Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Montreal Morgan participated in a home invasion robbery that resulted in the death of Fabian Alvarez. Following the incident, the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) paid $10,480 in benefits under Washington’s Crime Victims Compensation Act (CVCA) for Alvarez’s medical and funeral expenses. Morgan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder in the second degree and unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. At his restitution hearing, Morgan requested a reduction in the restitution amount due to mitigating factors, but the trial court believed it lacked discretion under RCW 9.94A.753(7) and ordered the full amount of restitution requested by the State.The trial court’s decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which agreed that RCW 9.94A.753(7) does not afford trial courts discretion to impose less restitution than the amount of CVCA benefits paid. Morgan then petitioned for review, which was granted by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that RCW 9.94A.753(7) does not allow a trial court discretion to modify the amount of restitution owed to L&I for CVCA benefits. The court emphasized that the statutory language is unambiguous and requires the court to order restitution in the amount of benefits paid by L&I. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld Morgan’s restitution order, concluding that the trial court correctly interpreted the statute as mandating full restitution for CVCA benefits without discretion for reduction based on mitigating factors. View "State v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Four elderly sisters were accused of defrauding the United States by falsely claiming benefits under two federal programs. Each sister pled guilty to one count of conspiracy, preserving the right to appeal two pretrial rulings: the denial of a motion to suppress evidence and the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for untimeliness.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied the motion to suppress, ruling that the sisters lacked standing to challenge the search of a property because they had no possessory interest in it. The court also found that even if the search was unconstitutional, the affidavits supporting the search warrants still provided probable cause. The motion to dismiss the indictment was denied because the court held that the statute of limitations for mail fraud begins on the date of mailing, not the date of the last overt act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, agreeing that the affidavits were sufficient to support the search warrants even without the contested information. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, stating that the aiding and abetting mail fraud charges were filed within the five-year limitations period. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motions, as the alleged disputes of fact were immaterial to the legal conclusions.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, upholding the convictions and sentences of the four sisters. View "United States v. Charles" on Justia Law

Brandon Phillips, who had several Missouri marijuana-possession convictions, pleaded guilty to a federal felon-in-possession charge. Despite Missouri legalizing marijuana and planning to expunge certain convictions, the district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison and imposed a lifetime ban on federal benefits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri overruled Phillips's objection that his criminal history was overstated due to Missouri's legalization of marijuana. The court stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the marijuana convictions. Phillips's marijuana convictions were still on record at the time of sentencing, although they were later expunged. Phillips argued that the expungement should require resentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Phillips did not preserve the expungement issue for appellate review, as he did not clearly state the grounds for his objection in the district court. The court also determined that even if the issue had been preserved, the district court would have imposed the same sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, considering Phillips's reoffending on parole and possession of a large quantity of fentanyl.However, the Eighth Circuit vacated the federal-benefits ban, finding it was a plain error to apply it to Phillips, as the ban only applies to drug distributors, not gun possessors. The court held that the district court's application of the ban was clearly incorrect and affected Phillips's substantial rights. The court affirmed the 120-month prison sentence but vacated the federal-benefits ban. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Johnathan Bertsch was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide and two counts of attempted deliberate homicide after shooting at a vehicle, killing one person and injuring two others, and subsequently shooting a highway patrol officer. He pleaded guilty to one count of deliberate homicide and three counts of attempted deliberate homicide. The State requested $34,728.14 in restitution based on payments made to the victims by Montana’s Crime Victim Compensation Program. Bertsch, who relied on Social Security payments and had not maintained employment, objected to the restitution due to his indigent status.The Fourth Judicial District Court sentenced Bertsch to four consecutive life terms without parole and imposed the requested restitution amount plus a 10% administrative fee. The court reasoned that any funds Bertsch earned through prison work should go towards restitution. Bertsch appealed the restitution order, arguing that it should be waived as unjust given his financial inability to pay.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the restitution statutes require courts to determine restitution amounts without considering an offender’s ability to pay. Bertsch did not adequately request a waiver or present sufficient evidence to show that restitution was unjust under § 46-18-246, MCA. The court found that a general objection based on indigence did not meet the burden of proof required to waive restitution. The court affirmed the District Court’s order, noting that Bertsch could petition for a waiver or adjustment of restitution if his circumstances changed. View "State v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

A former railroad employee, Demetris Hill, was convicted of theft of government property and making a false claim to the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Hill had been receiving monthly disability benefits from the RRB since 2012, based on his claim that he was unable to perform substantial gainful activity. As a condition of receiving these benefits, Hill was required to report any changes in his employment status, including any ownership in a family business. Despite this, Hill helped his ex-wife start a janitorial business, SparClean Premier Cleaning Solutions, and failed to report his involvement to the RRB.Hill was initially charged in a 60-count indictment for theft of government money or property. A superseding indictment later charged him with one count of theft of government property, one count of making false claims to the government, and one count of wire fraud. After a jury trial, Hill was found guilty of theft of government property and making false claims but was acquitted of wire fraud. The district court denied Hill’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 33 months for each conviction, to be served concurrently, followed by supervised release. Hill appealed his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed Hill’s appeal. The court found sufficient evidence that Hill was not entitled to the disability payments because he engaged in substantial gainful activity and failed to report his involvement with SparClean. The court also found that Hill knowingly deprived the government of its property by continuing to receive the payments without reporting his employment status. Additionally, the court held that receiving direct deposits while failing to disclose his employment constituted making a false claim to the government. Hill’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the jury instruction, and the constitutionality of the False Claims Act were rejected. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Hill’s convictions. View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Christina Barrera, the office manager at PowerMed, was involved in a scheme to help unqualified individuals, mainly employees of AB InBev, fraudulently obtain disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and private insurers. Patients paid PowerMed $21,600 for a "disability package" that included unnecessary medical tests and assistance in fraudulently applying for disability benefits. Barrera explained the scheme to patients, helped them complete paperwork, and coached them on how to appear disabled. An undercover officer's investigation led to Barrera's indictment and subsequent trial, where a jury found her guilty of conspiracy to defraud the SSA but acquitted her of health care fraud and theft of government funds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri sentenced Barrera, ordering her to pay restitution to the SSA and private insurers. The presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended $339,407.80 in restitution to the SSA, but the Government argued for additional restitution to private insurers, totaling $203,907.62. The district court adopted the Government's figures, ordering Barrera to pay a total of $543,315.42 in restitution. After Barrera's sentencing, her co-conspirator Clarissa Pogue was sentenced but was not required to pay restitution to private insurers, leading Barrera to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Barrera's criminal conduct included defrauding private insurers as part of the scheme to defraud the SSA, affirming the district court's decision to order restitution to private insurers. However, the court found errors in the calculation of restitution amounts for Prudential and MetLife, vacating those portions and remanding for further proceedings. The court rejected Barrera's argument regarding sentencing disparities with Pogue, emphasizing that the statutory direction to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities refers to national disparities, not differences among co-conspirators. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Barrera" on Justia Law

