Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In 1993, Kastman was charged with misdemeanor offenses based on acts of public indecency involving children and disorderly conduct. The state’s attorney initiated a civil commitment proceeding against Kastman under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01). Evidence indicated that Kastman suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, exhibitionism, and alcohol dependency. Kastman was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and the circuit court granted the petition. In 2016, Kastman was granted conditional release from institutional care.In 2020, he sought financial assistance. Kastman asserted that he was unemployed, disabled, and could not afford his $300 monthly treatment costs and the $1800 monthly rent for housing that complied with the Sex Offender Registration Act. The circuit court of Lake County ordered the Department of Corrections to pay a portion of Kastman’s monthly expenses. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statutes indicate that a sex offender’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding who should bear the expense of treatment costs; without a clear statutory directive, the legislature is not presumed to have intended that only financially stable individuals are eligible for conditional release. Financial instability and the need for supervision to protect the public are not the same things. View "People v. Kastman" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's postconviction petition in which she argued that her restitution order should be reduced, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Appellant was convicted of medical assistance fraud for submitting fraudulent Medicaid claims to the Minnesota Department of Human Services through a company she owned and operated. The district court convicted Appellant of racketeering and ordered her to pay a $2.64 million restitution award. In her postconviction motion Appellant argued that her restitution award should be reduced because DHS's economic loss had to account for the economic benefit it received from her offense. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Minn. Stat. 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) requires a district court to consider the value of any economic benefits a defendant conferred on a victim when calculating a restitution award; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it calculated DHS's economic loss. View "State v. Currin" on Justia Law

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Brooke Rojas was convicted of two counts of theft based on her improper receipt of food stamp benefits. Rojas initially applied for food stamp benefits from the Department of Human Services in August 2012 when she had no income. She received a recertification letter in December, which she submitted in mid-January 2013, indicating that she still had no income. And although she had not yet received a paycheck when she submitted the recertification letter, Rojas had started a new job on January 1. Rojas continued receiving food stamp benefits every month until July, when she inadvertently allowed them to lapse. She reapplied in August 2013. Although still working, Rojas reported that she had no income. The Department checked Rojas’s employment status in connection with the August application and learned that she was making about $55,000 a year (to support a family of seven). The Department determined that Rojas had received $5,632 in benefits to which she was not legally entitled. At trial, Rojas’s defense was that she lacked the requisite culpable mental state—she didn’t knowingly deceive the government; she just misunderstood the forms. Before trial, Rojas objected to the prosecution’s proposed admission of the August 2013 application because it exceeded the time period of the charged offenses and didn’t lead to the receipt of any benefits. The prosecution countered that the application was admissible as res gestae evidence—to show how the investigation began—and as evidence of specific intent. The court found it relevant as circumstantial evidence of Rojas’s mental state. In its opinion issued upon Rojas' appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded it was "time for us to bury res gestae. ... By continuing to rely on res gestae as a standalone basis for admissibility and allowing the vagueness of res gestae to persist next to these more analytically demanding rules of relevancy, we have created a breeding ground for confusion, inconsistency, and unfairness." The Court's decision to abolish the res gestate doctrine in criminal cases prompted it to reverse judgment and remand for a new trial. View "Rojas v. Colorado" on Justia Law

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Alma Vidauri was convicted of one count of theft and three counts of forgery in connection with filings she made with the Garfield County, Colorado Department of Human Services (“Department”) between 2009 and 2016 for medical assistance benefits. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had not shown the difference in value between the total amount of certain public benefits Vidauri received and the amount for which she might have been eligible had she accurately reported her household income. Therefore, the division reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the lowest level of theft, a class 1 petty offense. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the division, finding the applicable theft statute placed no burden on the prosecution to establish that Vidauri would have been ineligible for any of the benefits she received. "Because an applicant is not entitled to, and so has no legally cognizable interest in, any benefits until she has submitted accurate information demonstrating as much, we conclude that all the benefits Vidauri received by submitting false information were obtained by deception. Therefore, the original judgment of conviction for a class 4 felony must be reinstated." View "Colorado v. Vidauri" on Justia Law

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After defendant was convicted of wire and securities fraud, he was ordered to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The government sought to enforce the restitution order pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), and thus applied for a post-judgment writ of garnishment against a bank account that held the Social Security benefits of defendant's wife (the claimant), on the theory that those funds were subject to garnishment pursuant to community property principles of Idaho state law. The district court denied claimant's objections and concluded that the MVRA's enforcement provision, 18 U.S.C. 3613(a), overrides the protections afforded Social Security benefits under the Social Security Act (SSA) so the benefits were garnishable community property.The Ninth Circuit held that it has jurisdiction, following the district court's entry of an order directing the disposition of the funds at issue pursuant to the writ of garnishment. The panel reversed the district court's disposition order and held that claimant's Social Security benefits are not subject to garnishment pursuant to the MVRA in connection with her husband's criminal restitution order. The panel explained that the government was entitled to collect on property only to the same extent defendant had a right to it. In this case, defendant would have no right to his wife's Social Security benefits because the SSA preempts application of Idaho state law community property principles. Accordingly, the panel reversed the order denying claimant's objections, vacated the disposition order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swenson" on Justia Law

