Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff was an "excepted" (not in the competitive service or the Senior Executive Service) employee of the Veterans Canteen Service and was not preference-eligible (as a veteran or close relative). She appealed a notice of termination for misconduct. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she had been hired under 38 U.S.C. 7802(e). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute allows removal of such employees without regard to other civil service laws. Civil Service Due Process Amendments in 1990 did not extend protections to excepted, non-preference eligible employees.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.

Plaintiff appealed the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") denial of his application for supplemental security income alleging that he became disabled beginning in March 20, 2005 due to depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and schizoaffective disorder. At issue was whether the factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. The court held that the ALJ did not follow the law in evaluating all the medical evidence from a licensed clinical psychologist, a licensed professional counselor, and a physician who diagnosed plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder. The court also held that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards in assessing plaintiff's credibility, and alternatively, the ALJ's adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence.

The Equal Rights Center ("ERC") sued Post Properties, Inc. ("Post") alleging that Post designed, constructed, and operated its apartment complexes in a manner that violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Post on the ground that the ERC lacked standing to bring suit where it failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court held that the ERC failed to demonstrate that its injury was actual or imminent at the time of the filed suit and held that the district court erroneously concluded that the ERC could not establish standing because it chose to redirect its resources to investigate Post's allegedly discriminatory practice. Therefore, the court focused on whether the organizational plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of a defendant's alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation and determined that the ERC failed to demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact that was actual or imminent at the time it filed the suit.

Plaintiffs, two fair housing organizations in New Orleans and five African-American homeowners, claimed that a program to help homeowners rebuild after hurricanes Katrina and Rita employed a grant formula that violated the anti-discriminatory provisions of the Fair Housing Act. At issue was whether the district court properly denied plaintiffs' first motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and injunction to enjoin defendants' actions related to the Louisiana Recovery Authority's Road Home Homeowner Assistance program. Also at issue was whether the district court properly granted plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction where the district court denied the initial request for a TRO and injunction. The court held that the district court properly denied the initially requested TRO and injunction where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also held that the district court's grant of plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction was improper where the second motion also failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

The district court rejected a challenge to 5 U.S.C. 3328, which bars males who have knowingly and willfully failed to register for the draft by age 26 from employment by the executive branch. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for entry of a judgment denying relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs, who were dismissed or resigned from federal employment after discovery of their failure to register, is under the Civil Service Reform Act. Although the claims implicate constitutional violations, Congress intended to consolidate employee removal actions in a single forum. The Merit System Protection Board cannot grant relief by invalidating the statute, but a court could do so on review of board action. The court characterized the constitutional challenges as "unpromising."

Following a Veterans Court remand of a claim for service benefits relating to post-traumatic stress, the veteran submitted a petition for attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $6,193. The VA found that the veteran was a prevailing party, with a net worth of less than $2,000,000, and that the VA position was not substantially justified, as required by the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, but that several billing items should be denied for lack of sufficient detail. The Veterans Court agreed and reduced the fee award by $437.50, rejecting a claim that additional detail would violate attorney-client privilege. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Act does not abrogate privilege; its specificity requirements do not require disclosure of the exact contents of communications identified on a bill and do not violate privilege. Having been publicly filed, the general nature of the claim and documents filed are not privileged.