Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Minn. Stat. 125A.06(d), by its plain language, does not impose a heightened standard that burdens school districts with an absolute obligation to guarantee that each blind student will use the Braille instruction provided to attain a specific level of proficiency. I.Z.M. filed suit against the District, alleging claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and non-IDEA claims for relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the District's motions for judgment on the administrative record on the IDEA claim and for summary judgment on the non-IDEA claims. In this case, the ALJ cited the state regulation and expressly concluded that the District took all reasonable steps to provide instructional materials in accessible formats in a timely manner. In regard to the non-IDEA claims, the district court used the correct standard and correctly concluded that I.Z.M. failed to present evidence of bad faith or gross misjudgment View "I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools" on Justia Law

M.N. filed a due process complaint alleging that the District committed procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ denied all claims and the district court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion reversing the district court's judgment, holding that neither the duration of the hearing, the ALJ's active involvement, nor the length of the ALJ's opinion can ensure that the ALJ was thorough and careful in its findings of fact; plaintiffs' claim that the District committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing to adequately document its offer of the visually impaired (TVI) services was not waived; the District committed two procedural violations as to the individualized education plan (IEP); the District's failure to specify the assistive technology (AT) devices that were provided infringed M.N.'s opportunity to participate in the IEP process and denied the student a free appropriate education (FAPE); the panel remanded for a determination of the prejudice the student suffered as a result of the District's failure to respond to the complaint and the award of appropriate compensation; in regard to substantive violations, the panel remanded so the district court could consider plaintiffs' claims in light of new guidance from the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); and M.N., as the prevailing party, was entitled to attorneys' fees. View "M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District" on Justia Law

L.J.’s mother filed suit in federal district court to require the school district to provide L.J. with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) to provide specialized services to assist with what she contends are serious disabilities. The district court reviewed the record and found that L.J. was disabled under three categories defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that an IEP for specialized services was not necessary because of L.J.’s satisfactory performance in general education classes. The court concluded that L.J. clearly exhibited behavioral and academic difficulty during the snapshot period where he threatened and attempted to kill himself on three occasions in 2012; in the fall, he frequently acted out at school, and continued to have needs associated with his medication regimen; and the district court should not have discounted these facts. The court concluded that they demonstrate that L.J. required special education services. Because L.J. is eligible for special education, the school district must formulate an IEP. The court also concluded that the school district clearly violated important procedural safeguards set forth in the IDEA. In this case, the school district failed to disclose assessments, treatment plans, and progress notes, which deprived L.J.’s mother of her right to informed consent. The school district also failed to conduct a health assessment, which rendered the school district and IEP team unable to evaluate and address L.J.’s medication and treatment related needs. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "L. J. V. Pittsburg U.S.D." on Justia Law

Student and Guardian seek reimbursement from the district for the cost of Student's private education, claiming that the district failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1491o (IDEA), and thus failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) for Student. The district court affirmed the ALJ's denial of reimbursement. In regard to the June 2009 individualized education program (IEP), the court agreed with the lower courts that any procedural failure on the part of the district was caused by Guardian, and that, in any event, the Jordon Intermediate School placement was a FAPE. In regard to the June 2011 IEP, the court concluded that the IDEA does not require the school district to conduct all assessments possible. In this case, the district court did not violate the IDEA by failing to assess Student for anxiety and failing to determine the baseline for Student's speech and language goals. Finally, the Buena Park placement offer was a FAPE in the LRE for Student. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baquerizo v. Garden Grove USD" on Justia Law

