Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Louis Burden, a Vietnam veteran, served on active duty in the Army from 1948 until 1968. He married Michele in a ceremonial marriage in April, 2004. Two months later, Burden died. In August 2004, Michele applied for dependency and indemnity compensation. A VA regional office denied her claim because she had not been married to Burden for at least one year prior to his death, 38 U.S.C. 1102(a). Michele asserted that she and Burden had been living in a common law marriage for five years prior to his death. The board acknowledged that she had provided some evidence to support her claim, but concluded that it did not constitute the “clear and convincing proof” required to establish a valid common law marriage under Alabama law. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit upheld the denial. State law, including state law evidentiary burdens, applies in determining the validity of a purported common law marriage View "Burden v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, by and through her adoptive parents, brought this action challenging South Carolina's reduction of monthly adoption assistance benefits, claiming that the reduction violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq. The court held in this case that section 673(a)(3) did set forth a privately enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but that the parents have failed to plead any violation of that right by defendants. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hensley v. Koller" on Justia Law

Providers brought suit against the State, asserting that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (CWA), 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq., gave them a privately enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to receive payments from the State sufficient to cover the cost of certain statutorily enumerated components of foster care. At issue was whether Congress, in enacting the CWA, evinced a clear intent to grant foster care providers an individually enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments sufficiently large to cover the costs of each item enumerated in section 675(4)(A). The court held that Congress did not ambiguously confer such a right and, therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Providers' complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Midwest Foster Care, etc., et al v. Kincade, et al" on Justia Law

Theresa was married to Myron when he retired from the federal government in 1989. Myron elected to receive a reduced annuity and named Theresa to receive a survivor annuity. In 1998, they divorced. Myron married Roksoliana. Myron received annual notices from the Office of Personnel Management explaining that if he wanted to provide survivor benefits to a spouse that he married after retirement, he had to send a signed request within two years after the date of marriage. In 2002 Myron sent a letter requesting survivor annuity benefits for Roksoliana. OPM denied Myron’s request as not submitted within two years of his marriage and instructed Myron to send his divorce decree to change or eliminate the survivor election previously made. In 2006 Myron sent the divorce decree and the certificate documenting his marriage to Roksoliana. OPM sent notification that his election to transfer full survivor benefits to his new spouse was effective immediately. Myron died in 2009. OPM granted Roksoliana benefits and denied Theresa’s application. An ALJ reversed; the Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding OPM’s annual notice insufficient to inform Myron of his rights and obligations and that the Board’s award to Theresa was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Dachniwskyj v.Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Respondent gave birth to twins conceived through in vitro fertilization using her deceased husband's frozen sperm. Respondent applied for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins, relying on 42 U.S.C. 416(e) of the Social Security Act, which defined child to mean, inter alia, "the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual." The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, identified subsequent provisions of the Act, sections 416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C), as critical, and read them to entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualified for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfied one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement. The Court concluded that the SSA's reading was better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA's longstanding interpretation was not the only reasonable one, it was at least a permissible construction that garnered the Court's respect under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. View "Astrue v. Capato" on Justia Law

Upon granting Husband and Wife a divorce, the family court directed Husband to pay $1,000 per month in spousal support. The court found that the award did not need to be paid out of Husband's veteran's disability benefits. The circuit court set aside the award of permanent spousal support and directed Husband to pay supposal support in the amount of $500 per month for eighteen months. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in determining the amount of spousal support to be awarded, federal service-connected veterans disability benefits received by the payor spouse may be considered by the family court as a resource, along with the payor's other income, in assessing the ability of the payor to pay spousal support; and (2) because the circuit court, among other things, (i) failed to address with any specificity Husband's veterans benefits or the parties' Social Security awards, (ii) failed to address with specificity how those disability benefits were taken into account in setting aside the family court decision, and (iii) did not determine that any of the factual findings of the family court were clearly erroneous, the action was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Zickefoose v. Zickefoose" on Justia Law

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a motion to hold Renee Ivy in contempt after Ivy fell behind in her child support payments. At the hearing on the motion, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income was a federal benefit under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). The trial court reduced Ivy's support obligation and held her in contempt for having failed to pay the past due amount. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the contempt finding and the order to pay even reduced child support could not stand because evidence showed Ivy did not have the ability to pay. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it suggested that a SSI recipient-parent's present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support; (2) vacated the existing order and remanded for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(2); and (3) affirmed the holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate here where there was essentially uncontroverted evidence that Ivy's failure to provide child support stemmed only from her inability to do so. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Ivy" on Justia Law

Appellee sued the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA), seeking review of the SSA's denial of benefits to her daughter. At issue was whether a child conceived through artificial insemination more than a year after her father's death qualified for benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 402, 416. The Commissioner interpreted the Act to provide that a natural child of the decedent was not entitled to benefits unless she had inheritance rights under state law or could satisfy certain additional statutory requirements. The court held that the Commissioner's interpretation was, at a minimum, reasonable and entitled to deference, and that the relevant state law did not entitle the applicant in this case to benefits. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgments.

Father was ordered to pay child support and soon developed child support arrearages. Later, Father became disabled. Father and his children received lump sum Social Security disability benefits payments for the period retroactive to the date Father became eligible for the benefits. In a series of orders, the district court gave Father credit (1) against his child support arrearages back to the date he became eligible for benefits, and (2) for amounts that had been withheld from his monthly disability payments under an income withholding order for the period after he became disabled but before he became eligible to receive benefits. The court, however, refused to credit any of the disability payments against arrearages existing on the date Father became disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court may not credit Social Security disability benefits paid to dependent children against child support arrearage owed before the obligor became disabled. Because such benefits belong to the children, not the obligor, they are not available to be applied as a credit or offset to amounts owed by the obligor.