Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Education Law
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T.B.'s parents, on behalf of their autistic child, appealed the district court's finding that the school district did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., by failing to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to T.B., making the parents ineligible for reimbursement for the costs of T.B.'s home-based program. Given the parents' decision to ultimately settle the issue of the adequacy of the proposed individualized education program (IEP), the court questioned whether they could claim, much less successfully show, that the school district failed to provide a FAPE to T.B. Nonetheless, based on the record, the court could not say that T.B.'s home-based program was "reasonably calculated to enable [him] to receive educational benefits." The program was therefore not "proper" within the meaning of the IDEA and the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "T.B., et al. v. St. Joseph School District" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, parents of children who were eligible to receive a free and appropriate public education, filed suit to challenge the exclusion of mapping of cochlear implants from the regulatory definition of "related services" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(26)(B). The court concluded that the phrase "audiology services" as used in the IDEA's "related services" definition did not unambiguously encompass mapping of cochlear implants. The court also found that the Mapping Regulations embodied a permissible construction of the IDEA because they were rationally related to the underlying objectives of the IDEA. The court further found that the Mapping Regulations did not substantially lessen the protections afforded by the 1983 regulations. Because the Department's construction of its own regulation was neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court owed it deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department. View "Petit, et al. v. US Dept. of Education, et al." on Justia Law

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Appellants are the parents of G.J., a child with autism and brain injuries. At issue was whether the ALJ and the district court properly evaluated appellants' claims that the MCSD did not comply with certain provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., with respect to services it was to provide to G.J. The court held that the district court did not err in setting forth reasonable conditions for G.J.'s reevaluation and in determining that appellants were not entitled to either a private or publicly funded independent educational evaluation. The court also held that there was no basis for making a determination that any procedural failures with regard to the August 2008 and 2009 IEP meetings impacted the education received by G.J. to any substantive degree. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "G. J., et al. v. Muscogee Co. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California. View "Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

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This case involved A.S., a California minor, who was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding A.S.'s educational placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court held as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding A.S.'s education at an out-of-state residential treatment facility was the school district in which the student's parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resided. The court held that A.S. had no parent under the 2005 version of section 56028 and thus, from July 28, 2006, when A.S. was placed at the out-of-state facility, until October 9, 2007, when an amended version of section 56028 took effect, California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for A.S.'s education. The California Department of Education (CDE) was therefore responsible by default. The court held that A.S. did have a parent under the 2007 and 2009 versions of section 56028. CDE therefore was not responsible for A.S.'s out-of-state education after October 10, 2007, when the 2007 version of section 56028 took effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. View "Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. CA Dept. of Educ., et al" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a minor who had been diagnosed with autism, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) hearing officer's decision that plaintiff's free and appropriate public education placement complied with the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiff also claimed that his tuition reimbursement request for the 2007-2008 school year was timely, and that Loveland Academy was his "stay put" placement. The court held that Loveland Acadamy was not plaintiff's stay put placement because the DOE only agreed to pay tuition for the limited 2006-2007 school year and never affirmatively agreed to place plaintiff at Loveland Academy. The court also concluded that plaintiff's tuition reimbursement claim for the 2007-2008 school year was time-barred and that the district court did not err in finding that the 2007 and 2008 individualized education programs complied with IDEA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "K. D. v. Dept of Education" on Justia Law

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Parents requested that the Anchorage School District evaluate their child for eligibility for special education services. While awaiting the results of the eligibility assessment, the parents arranged for private tutoring. The school district did not assess the child’s eligibility within the statutorily-required time, and the parents requested a due process hearing. They also arranged for their child to be privately evaluated to determine whether he was eligible for special education services. The school district subsequently completed its evaluation and determined the child to be ineligible for services. At the due process hearing, the parents alleged that the school district committed procedural violations under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including impermissibly delaying the evaluation. They sought reimbursement for the cost of their child’s private evaluation and tutoring. An independent hearing officer presided over the due process hearing and ultimately agreed with the district that the child was ineligible for services. The hearing officer ordered the school district to pay the cost of the private eligibility assessment and to partially pay the cost of the tutoring. The superior court upheld the award of the private eligibility assessment, but reversed the award of the private tutoring cost. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the evaluation or the tutoring; the parents argued they are entitled to full reimbursement for both expenses. The central question the Court addressed was: where a child is ultimately determined to be ineligible for special education services, does the IDEA provide relief for procedural violations that occur during the process of evaluating the child’s eligibility for services? The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, upholding the independent hearing officer’s award of the private assessment cost, but reversing the hearing officer’s award of the private tutoring expenses.

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This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the individualized education program (IEP) of C.C., a child with a disability. At issue was whether a school district, after being declared in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1490, in respect to a disabled child's entitlements, by an administrative hearing officer, could bring a civil action in court for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party against the child's parents on the grounds that their IDEA administrative complaint was brought for an "improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," although the parents had voluntarily dismissed their administrative complaint without prejudice. The court held that, under the plain meaning of the IDEA and its implementing regulations, the administrative proceeding through which the school district sought a declaratory ruling was a proceeding under section 1415. The court also held that the declaratory ruling favorably altered the school district's legal relationship with the parents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's legal relationship dismissing the school district's civil action and remanded the case for determination of whether the parents' administrative complaint "was delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and if so, whether the district court should, within its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the school district.

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Two administrative hearing panels (Panels) concluded that the school district failed to provide plaintiffs' twin sons with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in 2005, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., but did provide one in 2006. The district court upheld these decisions and later awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and the school district cross appealed. The court held that the school district offered the twins a FAPE in 2005 and therefore, reversed the award of a reduced attorney's fee. The court affirmed, however, the district court's ruling that plaintiffs waived or abandoned their appeal of the Panels' 2006 FAPE decision.

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Plaintiffs brought this action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of their minor daughter, who allegedly was deprived of her constitutional rights when she was expelled from public school and refused alternative education benefits during the 2005-2006 academic school year by defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in principal part, but reversed summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims that their daughter was deprived of her constitutional right to procedural due process when defendants denied her right under state law to continued public educational benefits through an alternative education program without some kind of notice and some kind of hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.