Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

The New Mexico Legislature passed House Bill 59 during the 2011 legislative session. The Bill sought to amend five different sections of the Unemployment Compensation Act in order to address an impending insolvency in the unemployment compensation fund. In addition to reducing benefits to the unemployed, House Bill 59 increased employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund over contributions that would be made in 2011. Governor Susana Martinez partially vetoed the Bill by striking one of the variables necessary to calculate employer contributions beginning on January 1, 2012. The Petitioners, each of whom are legislators, sought a writ of mandamus to invalidate Governor Martinez's partial veto. Because the effect of the veto was to exempt most employers from making what would otherwise be mandatory contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for calendar year 2012, the Supreme Court held that the partial veto was invalid. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to order that House Bill 59 be reinstated as passed by the Legislature. View "State of NM ex rel Stewart v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After developing pain in his neck and shoulders, Petitioner Gordon George was diagnosed with cancer in 2003 and underwent surgery and radiotherapy. During his recovery, he continued to experience pain spanning from his neck to his shoulder and arm. Petitioner applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits. After many and various hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that for the period June 1, 2003 through July 31, 2005, Petitioner was disabled during that period. But the ALJ further found that Petitioner's condition improved dramatically over time and that by August 1, 2005, he no longer met any disability listing. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner raised several challenges to the ALJ's determination that he suffered no legally cognizable disability after August 2005. Upon review, the Court rejected all those challenges, and affirmed for substantially the reasons given by the district court, with one exception. The Court found that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether, after August 1, 2005, Petitioner suffered from a mental disability. In our case, by contrast, the ALJ has not made any factual findings "one way or the other" about the existence, severity, or functional limitations, if any, imposed by Petitioner's mental condition: "[i]t's entirely possible the ALJ on remand will find Mr. George's mental health issues have no impact on his ability to work." The Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "George v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Saterlee appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny social security disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly rejecting her hand impairment as medically nondeterminable at step two and consequently not including it in the RFC that formed the basis of the dispositive hypothetical to the Vocational Expert; and (2) failing to perform a proper credibility analysis in determining that complaints of limitations other than, or in excess of, those later included in the RFC were not credible. The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ was "undeniably wrong" about the lack of documented medical evidence of Plaintiff's condition that gave rise to the alleged numbness, "undercutting the categorical rejection of such an impairment on this threshold basis." The Court remanded the case for an administrative decision that properly accounted for all of the evidence of record. View "Saterlee v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ellen St. Louis appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) that denied her claim for unemployment benefits. Early 2009, Petitioner received a disciplinary notice stating that her conduct was not in line with company policy because she appeared to be asleep at work and was argumentative when her trainer instructed her regarding her faulty soldering work. Subsequently, Petitioner informed a human resources representative that she was having difficulties breathing and that she was depressed. The human resources representative recommended she take medical leave. Petitioner claims that when she returned to work she could no longer perform soldering work because the fumes caused headaches, and caused her to shake, cough, and have difficulty breathing. The record indicated that she never provided Insight Technology with any medical records or doctor's instructions regarding her breathing problems or opinions regarding her inability to do soldering work. Petitioner was ultimately terminated for poor work performance. She applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the record supported the determination that Petitioner was terminated for misconduct, and that there was no error in the Board's decision. View "Appeal of Ellen St. Louis " on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant Dennis Current appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission's denial of his unemployment benefits. Claimant argued that the Commission erred in finding he willfully made a false statement, and in failing to call one of his witnesses. The Department of Labor argued the Commission's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Supreme Court found that there was indeed substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's findings that Claimant willfully made a false statement. The Court also found that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in finding that one of Claimant's witnesses would not provide relevant testimony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Current v. Haddons Fencing, Inc. " on Justia Law

For 12 months following his injury, plaintiff, a police officer injured on duty, received salary under the Public Employee Disability Act. For a short time thereafter, he received salary through a combination of accrued sick and vacation time, light duty, and temporary total disability payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act. While plaintiff received salary under PEDA, the city deducted 20 percent of his health insurance premiums from his paycheck, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. After PEDA benefits expired, plaintiff continued to pay 20 percent of the premiums. When he was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension under the Illinois Pension Code, the city began paying 100 percent of the premiums, as required by the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10(a). Plaintiff's request for reimbursement for premiums paid since the date of injury was refused. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the city. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. Under PSEBA, an employer's obligation to pay the entire health insurance premium for an injured officer and his family attaches on the date that it is determined that the injury is "catastrophic," the date it is determined that the injured officer is permanently disabled and eligible for a line-of-duty disability pension. View "Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant William Rigoli appealed an Industrial Commission's decision that found him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment. Claimant worked as a toy department manager for Respondent Wal-Mart, and was fired for using foul language and leaving before his assigned shift was completed. Initially, Claimant was determined by the Department of Labor to be eligible for unemployment benefits, but his employer appealed his eligibility. The Department ultimately concluded that Claimant was ineligible, and he appealed to the Industrial Commission. The Commission upheld the Department's conclusion and denied benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was substantial and competent evidence the Commission relied upon to conclude that Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct, and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment benefits. View "Rigoli v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant David Tarbet worked for Employer J.R. Simplot Company for thirty-six years until an accident in 2007 left him totally and permanently disabled. The issue before the Industrial Commission (Commission) was whether Employer was liable for all or only a part of Claimant’s income benefits. If Claimant’s total disability resulted solely from the last accident, Employer would be liable for all of the income benefits. If his total disability resulted from the combined effects of both that injury and impairments that pre-existed that injury, then Employer was liable only for that portion of the income benefits for the disability caused by the accident, and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) would be liable for the remainder. The Industrial Commission found that the April 2007 accident was Claimant’s final industrial accident, that he was totally and permanently disabled as a result of the final accident, and that the impairments that existed prior to that accident did not contribute to his total disability. It found that ISIF was not liable for Claimant’s benefits and dismissed the complaint against it. Employer then appealed. Upon review of the Commission's record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's order. View "Tarbet v. J.R. Simplot Co. " on Justia Law

Petitioner Shanna Locker appealed the Industrial Commission’s (Commission) finding that she was insubordinate when she failed to provide a medical release at the request of her employer, Logan’s Foodtown. The Commission found that this constituted employment-related misconduct which rendered Petitioner ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Upon review of the record before the Commission, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Locker v. How Soel, Inc " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cynthia Anderson appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Cato Corporation on her claim of discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. A month or two after Cato terminated her employment, Plaintiff asked for a letter stating the reasons for her termination so that she could apply for public health benefits. A Cato supervisor wrote that Plaintiff "was terminated due to pregnancy related illnesses. [Plaintiff] needed off three weeks for bed rest required by a doctor. However, according to Cato policy a part time sales associate has to be release[d] if she/he needs off for longer than seven days unless she/he has been employed for 365 days. [Plaintiff] did not apply to the guidelines; therefore she was forced to be terminated." The supervisor's undisputed testimony was that Plaintiff "told me that she needed me to put on [the letter] it was because of her pregnancy." After Plaintiff filed suit, Cato moved for summary judgment. The district court determined that the letter was not direct evidence of discrimination. The court considered it "significant" that Plaintiff asked for the letter and told her supervisors what the letter should state as reasons for her termination. The court concluded that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for discrimination but that the evidence did not raise a disputed issue of material fact. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the letter was indeed not direct evidence of discrimination, and agreed with the district court's reasoning that Plaintiff could make a prima facie case but that summary judgment was appropriate. View "Anderson v. Cato Corporation" on Justia Law