Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to Appellant Crozer Chester Medical Center (Crozer) in its attempt to force the Department of Labor and Industry (Department) to reimburse it for medical fees. Claimant William Radel suffered a work-related injury while lifting a bundle of rebar for his employer. The claimant underwent surgery at Crozer, and Crozer sent claimant's records and the bill to claimant's insurance company, Zurich North American Insurance (Zurich). Zurich did not pay, nor did it deny the claim. Crozer then turned to the State for reimbursement. The Department rejected the application as "premature," because Zurich's non-payment made an "outstanding issue of liability/compensability for the alleged injury." Crozer then petitioned the Commonwealth Court to force the Department to pay. The Supreme Court agreed that Crozer's application for reimbursement was premature. The Court found that Crozer did not try to resolve Zurich's nonpayment before petitioning the State or the Commonwealth Court. The Court affirmed the decision of the Department and the lower court, and dismissed Crozer's petition for a writ of mandamus.

The Secretary of the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") petitioned the district court to enforce administrative document subpoenas after a DOL investigation into the management of respondents (collectively, "Funds"), which arose out of a $10.1 million loss of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1134(a)(1), plan assets, as a result of the Funds' investments in entities related to Bernard L. Madoff. At issue was whether the attorney-client and work product privileges protected some of the materials requested by the Secretary from disclosure and whether the district court erred in applying the fiduciary exception to override these privileges. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the Secretary's petition and held that the fiduciary exception applied to the Funds' claims of attorney-client privilege and no good cause showing was required in the ERISA context. The court also held that the Funds have failed to carry their burden to demonstrate the applicability of the work product doctrine.

The plaintiff was an "excepted" (not in the competitive service or the Senior Executive Service) employee of the Veterans Canteen Service and was not preference-eligible (as a veteran or close relative). She appealed a notice of termination for misconduct. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she had been hired under 38 U.S.C. 7802(e). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute allows removal of such employees without regard to other civil service laws. Civil Service Due Process Amendments in 1990 did not extend protections to excepted, non-preference eligible employees.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.

Plaintiff, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") and plaintiff-intervenor appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Lucent Technologies, Inc. ("Lucent"), plaintiff-intervenor's former employer, on claims that he was terminated in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, ("FEHA"), Cal.Gov't Code 12920.5. DFEH also challenged the district court's finding of diversity jurisdiction and plaintiff-intervenor challenged the district court's denial of his motion to intervene. The court held that the district court correctly determined that it possessed jurisdiction where the statutory scheme did not support a finding that DFEH was a real party in the controversy for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The court also held that the district court's denial of plaintiff-intervenor's motion to intervene as a right was not in error where he failed to demonstrate that he was not adequately represented by California and that the court did not abuse its discretion in placing various limitations on him as a permissive intervenor. The court further held that summary judgment was proper where there was no genuine issue of material fact as to DFEH's claims and where DFEH failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The court finally held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff-intervenor's wrongful termination claim where DFEH could not prevail on any of its claims under the FEHA.