Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Joyner served in the Marine Corps and completed a tour of duty in the Persian Gulf. During service, he was treated twice for neck pain. However, his separation from service examination indicated that his neck was “normal.” Joyner later filed a claim with the VA for disability compensation for chronic neck pain and other conditions. The VA regional office denied his claim for benefits for his neck pain. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, concluding that Joyner did not have a diagnosed neck condition and was not entitled to service connection under 38 U.S.C. 1110, a general provision that provides compensation for disabilities suffered in the line of duty. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1117, an additional disability compensation provision that applies to Gulf War Veterans. Pain can evidence a disability under that section. View "Joyner v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Young served as an Army combat engineer from 1965-1967, including duty in Vietnam. In 1984, Young applied for benefits with the VA Regional Office, describing “‘anxiety,’ ‘bad nerves,’ and ‘unable to adjust to society.’” The RO interpreted the claim as seeking an award of service connection due to PTSD, but denied it after Young failed to report for a VA medical examination. In 1989, a VA psychiatrist submitted a letter, stating that Young had been under his care since 1989 and was suffering from PTSD. The RO denied Young’s claim in 1989, 1990, and 1991 because the record did not establish exposure to an in-service stressor. The Board’s 1991 denial became final because Young did not appeal. Young sought to have his claim reopened. The RO denied the request in 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1997. In 1998, the RO received service department records documenting Young’s exposure to an in-service stressor for PTSD that had not been previously associated with his file and reopened Young’s claim. The agency granted him service connection with a 100% disability rating, effective to August 1992. Young sought an effective date of September 1984. The Veterans Court concluded that the effective date should be March, 1989. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Young v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Commander Cronin began active duty with the Navy in 1977. In 1978, she had a calcaneal spur in her heel. She had unsuccessful surgeries in 1979, 1993, 1994, and 1995. She was hospitalized for bipolar disorder in 1995. Beginning in 1998, medical professionals disagreed about whether she suffered from bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or some combination. She was diagnosed with chronic pain. Cronin alleged that during her service, she was subjected to physical and sexual assaults, stalking, and “extreme sexual harassment.” A social worker described these incidents as supporting a PTSD diagnosis. She had periods of limited duty. The Navy had selected Cronin for promotion, but in a 1994 letter, a Navy physician found her not fit for full duty. Her promotion was delayed. The Physical Evaluation Board assigned her a disability rating of 60% and placed her on the Temporary Disability Retired List. The Board for Correction of Naval Records upheld the promotion delay. In 1996, Cronin was formally placed on the TDRL and promoted. She was reevaluated every 18 months to continue receiving benefits. In 2000, the Board declined to find a compensable claim of PTSD or chronic pain disorder, concluded that her conditions had stabilized, and placed her on the Permanent Disability Retired List. Cronin sued in 2006. On remand, the trial court concluded that the 2003 Relief Act tolls the limitations period during time on the TDRL, so that the claims were timely, but affirmed the refusal to increase her disability rating. The Federal Circuit held that most of her claims were time barred. As to claims alleging PTSD, there was no timeliness issue, but they were properly rejected on the merits.View "Cronin v. United States" on Justia Law

Johnson served in the U.S. Army, 1970-197171. Years after leaving the service, he filed a claim for increased disability ratings for his service-connected disabilities, including rheumatic heart disease (then rated 10% disabling), and degenerative changes of the right and left knees (each knee rated 10% disabling). A VA regional office (RO) denied the claims, finding that he was not entitled to a rating of total disability based on individual unemployability. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed and denied his claim for extra-schedular consideration of the combined impact of his service-connected rheumatic heart disease and right knee disability under 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1). The Veterans Court affirmed, finding the CFR language ambiguous and deferring to the VA’s interpretation. The Federal Circuit reversed, citing plain language. Section 3.321(b)(1) entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extraschedular evaluation based on an individual disability not adequately captured by the schedular evaluations; it also entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extra-schedular evaluation based on multiple disabilities, the combined effect of which is exceptional and not captured by scheduler evaluations.View "Johnson v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Martin, an Army veteran, applied for educational-assistance benefits under 38 U.S.C. 3011. