Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Adams worked in coal mines for 17 years, leaving A & E Coal in 1988, after 12 years, because he was having difficulty breathing. He has not worked since. Adams also smoked cigarettes for about 25 years, averaging a pack a day before quitting in 1998 or 1999. Adams filed his first claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act 30 U.S.C. 901 in 1988. His claim was denied: He did not prove that his pneumoconiosis was caused in part by his coal-mine work, or that his pneumoconiosis totally disabled him. In 2007, Adams filed a second claim. Two pulmonologists agreed that he was completely disabled, but disagreed on what lung diseases Adams had, and on what caused them. An Administrative Law Judge awarded benefits, finding that Adams had pneumoconiosis, that the disease was caused by Adams’s exposure to coal dust during his coal-mine employment, and that he was totally disabled because of the disease. The Benefits Review Board and the Third Circuit affirmed. Although the ALJ was not required to look at the preamble to the regulations to assess the doctors’ credibility, he was entitled to do so. View "A & E Coal Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Filus, a 50-year-old former truck driver, has twice applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming that back problems have left him incapable of gainful employment. An administrative law judge concluded that Filus could perform some light work and denied his most recent application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the denial. The ALJ adequately considered Filus’s testimony about the limiting effects of his pain along with his testimony that he regularly completed his daily household activities without any pain medication, not even over-the-counter products.View "Filus v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Banks worked as a coal miner for 17 years and smoked about one pack of cigarettes per day for 38 years. His employment ended in 1991. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2003, Banks filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which provides benefits to coal miners who become disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 901. An ALJ found that Banks had shown a change in his condition and that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis which substantially contributed to his total disability. Banks was awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the regulatory interpretation urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The ALJ relied on reasoned medical opinions. View "Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Palmquist, a veteran, injured in a helicopter crash that caused residual brain injury, was entitled to preference in federal employment, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C), 3309(1), 3313(2)(A). The VA hired him as a medical support assistant. Aichner was his supervisor. Palmquist applied for promotion but did not receive an interview. He believed that the VA had not honored his preference, and told Aichner that he was going to complain to the equal employment opportunity specialist and his congressman. He did so. Aichner and Palmquist maintained a generally positive relationship for the next two years, but Palmquist was sometimes preoccupied, left the unit during working hours to do personal business, distracted other employees, and used his computer for personal purposes. Palmquist sought a new position. An interview went well. Interviewers warned Palmquist against unsolicited post-interview contact, but he e-mailed both to reiterate his qualifications. Aichner gave a generally favorable recommendation, but the recommendation was one factor in Palmquist not getting the job. The court rejected his claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701-796. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act does not entitle a plaintiff to relief when retaliation for complaints about disability discrimination is a motivating factor in, but not the “but-for” cause of, adverse employment action. View "Palmquist v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Gallo served as an FAA air traffic control specialist from 1982 until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received OWCP benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an operational ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the Agency terminated OWCP benefit. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration for restoration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. The Agency assigned Gallo to a supervisory ATCS position. In setting her salary, the Agency did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees during while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting “resumes employment with the Federal Government” under section 8151(a), and any pay increases that Gallo would have received based on her creditable service time with the federal government are “benefits based on length of service.” View "Gallo v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rebecca Gonzalez (Relator) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Defendants, Fresenius Medical Care N.A., Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., Bio-Medical Applications of Texas, Inc. (collectively, Fresenius), and Dr. Alfonzo Chavez. Relator also brought retaliation claims against Fresenius and her former supervisor Larry Ramirez. The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on the remaining claims. The district court then awarded Fresenius $15,360 in attorney's fees from Relator's counsel. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in all instances, holding (1) the district court correctly granted Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Relator's FCA claims, and the court's FCA jury instructions were not in error; (2) the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Relator's retaliation claims; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927. View "Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N.A." on Justia Law

Brault applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in 2007, claiming that he became disabled in 2006 because of nerve damage in his left arm and a cervical spine injury he sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested an administrative hearing. Brault’s counsel asserted a Daubert-like objection to the vocational expert’s testimony, contending it was unreliable. The ALJ never directly responded to the objections, but issued a ruling which relied on the VE’s testimony, agreed that positions existed in the eight DOT positions the VE had identified at the numbers the VE had given, and denied Brault’s application for benefits. The district court affirmed the denial. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge was not required to state expressly his reasons for accepting a vocational expert’s challenged testimony.View "Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits. Specifically, he objected to the ALJ's finding, without considering the testimony of a vocational expert, that plaintiff was able to engage in gainful activity. The court concluded that the ALJ erred by relying solely on the guidelines to determine plaintiff was "not disabled." Because the ALJ determined that plaintiff suffered from severe mental impairments, the ALJ should have consulted a vocational expert in determining whether plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform other jobs that existed in significant number in the national economy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brock v. Astrue" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Department of Defense retired in 2007 then served as a re-employed annuitant for a two-year term ending January 3, 2009. Like many Department employees, he was subject to the National Security Personnel System, and eligible for performance-based bonuses and salary increases until the system was repealed in 2009. He qualified in 2008, but was ineligible for a salary increase because of his two-year contract; by regulation, the effective date of any salary increase would be the first day of the first pay period on or after January 1. The Department denied a bonus, arguing that the effective date was the same as the effective of a salary increase. The employee argued that the effective date should be either the end of the appraisal period (September 30, 2008) or the first day of the following year. In his class action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the district court ruled in favor of the Department. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and deferring to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation. View "Price v. Panetta" on Justia Law

Firefighters, who suffered career-ending injuries during required training exercises, obtained line-of-duty disability pensions and sought continuing health coverage under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10, which requires employers of full-time firefighters to pay health insurance premiums for the firefighter and family if the firefighter suffers a catastrophic injury as a result of a response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency. The trial court dismissed a declaratory judgment action by one firefighter and affirmed denial of the insurance benefit for one firefighter. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court held that an "emergency" means an unforeseen circumstance calling for urgent and immediate action and can arise in a training exercise. The other firefighter had obtained a declaratory judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. The supreme court distinguished the situation because, although he was instructed to "respond as if it were an actual emergency," he was not injured while making an urgent response to unforeseen circumstances involving an imminent danger to person or property. View "Gaffney v. Bd. of Tr. of Orland Fire Prot. Dist." on Justia Law