In 2010-2011, the San Francisco Unified School District employed 11 substitute teachers who worked on an as-needed basis and 15 paraprofessional classified employees. Each of the 26 employees received a letter during the spring of the 2010-2011 school year advising that they had a reasonable assurance of employment for the following 2011-2012 school year. The 26 sought unemployment benefits for the period between the last date of the regular session of the 2010-2011 school year, May 27, 2011, and the first day of instruction for the 2011-2012 school year, August 15, 2011. The Employment Development Department denied benefits. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reversed. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the District: “in effect what the claimants ... are requesting is … a full year‘s income … they have agreed to work and be paid for only 41 weeks of each year. … school employees can plan for those periods of unemployment and thus are not experiencing the suffering from unanticipated layoffs that the employment-security law was intended to alleviate.” View "United Educators of San Francisco. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner has been employed by the Raleigh County Board of Education as a physical therapist since 1987. Her initial “Teacher’s Probationary Contract of Employment” provided that she would be paid an annual salary “for an annual employment term of 120 days.” In 1989, petitioner executed a “Continuing Contract of Employment,” which likewise provided that she was to be employed “for an employment term of 120 days.” She requested enrollment in the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS). Contributions on petitioner’s behalf were made to TRS continuously from 1987 through 1991, when she enrolled in the newly-created Teachers’ Defined Contribution System and froze her TRS contributions. In 1999, she transferred her TRS funds and service credit into TDC. In 2008, petitioner transferred back to the TRS. The Board ascertained that petitioner was ineligible to participate in either plan because she was only working 120 days a year and indicated that the money contributed would be returned to her and her employer. Petitioner testified that she believed that those working less than 200 days were not ineligible, but would merely receive fractional service credit for the year. The hearing examiner determined that West Virginia Code 18-7A-3 requires a 200-day contract before one may participate in TRS, but that there was no such 200-day requirement to participate in TDC. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was “sympathetic," but could not confer statutory eligibility where none exists. View "Ringel-Williams v. W.V. Consol. Pub. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

Paso Robles was responsible for providing Luke, a child with autism, with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1487. At the time of Luke’s initial evaluation, Paso Robles was aware that Luke displayed signs of autistic behavior, and therefore, autism was a suspected disability for which it was required to assess him. Paso Robles chose not to formally assess Luke for autism because a member of its staff opined, after an informal, unscientific observation of the child, that Luke merely had an expressive language delay, not a disorder on the autism spectrum. The court held that, in so doing, Paso Robles violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA and, as a result, was unable to design an educational plan that addressed Luke’s unique needs. Accordingly, the court held that Paso Robles denied Luke a free appropriate public education, and remanded for the determination of an appropriate remedy. View "Timothy O. v. Paso Robles USD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, K.T., filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., against the DOE. At issue is the adequacy of three individualized education programs (IEP), which were characterized by a pattern of procedural violations of the IDEA committed by the DOE, and whether these errors deprived K.T. of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for a period of three consecutive years. The court concluded that the procedural violations in formulating each IEP, when taken together, deprived K.T. of a FAPE for each school year. The DOE displayed a pattern of indifference to the procedural requirements of the IDEA and carelessness in formulating K.T.’s IEPs over the period of many years, repeatedly violating its obligations under the statute, which consequently resulted in the deprivation of important educational benefits to which K.T. was entitled by law. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court is directed to consider, in the first instance, what, if any, relief plaintiff is entitled to as an award for K.T.'s FAPE deprivations. View "L.O. ex rel. K.T. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

Parents of B.D. filed suit against the District, challenging the adequacy of a compensatory education award and seeking to enforce other portions of the Hearing Officer's Decision, as well as to require the District to secure a therapeutic residential placement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District. The court concluded that the parents have met their burden of demonstrating that the Hearing Officer, affirmed by the district court, was “wrong,” as he failed to award sufficient compensatory education to put B.D. in the position he would be in absent the free appropriate public education (FAPE) denial; neither 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(A) nor 28 U.S.C. 1331 provides a cause of action for parents seeking to enforce a favorable hearing officer decision; and the district court correctly held that the request for an injunction - the only relief count three specifically sought - had become moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "B.D. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Parents of B.D. filed suit against the District, challenging the adequacy of a compensatory education award and seeking to enforce other portions of the Hearing Officer's Decision, as well as to require the District to secure a therapeutic residential placement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District. The court concluded that the parents have met their burden of demonstrating that the Hearing Officer, affirmed by the district court, was “wrong,” as he failed to award sufficient compensatory education to put B.D. in the position he would be in absent the free appropriate public education (FAPE) denial; neither 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(A) nor 28 U.S.C. 1331 provides a cause of action for parents seeking to enforce a favorable hearing officer decision; and the district court correctly held that the request for an injunction - the only relief count three specifically sought - had become moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "B.D. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law