Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Duarte joined the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) in 1993. He earned 2.023 years of service. He took unpaid personal leave for Duarte for the 1995-1996 school year and unpaid educational leave for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. Duarte worked one season as a forest firefighter, attended law school, and worked as a paralegal. In 2003, Duarte returned to teaching in Oakland. On his second day he was assaulted and threatened by students. Duarte has not returned to teaching. In 2004, Duarte filed a worker’s compensation claim. After four evaluations, he entered into a stipulated settlement that indicated a “serious dispute” regarding the scope of Duarte’s disability. In 2006, Duarte sought social security disability benefits; it was determined that he was disabled from the date of the 2003 incident and became eligible for monthly disability benefits in 2005. Duarte’s student loans were forgiven. In 2008, Duarte sought CalSTRS disability retirement benefits. CalSTRS repeatedly asked Duarte to submit medical records and other documents. An ALJ upheld denial of Duarte’s application because he refused to complete the independent medical evaluation ordered under Education Code 24103 (b),. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars CalSTRS from relitigating his disability because several other state agencies have found him to be disabled. View "Duarte v. CA. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Serban worked as a massage therapist at Voda Spa. Serban and Voda Spa disagree as to why he left that work, but the trial court found Serban had good cause to leave and that finding was not challenged. They also disputed whether Serban was an employee or independent contractor. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, and the trial court agreed with the Board that its decision was not subject to judicial review because both the California Constitution and the Unemployment Insurance Code bar actions whose purpose is to prevent the collection of state taxes. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the case does not challenge the imposition of a tax. View "W. Hollywood Cmty. Health & Fitness Ctr. v. CA Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Dillip Mullings owned a NAPA auto-parts store in Seward called Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. Mullings hired Dennis Alder to be the store manager, a position Alder held from 2006 to 2010, when he was terminated. Alder did not keep a time card, but it was undisputed that he typically worked from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Monday through Friday. The extent of Alder’s overtime was not at issue on appeal; Mullings conceded that Alder worked over 40 hours a week. It was also undisputed that Alder was paid a salary and did not receive overtime pay. Once terminated, Alder sought unemployment compensation from the State. The Department of Wage and Hour determined that Alder was entitled to overtime pay, and attempted to negotiate a settlement on his behalf with Resurrection Bay. Alder later sued seeking overtime pay. The employer claimed the Alder was exempt from the overtime laws, but the superior court found he was not and awarded overtime pay and liquidated damages. The employer appealed. Because the employer failed to show that the manager satisfied all four requirements of the overtime laws’ exemption for executive employees, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the manager was owed overtime pay under Alaska and federal law. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s award of liquidated damages, because the employer failed to carry his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in good faith. View "Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder" on Justia Law

Respondent Kimberly Legette was employed by Appellant Nucor Corporation from 1998, through 2010. Nucor terminated Legette's employment after she failed a random on-site drug test in violation of Nucor's drug policy. Although Legette obtained an independent drug test, which tested negative for drugs, she was fired from her job at Nucor based on the two positive drug test results. Legette subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. Nucor requested that Legette be denied unemployment benefits, contending she was statutorily ineligible to receive them because she was fired for violating Nucor's drug policy by testing positive for drugs. This direct appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC) presented for the Supreme Court's review a threshold procedural challenge to appealability, and substantively, to the awarding of unemployment benefits to an employee terminated for failing a drug test administered by a laboratory that was not properly certified. Because this appeal arose from a final resolution of all issues, the Court found the matter is appealable. The Court affirmed the ALC. View "Nucor v. SCDEW" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs had been firefighters for the city of Portland when they suffered disabling injuries. The city's charger required it to provide disability benefits to its police and fire employees who suffer injuries in the course of their employment that render them “unable to perform [their] required duties,” with a minimum disability benefit of 25 percent of the employee’s base pay, “regardless of the amount of wages earned in other employment.” The city originally determined that plaintiffs’ disabilities made them unable to perform their “required duties” and paid them disability benefits. Years later, however, the city created new job assignments that included some of the duties within the job classifications that plaintiffs had held when they were injured. Because the city gave the new job assignments the same job classifications that plaintiffs had previously held, the city maintained that plaintiffs were no longer disabled. The city therefore required plaintiffs to return to work and discontinued paying them the minimum disability benefit. Plaintiffs sued the city for breach of contract, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the city charter’s use of the term “required duties” meant core duties. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties of plaintiffs’ new job assignments were the “required duties” for the job classifications that plaintiffs previously held, the Court further concluded that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Miller v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Appellant Billy J. Bringman appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission decision in favor of Respondents New Albertsons, Inc. and the Idaho Department of Labor. The Commission determined Bringman willfully made a false statement or failed to report a material fact regarding his separation from Albertsons to obtain unemployment benefits from the Department and ordered Bringman to repay the benefits he received and pay a civil penalty. Finding no reversible error with that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bringman v. New Albertsons, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant DeAnne Muchow began working for Varsity Contractors, Inc in 2011 as a human resources assistant. During her employment, the claimant had an ongoing conflict with her supervisor and had lodged several complaints about her supervisor with the director of the department. In an effort to resolve the conflict, the director held a meeting with claimant and her supervisor. The claimant and her supervisor both stated that they had documentation outlining their complaints. The director told them to get their documentation and bring it back to his office. The claimant asked if they could do so the following day because she wanted time to look over her documentation, but the director denied that request because he was leaving the next day on a business trip. He did give the claimant a few minutes to look over her documentation. She returned to her desk and after a few minutes printed her documentation. She took the documents and walked toward the director, who was standing outside his office. The claimant waved the documents in the air, told the director she had them and was going to shred them, and walked past him toward the shredder. He told her not to shred them, but she continued to the shredder and shredded them. The director then discharged her for insubordination. The claimant applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied. She appealed, and an appeals examiner reversed the ruling that the claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits. He held that as a matter of law there was no insubordination. The basis of his ruling was that the director’s order not to shred the documents was not a directive that the director was authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed, because the documents belonged to the claimant and contained her personal notations about issues and problems she was having with a coworker. The employer then appealed to the Industrial Commission. The commission adopted the findings of fact made by the appeals examiner. However, the commission disagreed with the conclusions of law made by the appeals examiner. The commission concluded that her conduct constituted employment-related misconduct, and it reversed the decision of the appeals examiner and held that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Commission's decision and affirmed. View "Muchow v. Varsity Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

