Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Joseph Tanner sought to overturn a decision of defendant California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) that significantly reduced his expected retirement benefit. The Court of Appeal found that Tanner’s argument appeared to be that under contract principles, he and the city made a mutual mistake in entering into a November 2006 agreement because they thought all of his compensation in that agreement could be used to calculate the amount of his retirement benefit, and when CalPERS informed them otherwise, they reformed the agreement to achieve their original intent by folding various miscellaneous items of compensation in the November 2006 agreement into his new, greater base salary in the March 2007 agreement. The Court concluded, however, that Tanner’s appeal was without merit regardless of these contract arguments, or any of the other arguments Tanner made. The Court agreed with the trial court that the greater base salary in the March 2007 agreement did not qualify as Tanner’s payrate for purposes of calculating the amount of his retirement benefit because that salary was not paid pursuant to a publicly available pay schedule. For this reason, Tanner had no right to have his retirement benefit calculated based on that greater base salary. View "Tanner v. CalPERS" on Justia Law

Baptist began working at Ford’s assembly plant, operating a forklift. Less than three months later, Baptist inadvertently hit a pillar, injuring his left wrist. He visited Ford’s medical department and submitted an injury report. An investigator and Ford’s physician doubted Baptist’s account of his injury; Baptist did not report the incident properly and refused to release medical records from a prior workers’ compensation case against another employer involving an injury to his other wrist. Ford paid for Baptist’s initial visit to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Heller. The parties are litigating Baptist’s workers’ compensation claim. After working two months, Baptist again sought medical attention. Dr. Heller diagnosed him with a complete ligament tear, recommended surgery, indicated that Baptist was not able to perform the essential function of his job, and cleared him to return to work if he did not lift or grip over five pounds with his left hand. Disagreeing with Ford's doctor, Baptist believed that this prevented him from operating the forklift and asked for another position. He did not work for several days. Ford suspended him for one month. When Baptist returned, he was told that the only available work was as a forklift driver. Baptist later testified that he was told that he would be fired unless he agreed to state that his injury did not happen at work. The company denied this assertion. Baptist was discharged for having three consecutive absences without justification. In a suit alleging retaliation for exercising his workers’ compensation rights, the court granted Ford summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A triable issue exists regarding whether Baptist was put to the impracticable choice between keeping his job or giving up a key argument for workers’ compensation. View "James Baptist v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case was whether the 2011 suspension of State pension cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) contravened a term of the contract right granted under the earlier enacted non-forfeitable right statute, L.1997, c.113 (codified as N.J.S.A.43:3C-9.5). Qualifying members of the State's public pension systems or funds were granted a non-forfeitable right to receive benefits as provided under the laws governing the retirement system or fund. By codifying that non-forfeitable right to receive benefits, the Legislature provided that the benefits program, for any employee for whom the right has attached, could not be reduced. Whether COLAs were part of the benefits program protected by N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5 depended on whether the Legislature, in enacting N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(a) and (b), intended to create a contractual right to COLAs. The Supreme Court found in this instance, proof of unequivocal intent to create a non-forfeitable right to yet-unreceived COLAs was lacking. Although both plaintiff retirees and the State advanced plausible arguments on that question, "the lack of such unmistakable legislative intent dooms plaintiffs' position." The Court concluded that the Legislature retained its inherent sovereign right to act in its best judgment of the public interest and to pass legislation suspending further COLAs. Having determined that there was no contract violation, and because the additional arguments advanced by plaintiffs were not meritorious, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment holding to the contrary. View "Berg v. Christie" on Justia Law

