Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathryn Johns appealed the district court’s denial of her motion for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) which followed the court's remand to the Commissioner of her claims for Social Security disability benefits. In denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that her diagnosed mental impairments were not severe apart from alcohol abuse. Plaintiff argued before the district court that the ALJ had failed to apply the correct analysis in assessing her alcoholism. Specifically, the ALJ did not first find that she was disabled, and only then could the ALJ determine whether she would still be disabled if she stopped using alcohol. The government admitted that the ALJ did not follow the specified procedure, but argued that the error was harmless because the dispositive question was the same. Ultimately the district court remanded the case back to the Commissioner. Plaintiff then moved for fees under the EAJA. The government responded by arguing that a fee award was inappropriate because it believed the error by the ALJ was harmless. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion for fees. Finding that the district court believed that application of harmless error in this case was a close call, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under those circumstances, the district court did not "cross the bounds of the rationally available choices available to it when it concluded that the Commissioner's position was substantially justified." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the denial of fees. View "Johns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

This case involved A.S., a California minor, who was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding A.S.'s educational placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court held as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding A.S.'s education at an out-of-state residential treatment facility was the school district in which the student's parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resided. The court held that A.S. had no parent under the 2005 version of section 56028 and thus, from July 28, 2006, when A.S. was placed at the out-of-state facility, until October 9, 2007, when an amended version of section 56028 took effect, California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for A.S.'s education. The California Department of Education (CDE) was therefore responsible by default. The court held that A.S. did have a parent under the 2007 and 2009 versions of section 56028. CDE therefore was not responsible for A.S.'s out-of-state education after October 10, 2007, when the 2007 version of section 56028 took effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. View "Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. CA Dept. of Educ., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a minor who had been diagnosed with autism, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) hearing officer's decision that plaintiff's free and appropriate public education placement complied with the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiff also claimed that his tuition reimbursement request for the 2007-2008 school year was timely, and that Loveland Academy was his "stay put" placement. The court held that Loveland Acadamy was not plaintiff's stay put placement because the DOE only agreed to pay tuition for the limited 2006-2007 school year and never affirmatively agreed to place plaintiff at Loveland Academy. The court also concluded that plaintiff's tuition reimbursement claim for the 2007-2008 school year was time-barred and that the district court did not err in finding that the 2007 and 2008 individualized education programs complied with IDEA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "K. D. v. Dept of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Dana Franklin appealed a district court's order that affirmed the Commissioner's decision to deny her application for Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff alleged disability based on degenerative disc disease, hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, anxiety and depression. The agency denied her applications initially and on reconsideration. Applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework, and and considering the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised two issues: (1) the ALJ erred by by failing to evaluate properly the opinions of her treating physician; and (2) the ALJ’s analysis of her credibility was contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence. Upon review, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate reversible legal error or lack of substantial evidence in the ALJ's treating-physician analysis. Furthermore, the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff's credibility was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Franklin v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Washington Medicaid beneficiaries with severe mental and physical disabilities, appealed the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a regulation promulgated by Washington's DSHS that reduced the amount of in-home "personal care services" available under the state's Medicaid plan. The court concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury because they have shown that reduced access to personal care services would place them at serious risk of institutionalization. The court further concluded that plaintiffs have raised serious questions going to the merits of their Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), claims, that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor, and that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. Accordingly, the court remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction. View "M. R., et al. v. Dreyfus, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant denied plaintiff's application for Medicaid benefits on the grounds that she had transferred property in 2005-2006 valued at $340,000. The district court subsequently dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants based on the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the district court should not have abstained from hearing her claim. Because, under Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, abstention was appropriate in administrative proceedings like plaintiff's, the court held that the district court did not err in abstaining. View "Hudson v. Campbell, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits and an ALJ denied the claim, noting that plaintiff failed to provide an opinion from his treating physician. When plaintiff requested review of his claim by the Appeals Council, he submitted a letter from his treating physician detailing the injuries and recommending significant restrictions on plaintiff's activity. The Appeals Council made this letter part of the record but denied plaintiff's request for review. Thus, the ALJ's decision denying benefits became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the Appeals Council erred by failing to articulate specific findings justifying its denial of his request for review. The court rejected the argument and held that the Appeals Council need not explain its reasoning when denying review of an ALJ decision. But because in this case the court could not determine if substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits, the court reversed and remanded. View "Meyer, III v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants, employees of the State of Washington's State Operated Living Alternative (SOLA) program, on behalf of herself and her daughter's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants deprived her daughter of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe physical conditions while in involuntary state custody. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that defendants had no constitutionally required duty of care towards plaintiff's daughter because there was no special relationship between her daughter and the state and there was no state-created danger. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Campbell v. WA Dept. of Social and Health Services, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the individualized education program (IEP) of C.C., a child with a disability. At issue was whether a school district, after being declared in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1490, in respect to a disabled child's entitlements, by an administrative hearing officer, could bring a civil action in court for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party against the child's parents on the grounds that their IDEA administrative complaint was brought for an "improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," although the parents had voluntarily dismissed their administrative complaint without prejudice. The court held that, under the plain meaning of the IDEA and its implementing regulations, the administrative proceeding through which the school district sought a declaratory ruling was a proceeding under section 1415. The court also held that the declaratory ruling favorably altered the school district's legal relationship with the parents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's legal relationship dismissing the school district's civil action and remanded the case for determination of whether the parents' administrative complaint "was delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and if so, whether the district court should, within its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the school district.

Two administrative hearing panels (Panels) concluded that the school district failed to provide plaintiffs' twin sons with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in 2005, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., but did provide one in 2006. The district court upheld these decisions and later awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and the school district cross appealed. The court held that the school district offered the twins a FAPE in 2005 and therefore, reversed the award of a reduced attorney's fee. The court affirmed, however, the district court's ruling that plaintiffs waived or abandoned their appeal of the Panels' 2006 FAPE decision.