Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Plaintiff-Appellant John Conger appealed the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental social security income benefits. Plaintiff applied for benefits in 2005 alleging he was unable to work because of degenerative disk disease, spondylosis, arthritis, depression, and problems sleeping. His application was denied at the administrative level after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform simple and routine medium exertional work that required no more than occasional stooping and no contact with the public. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, Plaintiff filed his complaint in the district court. The district court adopted the report and affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the ALJ's RFC finding and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the district court and Commissioner's rulings. View "Conger v. Astrue" on Justia Law

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The primary question in this case was whether a workplace injury that Plaintiff Nancy Petock characterized as an aggravation or worsening of an earlier compensable injury can give rise to a new three-year period in which she could demand reinstatement or reemployment. The trial court held that it could not and granted Defendant Asante's (dba Asante Health System) summary judgment motion. Although the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that an aggravation of an earlier injury cannot give rise to new reinstatement rights, it concluded that there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff had sustained a "new and separate injury" in 2005 that would give rise to those rights, and remanded the case. On review, Plaintiff argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an aggravation of an earlier injury cannot give rise to a right to reinstatement under ORS 659A.043 or a right to reemployment under ORS 659A.046. Though the Supreme Court disagreed with some of the appellate court's reasoning, it affirmed the decision to reverse the trial court for further proceedings: "Even if defendant were correct that the same facts cannot give rise to an aggravation claim and a compensable injury claim (a proposition with which [the Court] noted our disagreement), [the Court] fail[ed] to see the relevance of that proposition in the context of defendant's summary judgment motion. On this record, Plaintiff was free to argue that her 2005 injury was a compensable injury." View "Petock v. Asante" on Justia Law

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After Employee was unable to successfully complete her necessary training, Employer gave her the option to resign immediately or to be placed on a thirty-day unpaid leave of absence. Employee opted to resign immediately and thereafter sought unemployment insurance benefits. The Department of Workforce Development denied Employee's application for benefits on the grounds the Employee voluntarily left employment and did so without good cause. An ALJ concluded (1) Employee did not voluntarily quit her position but was constructively discharged, and (2) Employee was disqualified from receiving benefits because she had breached a duty reasonably owed to her employer, which breach constituted just cause for her termination. The Unemployment Insurance Review Board adopted and approved the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Employee's claim, holding (1) the Board's finding that Employee breached a duty reasonably owed to Employer was reasonable; and (2) it was reasonable for the Board to find that Employee was discharged for just cause and was therefore ineligible for benefits. View "Recker v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev. Review Bd." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellee Denise Zaricor-Ritchie appealed the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits and Supplement Security Income. Plaintiff claimed she was disabled by bipolar disorder and depression. After administrative denials of her claims for benefits, she had two hearings before an ALJ, who concluded she was not disabled at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process. Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ erred in his treatment of the medical source evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment; and (3) the ALJ failed to perform a proper analysis in concluding that she could return to her past relevant work as a dishwasher. Taking each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn, the Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ's analysis was sufficient to support its decision. The Court affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits. View "Zaricor-Ritchie v. Astrue" on Justia Law

