Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

The State’s public pension systems were defined-benefit plans, which guaranteed participants a calculable amount of benefits payable upon retirement based on the participant’s salary and time spent in the pension system. In 2011, with the enactment of L. 2011, c. 78 (Chapter 78), the Legislature added language explicitly declaring that each member of the State’s pension systems "shall have a contractual right to the annual required contribution amount" and the failure of the State to make the required contribution "shall be deemed to be an impairment of the contractual right." A separate statutory provision, enacted earlier, required the State to increase its annually required contribution (ARC) beginning with fiscal year 2012 (FY12) over the course of seven years at increments of 1/7 of the ARC per year, until the contribution covered the full ARC. The State made the required contributions in FY12 and FY13, and the Appropriations Act signed into law for FY14 included the required contributions of 3/7 of the ARC. In February 2014, the Governor released the FY15 proposed budget, which also included funding to satisfy the State’s required payment (i.e., 4/7 of the ARC). On May 20, 2014, the Governor issued Executive Order 156, which reduced the State payments into the pension systems for FY14, explaining that the reduction was due to a severe and unanticipated revenue shortfall. Instead of paying the required 3/7 of the ARC contribution, which totaled $1.582 billion, the State made a total contribution of $696 million for FY14. The next day, citing new information that placed the State’s projected revenue at less than previous projections, the State Treasurer announced that the proposed budget for FY15 was being revised to reduce the amount that would be contributed to pension systems. The revised FY15 budget thus advanced would include a total contribution of $681 million, reflecting $1.57 billion less than what was required. Plaintiffs brought this action because the prior Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and current FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for under Chapter 78’s payment schedule. Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The trial court issued a detailed and comprehensive opinion that granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their impairment-of-contract claims and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court accepted the argument that Chapter 78 created a contract and that the State’s failure to appropriate the full value of ARC in the FY15 Appropriations Act substantially impaired plaintiffs’ rights under the contract. In so finding, the court rejected arguments that Chapter 78 was unenforceable as violative of the Debt Limitation Clause, the Appropriations Clause, and the gubernatorial line-item veto power. The court did not order a specific appropriation, but rather determined to give the other branches an opportunity to act in accordance with the court’s decree. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Chapter 78 did not create a legally enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection. The Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution interdicted the creation, in this manner, of a legally binding enforceable contract compelling multi-year financial payments in the sizable amounts called for by the statute. View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Hansler was hired by Lehigh Valley in 2011. In 2013, Hansler began experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting, of unknown origins. Hansler’s physician completed a medical certification form “requesting intermittent leave at a frequency of 2 times weekly starting on March 1, 2013 and lasting for a probable duration of one month.” Hansler submitted the certification as part of a formal request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. Hansler was unable to work on March 13, 14, 23, 24, and 25. Without seeking further information from either Hansler or her physician, Lehigh terminated Hansler on March 28, citing absenteeism, including the five days she took off in March. Lehigh informed her, for the first time, that her leave request had been denied because her “condition presently does not qualify as a serious health condition under the criteria set forth by the [Act].” After her dismissal, Hansler received a diagnosis of diabetes and high blood pressure. The district court dismissed her suit under the Act, on the basis that the medical certification supporting Hansler’s request for leave was “invalid.” The Third Circuit reversed, finding that Lehigh violated the Act in failing to afford Hansler a chance to cure any deficiencies in her medical certification. View "Hansler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Network" on Justia Law

Robles worked collecting food grease from restaurants until his 2010 termination. Robles’s supervisor cited Robles’s attempt to buy shoes at the Red Wing store, where employees can use an annual $150 shoe allowance. Robles asked the clerk to measure his friend’s foot because he “intended to give it to my friend.” Robles reasoned that he had shoes and his friend needed them. The clerk told Robles “that was not possible.” Robles believes there was a misunderstanding of policy but no misconduct. Robles sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Development Department’s record contained no employer information about the incident. The EDD’notice stated that Robles’s claim was denied because he “broke a reasonable employer rule.” Robles appealed, stating his employer did not cite any specific rule, that he was not aware of any such rule, and that he did not obtain an improper benefit or cause his employer any harm. Despite being twice ordered to do by the trial court, EED continued to refuse to award benefits. The court of appeal affirmed the court’s most recent response to Robles’s motion to enforce writ of administrative mandate,ordering EDD “to pay withheld federal extension benefits, costs and interest in the amount of $45,560.39, within 30 days.” View "Robles v. Emp't Dev. Dept." on Justia Law

