigan intestacy law, plaintiff's children could not inherit from Jeffery. The matter was returned to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Mattison v. Social Security Comm." on Justia Law