Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Employment Law
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Employer Maple Leaf Farm Association, Inc. appealed a decision of the Employment Security Board finding that its former employee Katherine Kelley was involuntarily terminated from her position and therefore eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Employer operated an intensive inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. Claimant worked for employer as a part-time treatment counselor for seven years. Due to a conflict with a supervisor, claimant resigned from her position in writing on August 29, 2013. She stated in her letter to employer that her last day would be September 19, 2013, and employer allowed her to continue working. Four days later, on September 3, employer terminated her employment and escorted her off the premises. Claimant applied for unemployment compensation. The claims adjudicator determined that she was not entitled to benefits for the first two weeks after her termination because the accrued vacation pay that employer paid her during that period was in excess of her weekly benefit amount. The claims adjudicator further determined that claimant was not entitled to benefits because she had left employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer. Employer appealed the referee’s decision to the Employment Security Board, which adopted the referee’s findings and affirmed its conclusions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Kelley v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

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Robert Campbell quit his job as a school teacher in anticipation of accompanying his wife to Finland on her Fulbright grant. Campbell applied for unemployment benefits for the months between his resignation in June 2010 and his family's planned departure in February 2011. His request was denied because the Department of Employment Security determined that Campbell did not qualify for benefits as claimed under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii), known as the "quit to follow" provision. On appeal, the superior court reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the agency action. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Campbell's resignation from his job seven months before the planned relocation was not reasonable as contemplated by the statute.View "Campbell v. Dep't of Emp't Sec." on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) appealed a decision that respondent Norman Coulombe was an employee of petitioner, Niadni, Inc. (d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel) who was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Coulombe appeared as a musical entertainer at the resort in both solo and group performances beginning in approximately 1980. He also performed at other venues but testified that he performed at the resort nearly three hundred times in the last two years that he worked there. The resort and Coulombe negotiated a pay rate for Coulombe’s services, and he was paid weekly for his performances. He provided his own instruments and selected the songs he would play in his performances, though the resort asked him to perform new material prior to the end of his relationship with the resort. He reported that his last booking with the resort was in the summer of 2012, after which the relationship terminated. He subsequently filed for unemployment benefits with DES. Finding none of the Resort's arguments persuasive to reverse the Appellate Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Niadni, Inc. d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel" on Justia Law

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A Job Service claims deputy issued an initial determination that Kenneth Risovi misrepresented facts in order to obtain unemployment benefits, which he was not eligible to receive. Job Service disqualified Risovi from receiving unemployment benefits from November 4, 2012, to October 26, 2013. Risovi appealed the determination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Risovi v. Job Service" on Justia Law

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Four cases challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill (SB) 822, which was passed by the 2013 Legislative Assembly during its regular session, and SB 861, passed during a special session in October 2013. Both bills changed certain statutory provisions of the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) and, in doing so, affected the retirement benefits of some current and former public employees. Central Oregon Irrigation District (the District), an intervenor in these proceedings, filed a motion to disqualify the sitting judges of the Oregon Supreme Court from hearing these cases. The District also filed a separate motion to disqualify the circuit judge appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as a special master for purposes of conducting evidentiary proceedings and preparing recommended findings of fact. Because disqualification would leave petitioners without a tribunal to decide their claims, and in light of the legislature's express grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to decide challenges to the 2013 PERS legislation, the Court concluded that the rule of necessity applied and that the members of Court were not disqualified from deciding these cases because of any interest in the proceeding. Further, the application of the rule of necessity in these circumstances was not a denial of due process. Central Oregon Irrigation District's motions to disqualify the members of the Supreme Court and the Special Master on this matter was denied. View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

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Two Chicago firefighters suffered duty-related injuries in the 1980s and later died. Their widows each received an ordinary widow’s pension from the Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Retirement Benefit Fund of Chicago. The two widows were later awarded annuities available to widows of firemen who died in the line of duty, retroactive to the date of death of each spouse, with interest, because the injuries were permanent and had prevented them from ever returning to active duty. The widows claimed that the calculation of their annuities (based on the current salary of the position last held by the deceased) should include duty availability pay, which is generally intended to compensate firefighters for being available for duty. This type of compensation was created in the 1990s, after these firemen’s accidents, and neither ever received it. Their argument, based on Pension Code language added in 2004, was rejected by the Board and the trial court. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial. If duty availability pay may be used for pension calculation, it must be pay that was actually received by the firemen.View "Hooker v. Ret. Bd. of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago" on Justia Law

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The worker was injured in a 2006 automobile accident near Cordova, where he was working temporarily for Venture. Cordova is 200 miles from Springfield, where he lived and where his plumbers’ and pipefitters’ union was. He was living a motel 30 miles from the worksite with a coworker, also from Springfield, who was driving when the accident occurred. An arbitrator denied his workers’ compensation claim. The Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed; the trial court set aside the Commission’s finding. The Workers’ Compensation Division of the Appellate Court granted relief to the worker. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the worker was not a “traveling employee” and could not be compensated. An injury incurred by an employee in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, because it is not arising out of or in the course of employment, unless the worker can be categorized as a “traveling employee.” The employer did not direct the worker to accept the position at the Cordova location; he accepted it with full knowledge of the commute involved. His course or method of travel was not determined by the demands and exigencies of the job. He was not reimbursed for travel time or expenses or told what route to take.View "The Venture-Newberg Perini Stone v. IL Workers' Compensation Comm'n" on Justia Law

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The Jackson County Board of Supervisors terminated June Seaman, and she applied to the Mississippi Employment Security Commission (MESC) for unemployment benefits. A claims examiner, an administrative-law judge, and the Board of Review all determined that Seaman was entitled to unemployment benefits because Jackson County had failed to prove by clear and convincing, substantial evidence that Seaman had been terminated for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed the agency’s decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the employer had proven misconduct by substantial evidence. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence before the MESC. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Jackson County Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission" on Justia Law

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The City of Gadsden and certain members of the State Employees' Insurance Board appealed two circuit court orders that granted injunctive relief to John Boman. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. In 2000, Gadsden elected to join the 'Local Government Health Insurance Plan,' a health benefit plan administered by the Board. When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and other ailments. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a 'record of the Medicare payment.' However, Boman had no Medicare credits. When the dispute over coverage arose, Boman sought review by the Board. The Board denied Boman's request for an appeal. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden, alleging, among other things, that they had 'been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided' and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. In 2011, Boman filed a 'motion for immediate relief for medical care.' The Supreme Court found that the circuit court issued preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden without requiring Boman to give security and without making any specific findings. As such, the Supreme Court had "no alternative but to reverse" the preliminary injunction issued against Gadsden and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "City of Gadsden v. Boman " on Justia Law

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The employee alleged that, while at work in 2004, he was involved in an accident that resulted in a condition for which he sought compensation. A Workers’ Compensation Commission arbitrator denied benefits, citing lack of causation, and, in 2009, the Commission adopted the decision. The trial court confirmed the denial. The appellate court vacated, finding that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The employee had calculated the 20-day time period for filing, Workers’ Compensation Act, section 19(f)(1), using the date on which required documents were mailed to the court, rather than the date on which the documents were received and file-stamped. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the so-called “mailbox rule,” which has applied to notices of appeal from the trial to the appellate court and to petitions for the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s review of arbitrators’ decisions, also applies to commencement of an action for judicial review of a Commission decision, which is an exercise of special statutory jurisdiction. Notice to the other party and the statute of limitations were not factors in this case and, absent a clear directive from the legislature, allowing the mailbox rule in such a case is most consistent with Illinois law.View "Gruszeczka v. IL Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law