Petitioners were active and retired members of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) who challenged two legislative amendments aimed at reducing the cost of retirement benefits: Senate Bill (SB) 822 (2013), and SB 861 (2013). Petitioners raised numerous challenges to the amendments but primarily argued that the amendments impaired their contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the federal Contract Clause, Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the United States Constitution. "Although there is no doubt that the legislature passed SB 822 and SB 861 to address legitimate public policy concerns and with an appropriate sensitivity to the impact that the amendments would have on retirees, those concerns do not establish a defense to the contractual impairment that the amendments effect. The public purpose defense that respondents ask [the Oregon Supreme Court] to recognize imposes a high bar to justify the state’s impairment of a state contract, like PERS, and the record in this case does not meet that standard. We therefore hold that respondents constitutionally may cease the income tax offset payments to nonresidents as set out in SB 822 and that respondents also constitutionally may apply the COLA amendments as set out in SB 822 and SB 861 prospectively to benefits earned on or after the effective dates of those laws, but not retrospectively to benefits earned before those effective dates." View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Robinson worked for Concentra as a medical assistant from 2003 until she was terminated in 2010. Robinson applied for Social Security disability benefits four days after being terminated, claiming that she had multiple sclerosis that rendered her unable to work. The initial application was denied. An ALJ reversed, summarizing Robinson’s statements that: she must use a cane to walk because of leg numbness; she has poor vision; her hands frequently cramp and she has difficulty holding objects; and she needs help with all household chores. Robinson then filed suit against Concentra under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, claiming that she had been terminated on the basis of her race and color and in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC and taking FMLA leave and that Concentra had interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave. The court entered summary judgment, finding that Robinson was estopped from showing that she was qualified for her position when she was terminated in September 2010, because she received disability benefits based on her statement that she was fully disabled as of June 2010. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that Robinson failed to “proffer a sufficient explanation” for the contradictory statements. View "Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs.,Inc." on Justia Law

Three former New Mexico State employees were denied unemployment compensation benefits by the Department of Workforce Solutions because they were in positions designated as "a major nontenured policy-making or advisory position." The Supreme Court reversed the Department's decision, because after review, it concluded that the three positions in questions in these cases were not indeed designated as major nontentured policy-making or advisory positions. View "Perez v. N.M. Dep't of Workforce Solutions" on Justia Law

Johnson began working for U.S. Steel in 2004. On May 12 2011, he left work, complaining of a headache, and went to a clinic where a physician’s assistant indicated that he had high blood pressure. The next day he provided a note that was deemed insufficient by his employer. His regular physician later indicated that Johnson's blood pressure was normal. Emails, memoranda, and letters indicate that Johnson was suspended on May 16 and then terminated for altering, falsifying, or forging the work excuse. U.S. Steel never provided him with notice of his FMLA rights and obligations. Nor was such notice included in the employee handbook. Johnson filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, alleging that U.S. Steel retaliated against him for taking protected FMLA leave, failed to reinstate him after a period of protected leave, and otherwise unlawfully interfered with his FMLA rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Johnson did not demonstrate how any alleged technical violations could have prejudiced him if his condition was not a serious health condition and did not qualify him for FMLA leave in the first place. View "Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods." on Justia Law

In 2010, while Kerner was an Evidence Custodian, GS-05, with the Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service, he applied for two vacancies: Wildlife Inspector, GS-09/11, and Wildlife Inspector, GS-11/11. Both positions were merit-promotion vacancies. Each required federal employee applicants to meet a time-in-grade requirement. A federal civil service applicant must have completed at least 52 weeks of experience equivalent to GS-07 to be qualified for the GS- 09 position, and at least 52 weeks of experience equivalent to GS-09 to be qualified for the GS-11 position. The vacancies also required one year of specialized experience in the federal civil service equivalent to GS-07 or GS-09, respectively. Kerner had no federal civil service experience at the GS-07 or GS-09 level and, therefore, did not meet the time-in-grade requirements. The Department determined that he did not qualify for either vacancy. Kerner then filed a Veterans Employment Opportunity Act claim with the Department of Labor, alleging that the Department violated his VEOA rights. The Department of Labor and Merit Systems Protection Board rejected the claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The provisions cited by Kerner only apply to preference-eligible veterans not already employed in federal civil service, not to current federal employees seeking merit promotions. View "Kerner v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

Nealy was hired by Santa Monica in 1996 and became a recycling worker. Nealy injured his knee on the job in 2003. A doctor declared him temporarily totally disabled until 2005, when he was released to “light duty” with the restriction that he could not push large trash bins. Nealy requested a clerical or refuse collection vehicle operator position, but began working as a groundskeeper. Nealy met with the accommodations committee again in 2006 because of difficulty climbing or descending stairs. The city did not have any office work available; Nealy never returned to work after a 2006 emergency room visit. After additional accommodation meetings, in 2010, the city indicated that it was unable to provide reasonable accommodation into an alternative position because Nealy was not minimally qualified for the only available position that was not a promotion. The city filed a disability retirement application but, in 2011, CalPERS canceled the application for failure to submit necessary information. Nealy obtained a right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The court entered judgment for the city on disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation. Meanwhile, an ALJ awarded Nealy $36,260 on his workers’ compensation claim. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of the city. View "Nealy v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Alphonso Myers was injured on the job. He received social security benefits due to his inability to work. While claiming benefits, he applied for a job as an armed guard with defendant-appellee Knight Protective Service. On his job application, plaintiff made no mention of his prior injury. Supervisors at Knight noticed that plaintiff appeared to be in pain. Plaintiff then admitted that he had undergone a series of surgeries from the prior workplace injury. Concerned that this pain might interfere with his duties as an armed guard, Knight required plaintiff to submit to a physical exam before resuming his duties as a guard. Plaintiff waited months for the exam - long enough that plaintiff considered the delay as an effective termination from his job. Plaintiff then filed suit, arguing that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Knight, and plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Myers v. Knight Protective Service" on Justia Law