To address economic conditions and projections demonstrating a severely underfunded plan, the Colorado General Assembly approved measured designed to protect present and future retirees by providing an adequately pension program. This appeal centered on changes made to the annual cost of living (COLA) that applied to increase each retiree's vested base retirement benefit. Plaintiffs in this case were retired public employees who contended that they had a contract with the State entitling each of them, upon retirement, to have their base pension benefit annually adjusted by the specific COLA formula in existence at the time they were eligible to retire, for the rest of their lives without change. The district court ruled they had no such contract right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The court of appeals disagreed, finding the retirees had a contract right to the formula in place at the time of eligibility for retirement or actual retirement based on the so-called "public policy exception," and remanded for further review to determine whether the legislature's act violated the Contract Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, and agreed with the district court. The appellate court's judgment was reversed that the district court's judgment reinstated. View "Justus v. Colorado Public Employee's Retirement Association Pension Plan" on Justia Law

The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court were whether ORS 243.303(2) (which requires local governments to make available to retired employees, "insofar as and to the extent possible," the health care insurance coverage available to current officers and employees of the local government,) created a private right of action for the enforcement of that duty; or, if not, whether the Court should (under its common-law authority) provide such a right of action. The Court of Appeals held that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action, and it considered that conclusion to be dispositive of plaintiffs' claim for relief. The Supreme Court also concluded that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action for its enforcement. However, where a statute imposes a legal duty, but there is no indication that the legislature intended to create (or not to create) a private right of action for its enforcement, courts must (if such relief is sought) determine whether the judicial creation of a common-law right of action would be consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy, and needed to ensure its effectiveness. Analyzing the duty imposed on local governments by ORS 243.303(2) under that standard, the Court declined to create an additional common-law right of action for its enforcement because: (1) plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable common-law claim for relief whose creation is appropriate and necessary to effectuate the legislature's purpose; (2) a declaratory judgment and supplemental relief were adequate to enforce the statutory duty; and (3) a significant change in existing law would result from judicial creation of a tort claim permitting the recovery of noneconomic damages in the circumstances here, and there is no other need to create a common-law tort claim. View "Doyle v. City of Medford" on Justia Law

Gienapp worked at Harbor Crestnursing care facility. In January 2011 she told Chattic, its manager, that she needed leave to care for her daughter, who was being treated for thyroid cancer. Chattic granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). While on leave, Gienapp submitted an FMLA form, leaving blank a question about the leave’s expected duration. Harbor Crest did not ask her to fill in the blank, nor did it pose written questions as the 12-week period progressed. A physician’s statement on the form said that the daughter’s recovery was uncertain, and that if she did recover she would require assistance at least through July 2011. Chattic inferred from this that Gienapp would not return by April 1, her leave’s outer limit, and hired a replacement. When Gienapp reported for work on March 29, Chattic told her that she no longer had a job. The district court entered summary judgment, ruling that Gienapp had forfeited her FMLA rights by not stating exactly how much leave she would take. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gienapp could not give a firm date; Department of Labor regulations call her situation “unforeseeable” leave, governed by 29 C.F.R. 825.303, which does not require employees to tell employers how much leave they need. View "Gienapp v. Harbor Crest" on Justia Law