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Petitioner John Halaseh petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to review a court of appeals' remand order to his underlying appeal, which directed the district court to enter four convictions for class 4 felony theft in place of the single conviction of class 3 felony theft that was reflected in the charge and jury verdict. The appellate court reversed the class 3 felony on grounds that when the statutory authorization for aggregating separate acts of theft was properly applied, there was insufficient evidence to support a single conviction for theft of $20,000 or more. It also found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate convictions for aggregated thefts with values qualifying as class 4 felonies, and that substituting these four class 4 felony convictions for the vacated class 3 felony conviction was necessary to fulfill what it understood to be its obligation to maximize the effect of the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court disapproved of the appellate court's judgment, finding no theft offense required the aggregation of two or more separate instances of theft, whether that aggregation were to be based on commission within a period of six months or on commission as a single course of conduct, was a lesser included offense of the class 3 felony of which Halaseh was actually charged and convicted. Further, no such offense was implicitly found by the jury, and therefore none could be entered in lieu of the reversed conviction without depriving the defendant of his right to a jury trial. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Halaseh v. Colorado" on Justia Law

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After a bench trial, Xun Wang was convicted of two counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of unauthorized practice of a health profession. Defendant earned a medical degree in her native China, and earned a Ph.D. in basic medical science in the United States. Notwithstanding her education in the United States and abroad, defendant was never licensed to practice in a health profession in the United States. The Michigan Department of the Attorney General’s Health Care Fraud Division discovered that a high volume of narcotics prescriptions were being written at the clinic for which she worked part time. In 2014, the department conducted an investigation, during which Drew Macon and Lorrie Bates, special agents with the department, separately went to the clinic while posing as patients with Medicaid benefits. Defendant saw both agents when they posed as patients, identified herself as clinic-owner Dr. Murtaza Hussain’s assistant, and took written notes of their medical histories. Defendant also performed physical examinations, answered their questions, and wrote prescriptions for both agents on a prescription pad that Hussain had previously signed, including a prescription for Ambien, a Schedule 4 controlled substance. The patients’ notes were entered into the clinic’s computer system and were electronically signed by Hussain; the notes indicated that both defendant and Hussain had seen the agents. The Medicaid processing system reflected that claims were submitted for both agents’ treatment and were paid to Hussain for a total of $260. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent terms of 365 days in jail for each conviction, which was suspended upon the successful completion of five years’ probation and the payment of $106,454 in fines and costs. The Michigan Supreme Court found after review that while the lower courts did nor err in determining there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant on unauthorized practice of a health profession, the evidence did not establish she was aware or should have been aware that the patients at issue were Medicaid beneficiaries and their treatment was substantially certain to cause the payment of a Medicaid benefit under the applicable statute. Therefore, defendant's convictions of Medicaid fraud were reversed. The matter was remanded back to the trial court for reconsideration of the fines assessed. View "Michigan v. Wang" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Dr. Chalhoub of defrauding health care benefit programs under 18 U.S.C. 1347. A Kentucky cardiologist, Chalhoub implanted permanent pacemakers in patients who did not need the devices or the tests that he ordered before and after surgery. On appeal, Chalhoub claimed that the district court repeatedly admitted evidence unduly prejudicial to him—and to which he could not effectively respond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that “some of the government’s tactics here leave something to be desired.” Noting Chaloub’s failure to cross-examine, the court rejected a due process challenge to the admission of testimony by a doctor who claimed to have examined 20 of former Chaloub’s patients but could not name those patients. Chalhoub was not denied a right to be heard and the government did not base its case solely on allegations about those 20 victims. Chalhoub argued that he was severely prejudiced by testimony that he misbilled insurers for other unspecified procedures, but he did not seek clarification or additional information at trial. The court upheld the admission of testimony about Chaloub’s income and expenditures and testimony about his installation of a pacemaker in a former patient. View "United States v. Chalhoub" on Justia Law

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Brooke Rojas received food stamp benefits to which she was not legally entitled. Colorado charged her with two counts of theft under the general theft statute, section 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019). Rojas moved to dismiss these charges, arguing that she could only be prosecuted under section 26-2-305(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), because it created the specific crime of theft of food stamps. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Rojas of the two general theft counts. Rojas contended on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss because section 26-2-305(1)(a) abrogated the general theft statute in food stamp benefit cases. A split division of the court of appeals agreed with her. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with Rojas and the division majority. Based on the statute’s plain language, the Court held that the legislature didn’t create a crime separate from general theft by enacting section 26-2-305(1)(a). View "Colorado v. Rojas" on Justia Law

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Defendant Leola Allen plead guilty to committing felony welfare fraud in 1993, 1997, and 2000 (and to committing felony perjury in 2000). At sentencing in each case, the trial court ordered Allen to pay direct victim restitution and various fines and fees. In 2018, Allen petitioned pursuant to Penal Code sections 1203.4 and 1203.42 seeking discretionary "expungement" of her convictions on the basis she had been rehabilitated. She also sought to stay, dismiss, or delete her court-ordered fines and fees because she asserted she was unable to pay them. The prosecution opposed the expungement requests because Allen still owed about $9,000 in direct victim restitution; the prosecution did not oppose the request for relief from the fines and fees. The trial court denied Allen's petitions based on her outstanding victim restitution obligations, but did not directly address her request for relief from the fines and fees. On appeal, Allen argued that under the recent decision in California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019), the trial court's denial of her expungement petitions violated her due process or equal protection rights because she was financially unable to pay the victim restitution. Alternatively, Allen contended the trial court erred in its conclusion her outstanding restitution obligations deprived the court of the authority to grant discretionary expungement. The Court of Appeal found Duenas was materially distinguishable: it involved revenue-generating assessments and a punitive restitution fine, whereas this case involves voter-mandated direct victim restitution intended to make the victim whole. Furthermore, the Court agreed with the analysis of numerous courts that rejected Duenas's due process framework. On remand, however, the Court directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings: (1) because the trial court did not directly address Allen's request for relief from the court-ordered fines and fees (other than victim restitution); and (2) because the record was unclear regarding whether Allen paid all the victim restitution owed in connection with her convictions in 2000. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Allen" on Justia Law