In 2010-2011, the San Francisco Unified School District employed 11 substitute teachers who worked on an as-needed basis and 15 paraprofessional classified employees. Each of the 26 employees received a letter during the spring of the 2010-2011 school year advising that they had a reasonable assurance of employment for the following 2011-2012 school year. The 26 sought unemployment benefits for the period between the last date of the regular session of the 2010-2011 school year, May 27, 2011, and the first day of instruction for the 2011-2012 school year, August 15, 2011. The Employment Development Department denied benefits. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reversed. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the District: “in effect what the claimants ... are requesting is … a full year‘s income … they have agreed to work and be paid for only 41 weeks of each year. … school employees can plan for those periods of unemployment and thus are not experiencing the suffering from unanticipated layoffs that the employment-security law was intended to alleviate.” View "United Educators of San Francisco. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner has been employed by the Raleigh County Board of Education as a physical therapist since 1987. Her initial “Teacher’s Probationary Contract of Employment” provided that she would be paid an annual salary “for an annual employment term of 120 days.” In 1989, petitioner executed a “Continuing Contract of Employment,” which likewise provided that she was to be employed “for an employment term of 120 days.” She requested enrollment in the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS). Contributions on petitioner’s behalf were made to TRS continuously from 1987 through 1991, when she enrolled in the newly-created Teachers’ Defined Contribution System and froze her TRS contributions. In 1999, she transferred her TRS funds and service credit into TDC. In 2008, petitioner transferred back to the TRS. The Board ascertained that petitioner was ineligible to participate in either plan because she was only working 120 days a year and indicated that the money contributed would be returned to her and her employer. Petitioner testified that she believed that those working less than 200 days were not ineligible, but would merely receive fractional service credit for the year. The hearing examiner determined that West Virginia Code 18-7A-3 requires a 200-day contract before one may participate in TRS, but that there was no such 200-day requirement to participate in TDC. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was “sympathetic," but could not confer statutory eligibility where none exists. View "Ringel-Williams v. W.V. Consol. Pub. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

In 2008, Joseph Gerdon was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment. He was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by a coworker, who drove off the road. The Industrial Commission awarded Gerdon benefits. Gerdon requested a hearing to determine whether he was also entitled to benefits for a compensable psychological injury. That issue was heard before a referee, who issued proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation that Gerdon had failed to prove that he was entitled to additional psychological care. The Commission adopted the referee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued an order. Gerdon appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Because the Commission’s decision was based upon its constitutional right to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of conflicting expert opinions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Gerdon v. Con Paulos, Inc." on Justia Law

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

While claimant-appellant Judith Weible was employed by Safeway, Inc., she requested time off because she had to have surgery. Safeway granted her request and agreed to hold her job until she was able to return to work, which she intended to do. She was gone for approximately six weeks. While on leave, claimant applied for unemployment benefits. She was denied because during her leave of absence she was still employed, even though she was not working. An appeals examiner upheld the denial, and the Industrial Commission upheld the appeals examiner. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Weible v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law

Dreher had been a maintenance supervisor at an Alliance apartment complex for 74 days when he slipped and fell on concrete walkway in the complex in the rain. Dreher sustained a fractured pelvis and injuries to his neck, shoulder, leg, and knee. He suffered gait derangement, a sleep disorder, and headaches. Dreher required surgery to repair pelvic fractures, another surgery to repair a torn meniscus, and another surgery to address issues with his foot and ankle. Dreher sought compensation for a psychiatric injury. An evaluation concluded that Dreher suffered a psychiatric disability as a result of the accident, including depression, difficulty sleeping, and panic attacks. The ALJ found that Dreher sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment but denied his claim as barred by section 3208.3(d) because Dreher was employed by Alliance for less than six months and his psychiatric injury did not result from a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. On reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board found that the injury was not barred. The court of appeal annulled the decision. Dreher’s testimony that he was surprised by the slick surface because the other walkways had a rough surface, and that the walkway was later resurfaced, did not demonstrate that his injury was caused by an uncommon, unusual, or totally unexpected event. View "Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by American since 1988. On January 1, 2012, while working as a tower planner at O’Hare, plaintiff received a call from a friend at another airline, asking plaintiff to do something for a passenger who was scheduled to fly on American. Plaintiff requested that the catering department deliver a bottle of champagne and asked a flight attendant whether it would be possible to upgrade the passenger. The passenger was upgraded to first class. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because she upgraded the passenger and requested the champagne without proper authorization. American cited employee policies concerning dishonesty. Plaintiff applied for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department of Employment Security. American protested, alleging that plaintiff was ineligible because she was “discharged for misconduct connected with [her] work,” under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 820 ILCS 405/602(A). Following a hearing, a Department referee denied plaintiff’s application. The Board of Review affirmed. The circuit court reversed, finding that the actions which led to plaintiff’s discharge did not constitute “misconduct” under the strict statutory definition. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the circuit court decision, finding no illegal or intentionally tortious conduct, nor evidence of a deliberate rule violation. View "Petrovic v. Dep't of Emp't Sec." on Justia Law