Scott Carlberg was convicted by a jury of four counts of wire fraud for fraudulently obtaining disability benefits from the United States Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Carlberg, who had suffered a traumatic brain injury while working at Soo Line Railroad, applied for occupational disability benefits in 2013 and later for enhanced benefits in 2015. The RRB requires applicants to disclose any non-railroad work and earnings, which Carlberg failed to do accurately. Despite purchasing and operating a tanning salon, Carlberg misrepresented his work activities to the RRB, leading to his prosecution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carlberg’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, which argued that the evidence did not show he intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud or made material misrepresentations. The court found sufficient evidence that Carlberg had concealed his ownership and involvement in the salon, and that his misrepresentations were material to the RRB’s decision to grant him benefits. Carlberg was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $279,655.22 in restitution, representing the full value of the benefits he received.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Carlberg’s appeal, which challenged both the denial of his motion for acquittal and the restitution award. The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, as it showed Carlberg engaged in significant physical and mental duties at the salon, which would have disqualified him from receiving benefits. The court also upheld the restitution award, agreeing that the government had proven the full amount of benefits Carlberg received was ill-gotten. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "United States v. Carlberg" on Justia Law

In 1993, Kastman was charged with misdemeanor offenses based on acts of public indecency involving children and disorderly conduct. The state’s attorney initiated a civil commitment proceeding against Kastman under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01). Evidence indicated that Kastman suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, exhibitionism, and alcohol dependency. Kastman was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and the circuit court granted the petition. In 2016, Kastman was granted conditional release from institutional care.In 2020, he sought financial assistance. Kastman asserted that he was unemployed, disabled, and could not afford his $300 monthly treatment costs and the $1800 monthly rent for housing that complied with the Sex Offender Registration Act. The circuit court of Lake County ordered the Department of Corrections to pay a portion of Kastman’s monthly expenses. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statutes indicate that a sex offender’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding who should bear the expense of treatment costs; without a clear statutory directive, the legislature is not presumed to have intended that only financially stable individuals are eligible for conditional release. Financial instability and the need for supervision to protect the public are not the same things. View "People v. Kastman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's postconviction petition in which she argued that her restitution order should be reduced, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Appellant was convicted of medical assistance fraud for submitting fraudulent Medicaid claims to the Minnesota Department of Human Services through a company she owned and operated. The district court convicted Appellant of racketeering and ordered her to pay a $2.64 million restitution award. In her postconviction motion Appellant argued that her restitution award should be reduced because DHS's economic loss had to account for the economic benefit it received from her offense. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Minn. Stat. 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) requires a district court to consider the value of any economic benefits a defendant conferred on a victim when calculating a restitution award; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it calculated DHS's economic loss. View "State v. Currin" on Justia Law

Brooke Rojas was convicted of two counts of theft based on her improper receipt of food stamp benefits. Rojas initially applied for food stamp benefits from the Department of Human Services in August 2012 when she had no income. She received a recertification letter in December, which she submitted in mid-January 2013, indicating that she still had no income. And although she had not yet received a paycheck when she submitted the recertification letter, Rojas had started a new job on January 1. Rojas continued receiving food stamp benefits every month until July, when she inadvertently allowed them to lapse. She reapplied in August 2013. Although still working, Rojas reported that she had no income. The Department checked Rojas’s employment status in connection with the August application and learned that she was making about $55,000 a year (to support a family of seven). The Department determined that Rojas had received $5,632 in benefits to which she was not legally entitled. At trial, Rojas’s defense was that she lacked the requisite culpable mental state—she didn’t knowingly deceive the government; she just misunderstood the forms. Before trial, Rojas objected to the prosecution’s proposed admission of the August 2013 application because it exceeded the time period of the charged offenses and didn’t lead to the receipt of any benefits. The prosecution countered that the application was admissible as res gestae evidence—to show how the investigation began—and as evidence of specific intent. The court found it relevant as circumstantial evidence of Rojas’s mental state. In its opinion issued upon Rojas' appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded it was "time for us to bury res gestae. ... By continuing to rely on res gestae as a standalone basis for admissibility and allowing the vagueness of res gestae to persist next to these more analytically demanding rules of relevancy, we have created a breeding ground for confusion, inconsistency, and unfairness." The Court's decision to abolish the res gestate doctrine in criminal cases prompted it to reverse judgment and remand for a new trial. View "Rojas v. Colorado" on Justia Law