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the application, concluding that Mr. Martin was ineligible for benefits because the basis for his honorable discharge in 1990 constituted “willful misconduct.” The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The officially declared reason for Martin’s discharge was “alcohol rehabilitation failure.” The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that “alcohol rehabilitation failure” cannot be said always to constitute or result from willful misconduct, regardless of circumstances. Neither the Board nor the Veterans Court made any determination of what particular conduct constituted misconduct, engaged in with the state of mind required for willfulness, that led to the rehabilitation-failure determination.View "Martin v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Mrs. Rusick is the surviving spouse of veteran George Rusick, who served on active duty in the U.S. military 1942-1943. In 1983, a Veterans Administration regional office issued a decision continuing a 30-percent rating for Rusick’s service-connected anxiety disorder. With a service-connected hearing loss rated at 40 percent, Rusick’s combined rating was 60 percent. In 1996, the regional office increased the rating for his anxiety disorder to 100 percent. Rusick died in April 2000, with no pending claims for benefits. In May 2000, Mrs. Rusick filed a claim seeking dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) and accrued benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs denied both claims and she did not appeal. In September 2006, Mrs. Rusick filed another claim, asserting clear and unmistakable error in that Rusick should have received a 100 percent rating in 1983 because he was unemployable. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed that the regional office’s failure to assign a 100 percent rating in 1983 constituted CUE and that Mrs. Rusick was entitled to DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1318. The regional office implemented the Board’s decision by awarding DIC, but it denied accrued benefits under 38 U.S.C. 5121. The Board, Veterans Court, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Rusick v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Robertson voluntarily enlisted in the Army in 1963.After serving confinement for being absent without leave on two occasions for a total of about 340 days, Robertson was discharged in 1967 under conditions other than honorable, a character of discharge that can foreclose the receipt of veterans’ benefits. He later participated in President Ford’s clemency program, completed alternative service, and received a presidential pardon and a new clemency discharge. Despite his pardon and clemency discharge, the Department of Veterans Affairs has continued to deny Robertson’s claim for veterans’ benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Department of Veterans Affairs properly considered the misconduct underlying his pardoned offense to deny his application for benefits. Entitlement to veterans’ benefits under the clemency program was meant to be the exception, not the rule. View "Robertson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Larson, a Vietnam War veteran, suffered a gunshot wound in service. In 1969, he was granted a 40 percent combined disability rating. He did not appeal. In 2007, he claimed clear and unmistakable error (CUE), arguing misapplication of diagnostic codes in effect in 1969. The Regional Office denied his claim. The Board affirmed, stating: “the Veteran has not demonstrated that the law in effect during that time was incorrectly applied or that the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicators.” The Veterans Court rejected his challenges on the merits and a motion to modify the decision by deleting the phrase “or that the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicators.” Larson was concerned that the language could be interpreted as a ruling on a “correct facts” CUE claim, precluding him from raising such a claim in the future. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Veterans Court erred in holding that there is only one opportunity to raise any allegation of CUE for each claim decided by the Board. Under 38 C.F.R. 3.105(a) a veteran may raise a new argument that a RO committed CUE at any time. Larson only challenged the legal basis for the 1969 determination, and did not assert that the adjudicators did not have the correct facts before them; he remains free to raise a “correct facts” CUE claim, so his request for clarification of the Board’s decision was not moot. View "Larson v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

When an attorney successfully represents a veteran, the Veterans Administration may directly pay reasonable legal fees to the attorney from any past-due benefits awarded to the veteran, 38 U.S.C. 5904(d). For most types of claims, an attorney has one year to challenge denial of direct pay, 38 U.S.C. 7105, but for “simultaneously contested claims,” the period is 60 days, 38 U.S.C. 7105A. A regional office applied the 60-day period to reject a challenge filed by an attorney 90 days after written denial of his direct-fee request, based on its award to the veteran on a claim other than the claim for which the attorney represented the veteran. Because the statute does not define the term, the VA relied on 38 C.F.R. 20.3(p), which explains that simultaneously contested claim refers to the "situation in which the allowance of one claim results in the disallowance of another claim involving the same benefit or the allowance of one claim results in the payment of a lesser benefit to another claimant” and its Claim Adjudication Manual’s guidance that a denial of an attorney fee request should be treated as a simultaneously contested claim. The Board of Veterans Appeals, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Mason v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Stallworth served in the U.S. Army, 1974-1975, during which time he experienced a psychotic episode that was attributed to his illicit use of the drug LSD. He recovered with hospitalization, but relapsed following return to active duty and was diagnosed with acute paranoid schizophrenia. A treating physician noted that it was not clear whether Stallworth’s illness was caused by his drug use or by independent psychosis. An Army medical board found him unfit for further military duty. Weeks later, a VA Regional Office awarded Stallworth service connection for schizophrenia at a 50% disability rating. Thereafter, Stallworth was often admitted to inpatient psychiatric facilities where medical professionals repeatedly opined that he had “no mental disorder” and that Stallworth’s service connection diagnosis was in error. The VA severed Stallworth’s service connection on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) and declined to reopen his claim because of a lack of new evidence. In 1981, the Appeals Board affirmed. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Stallworth v. Shinseki" on Justia Law