Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

After leaving coal mining, Eckman sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, in 1985. An ALJ awarded benefits in 1993; the Benefits Review Board affirmed the decision. Marmon paid benefits to Eckman until his 2002 death; his widow, Ethel, sought benefits as a dependent survivor. An ALJ denied the claim in 2005, finding that although Eckman had pneumoconiosis, Ethel failed to prove that his death was due to the disease. The Board affirmed. After Congress enacted the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, and amended the BLBA, Ethel filed a new claim. A Department of Labor district director awarded benefits. An ALJ upheld the award, finding that Ethel satisfied the familial relationship and dependency criteria for survivors under the BLBA and that, based on Eckman’s lifetime disability award and the filing date of Ethel’s claim, Ethel was entitled to benefits under section 932(l), as amended by the ACA. The Board affirmed. The Third Circuit denied the coal company’s petition for review, noting that in Ethel’s second claim, the cause of death was not at issue, her entitlement to benefits turned primarily on an administrative fact: whether her husband had been awarded benefits. View "Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir. Office of Workers Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Mingo Logan challenged the award of benefits to claimant under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). Because the court concluded that the ALJ did not in fact apply rebuttal limitations to Mingo Logan, and the Board affirmed the ALJ's analysis, the court did not reach Mingo Logan's challenge to the standard announced by the Board to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption of entitlement to benefits. The court affirmed the Board's award of benefits because it also found that Mingo Logan's other challenges to the ALJ's factual findings lacked merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. Owen" on Justia Law

Claimant was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901-945. At issue was whether the awards of attorneys' fees properly reflected market-based evidence of counsel's hourly rate, as required by the lodestar analysis in Hensley v. Eckerhart. The court held that neither the ALJ nor the BRB abused its discretion in concluding that counsel provided sufficient market-based evidence of rates, and that the number of hours billed for attorneys' services reasonably reflected the work completed. The court also held that the award of fees for work performed by certain legal assistants was not supported fully by the record, and modified that award accordingly. View "Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Crawford began working for the Department of the Army in 1986, with credit for military service. In 2006, when called to uniformed service, Crawford was an IT Specialist, GS-2210-11, in the Corps of Engineers. The Army subsequently outsourced many IT functions and abolished Crawford’s position, but formed a new organization, the Corps of Engineers Information Technology (ACE-IT). When Crawford completed uniformed service, the Army briefly returned him to an IT Specialist position, but reassigned him as Program Support Specialist, GS-0301-11. Crawford claimed violation of reemployment protections for those in uniformed service under 38 U.S.C. 4313(a)(2). The administrative judge ordered the Army to place Crawford in a position of “like status” to an IT Specialist. The Army later submitted notice that it was not able to find a position of “like status” and had requested the Office of Personnel Management’s placement assistance. Crawford sought enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that the search for positions was limited to vacant positions. The AJ agreed. The Army then reassigned Crawford to a position as an IT Specialist within ACE-IT, with the same duty station, title, and grade as his old position. The Board concluded that the Agency was in compliance and dismissed Crawford’s appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Crawford v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law

While working at a Ford Motor plant, Rudisill was hit in the face by a piece of equipment, was knocked against a wall, fell to the floor, and rolled forward through the floor opening into the hot pit below. He lay there unconscious, being burned, until coworkers pulled him out of the pit. Rudisill had gained consciousness by this time and was screaming in pain. Rudisill sustained a head injury that required several staples to close. He was also burned on his arms and legs, abdomen, and left hand. Rudisill continues to experience pain, dizzy spells, ringing in the ears, and memory problems. He has had numerous surgeries and has undergone physical and occupational therapy. After a safety review immediately following the incident, Ford decided to modify the process so that employees slide metal grates over the pit before removing the guard rails. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, Rudisill sued Ford, alleging intentional tort; his wife asserted a derivative claim of loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for Ford. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence that Ford acted with deliberate intent to injure Rudisill, as required by Ohio statute. View "Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Prasch worked as a mail carrier for the Postal Service until suffering a work-related injury, compensable under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. He received benefits from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs from December 2007 until October 2008. Prasch applied for disability retirement. OPM approved his application and deposited $14,640.27, representing retroactive retirement annuity payments from December 2007 through the approval of his application. OPM paid him another $5,869.60 in retirement annuity benefits before determining that Prasch had received FECA disability benefits from OWCP during the period that OPM was paying him retirement annuity benefits. Because governing statutes prohibit dual benefits, OPM adjusted the commencement date of Prasch’s retirement annuity and computed an overpayment of $14,703.62.and sent a proposed repayment schedule. Prasch requested a waiver of the repayment obligation, lower installments, or a compromise payment, but he did not ask for reconsideration of OPM’s decisions as to the existence of the overpayment or its amount. OPM affirmed its initial decision, finding that Prasch should have known that he could not receive dual benefits and rejecting his claim of financial hardship, but extended the time for repayment. The Merit Systems Protection denied an appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Prasch v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Stephenson began receiving a Federal Employees Retirement System disability retirement, annuity and applied for SSA disability benefits, as required of applicants for FERS disability retirement. SSA determined that he was entitled to receive monthly SSA disability benefits; the Office of Personnel Management reduced his FERS annuity, 5 U.S.C. 8452(a)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 423. The Social Security Act allows a “trial work period,” without loss of benefits. Stephenson completed a nine-month trial work period and demonstrated ability to work. SSA notified Stephenson that he was not entitled to payments beginning September 2009, but that he could get a 36-month extended period of eligibility after the trial work period. Stephenson requested that OPM terminate the offset in his FERS annuity. OPM denied the request finding that he retained eligibility for Social Security benefits and that the offset did not depend on actual receipt of benefits. An administrative judge and the Merit Systems Protection Board denied appeals, acknowledging section 8452’s use of the word “entitled,” not “eligible,” but finding Stephenson remained “entitled” to SSA benefits during the 36-month period. The Federal Circuit reversed; because Stephenson performed substantial gainful activity during that period, he was not “entitled” to benefits under section 223 of the Social Security Act. View "Stephenson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Sexton, a smoker, spent 25 years working in coal mines. He first applied for Black Lung Act (30 U.S.C. 901) benefits in 1973. The application was unsuccessful as were two other claims. In 2001, two years after the denial became final, Sexton filed a subsequent claim. The district director recommended an award of benefits. Buck Creek Coal requested a formal hearing. While his claim was pending Sexton died. His widow filed her own claim and the district director issued a proposed order awarding benefits in the survivor claim. Buck Creek requested a hearing. The administrative law judge considered four medical opinions, and based on that new evidence, determined that Sexton suffered a total disability from clinical and legal pneumoconiosis and that Sexton established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 725.309 and awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed with respect to Sexton’s claim and affirmed in part and vacated in part with respect to the survivor claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that 20 C.F.R. 725.309 is valid and was correctly applied and that the Board’s decision did not violate principles of finality or res judicata. View "Buck Creek Coal Co. v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits. The court rejected plaintiff's contention to the extent that she alleged the ALJ failed to develop the record or make explicit findings regarding the mental and physical demands of her past relevant work as a factory packer and assembler. The court concluded that the ALJ had sufficient evidence on the record as a whole to reach his determination where the ALJ adequately compared the demands of plaintiff's past with her residual functioning capacity to perform light work, including with her manipulative limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of benefits. View "Young v. Astrue" on Justia Law