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The New Mexico Legislature passed House Bill 59 during the 2011 legislative session. The Bill sought to amend five different sections of the Unemployment Compensation Act in order to address an impending insolvency in the unemployment compensation fund. In addition to reducing benefits to the unemployed, House Bill 59 increased employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund over contributions that would be made in 2011. Governor Susana Martinez partially vetoed the Bill by striking one of the variables necessary to calculate employer contributions beginning on January 1, 2012. The Petitioners, each of whom are legislators, sought a writ of mandamus to invalidate Governor Martinez's partial veto. Because the effect of the veto was to exempt most employers from making what would otherwise be mandatory contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for calendar year 2012, the Supreme Court held that the partial veto was invalid. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to order that House Bill 59 be reinstated as passed by the Legislature. View "State of NM ex rel Stewart v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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After developing pain in his neck and shoulders, Petitioner Gordon George was diagnosed with cancer in 2003 and underwent surgery and radiotherapy. During his recovery, he continued to experience pain spanning from his neck to his shoulder and arm. Petitioner applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits. After many and various hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that for the period June 1, 2003 through July 31, 2005, Petitioner was disabled during that period. But the ALJ further found that Petitioner's condition improved dramatically over time and that by August 1, 2005, he no longer met any disability listing. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner raised several challenges to the ALJ's determination that he suffered no legally cognizable disability after August 2005. Upon review, the Court rejected all those challenges, and affirmed for substantially the reasons given by the district court, with one exception. The Court found that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether, after August 1, 2005, Petitioner suffered from a mental disability. In our case, by contrast, the ALJ has not made any factual findings "one way or the other" about the existence, severity, or functional limitations, if any, imposed by Petitioner's mental condition: "[i]t's entirely possible the ALJ on remand will find Mr. George's mental health issues have no impact on his ability to work." The Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "George v. Astrue" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Donna Saterlee appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny social security disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly rejecting her hand impairment as medically nondeterminable at step two and consequently not including it in the RFC that formed the basis of the dispositive hypothetical to the Vocational Expert; and (2) failing to perform a proper credibility analysis in determining that complaints of limitations other than, or in excess of, those later included in the RFC were not credible. The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ was "undeniably wrong" about the lack of documented medical evidence of Plaintiff's condition that gave rise to the alleged numbness, "undercutting the categorical rejection of such an impairment on this threshold basis." The Court remanded the case for an administrative decision that properly accounted for all of the evidence of record. View "Saterlee v. Astrue" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Ellen St. Louis appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) that denied her claim for unemployment benefits. Early 2009, Petitioner received a disciplinary notice stating that her conduct was not in line with company policy because she appeared to be asleep at work and was argumentative when her trainer instructed her regarding her faulty soldering work. Subsequently, Petitioner informed a human resources representative that she was having difficulties breathing and that she was depressed. The human resources representative recommended she take medical leave. Petitioner claims that when she returned to work she could no longer perform soldering work because the fumes caused headaches, and caused her to shake, cough, and have difficulty breathing. The record indicated that she never provided Insight Technology with any medical records or doctor's instructions regarding her breathing problems or opinions regarding her inability to do soldering work. Petitioner was ultimately terminated for poor work performance. She applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the record supported the determination that Petitioner was terminated for misconduct, and that there was no error in the Board's decision. View "Appeal of Ellen St. Louis " on Justia Law

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Claimant-Appellant Dennis Current appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission's denial of his unemployment benefits. Claimant argued that the Commission erred in finding he willfully made a false statement, and in failing to call one of his witnesses. The Department of Labor argued the Commission's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Supreme Court found that there was indeed substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's findings that Claimant willfully made a false statement. The Court also found that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in finding that one of Claimant's witnesses would not provide relevant testimony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Current v. Haddons Fencing, Inc. " on Justia Law

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For 12 months following his injury, plaintiff, a police officer injured on duty, received salary under the Public Employee Disability Act. For a short time thereafter, he received salary through a combination of accrued sick and vacation time, light duty, and temporary total disability payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act. While plaintiff received salary under PEDA, the city deducted 20 percent of his health insurance premiums from his paycheck, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. After PEDA benefits expired, plaintiff continued to pay 20 percent of the premiums. When he was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension under the Illinois Pension Code, the city began paying 100 percent of the premiums, as required by the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10(a). Plaintiff's request for reimbursement for premiums paid since the date of injury was refused. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the city. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. Under PSEBA, an employer's obligation to pay the entire health insurance premium for an injured officer and his family attaches on the date that it is determined that the injury is "catastrophic," the date it is determined that the injured officer is permanently disabled and eligible for a line-of-duty disability pension. View "Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law