Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Van Dermark served in the Navy from 1963 until his 1976 honorable discharge. The VA found Van Dermark to be totally and permanently disabled due to service-connected injuries. Van Dermark received treatment in Thailand (where he lived) at non-VA facilities, from physicians and others not affiliated with VA, in 2016 and in 2018, both times for cardiac conditions not related to his service-connected disability. For each of the two instances of treatment abroad, Van Dermark filed a claim with VA under 38 U.S.C 1728 and 1725 seeking VA payment—to him or his medical creditors—for the surgical or other heart-related treatment he received abroad.VA Community Care denied both claims. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals maintained the denials. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Section 1724(a) prohibits the VA from “furnish[ing] hospital . . . care or medical services” abroad, where the care or services are unrelated to the service-connected disability. The “furnishing” phrase encompasses the payment for a veteran’s hospital care or medical expenses abroad at issue here; sections 1728 and 1725 do not override that prohibition. View "Van Dermark v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Mattox served in the Navy from 1967-1971, including on a vessel in the waters of Vietnam. In 2015, Mattox sought disability benefits with a service connection for PTSD. He submitted the diagnosis by a private doctor. A VA psychologist concluded that Mattox did not present “a diagnosis of PTSD according to the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria” but that Mattox suffered from moderate alcohol and cannabis use disorder, which explained his depression, anxiety, and irritability. Mattox had indicated that he used cannabis “about daily.” The Board of Veterans’ Appeals and the Veterans Court affirmed the denial of Mattox’s claim.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Mattox’s appeal to the Board was not subject to the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, 131 Stat. 1105 (AMA); Mattox was not prejudiced by the Board’s failure to provide him with a notice of its decision that met the requirements of 38 U.S.C. 5104(b), as amended by the AMA. The Board did not err in concluding that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule, 38 U.S.C. 5107(b), did not apply because, although a veteran is entitled to the benefit of the doubt “where the evidence is in approximate balance,” it found that, in Mattox’s case, “the preponderance of the evidence” was against his claim for service connection. View "Mattox v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Hanser served in the Army from 1979-1999. In 2012, he was assigned 20% service-connected disability ratings, effective July 2011, for his left leg radiculopathy and his bilateral arm radiculopathy. In 2014 and 2015, lumbar and cervical spine examinations showed improvement in his conditions. in March 2016, the VA reduced his disability ratings to 0% for both his left leg and bilateral arm radiculopathy, effective June 2016. Hanser timely filed a notice of disagreement. Following examinations in October 2017, the VA confirmed the ratings reductions in December 2017.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals and the Veterans Court concluded that the procedural protections of 38 C.F.R. 3.344 did not apply to Hanser and affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Section 3.344(c) applies the procedures of sections 3.344(a) and (b) only to disability ratings that have continued at the same level for five years or more. Hanser’s ratings do not satisfy this condition. Section 3.344(c) guides the VA’s determinations as to whether procedures that make it more difficult to reduce a rating must be followed, and provides that such procedures apply when a rating has been in place, unchanged, for a long period, parenthetically defined as five years. View "Hanser v. McDonough" on Justia Law

In 2011, Cranford, on active duty in the Army, was charged with possessing and using Spice, an unregulated intoxicant, in violation of a lawful general order. Captain Lease recommended that Cranford be tried by general court-martial and forwarded the charges. Cranford requested to be discharged in lieu of trial by court-martial, acknowledging that the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorized the imposition of a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge for the charge. Cranford admitted guilt and acknowledged that he would qualify for an “other than honorable” (OTH) discharge, potentially barring him from receiving benefits. Cranford received an OTH discharge. Cranford later requested VA benefits. The regional office denied that request, reasoning that Cranford’s discharge status barred him from receiving benefits. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial, applying 38 C.F.R. 3.12(d)(1), to conclude that Cranford had been discharged under dishonorable conditions and was ineligible for benefits as a non-veteran under 38 U.S.C. 101(2).The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Board mischaracterized his discharge as being “in lieu of a general court-martial,” instead of a summary court-martial and that section 3.12(d)(1) did not apply to him because he had accepted an OTH discharge, not an “undesirable discharge.” An OTH discharge accepted in lieu of a general court-martial is equivalent to an undesirable discharge—despite the military service departments’ shift in terminology. View "Cranford v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Gudinas served in the Army, 1966-1968. In 2005, the VA determined that Gudinas suffered from service-connected PTSD and awarded him a 50 percent disability rating plus a 10 percent disability rating for service-connected tinnitus. In 2014, Gudinas filed an unsuccessful claim for service-connected sleep apnea. Gudinas timely filed a notice of disagreement. Gudinas sent a letter indicating that the claim was secondary to his service-connected PTSD, requested increased compensation for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU), and sought to increase his PTSD disability rating. The VA denied the TDIU claim but increased his PTSD disability rating to 100 percent, effective October 2015. Gudinas argued that 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b) entitled him to an effective date of May 2014, because his October 2015 submission constituted new and material evidence relating to his May 2014 claim.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals rejected that argument, noting that Gudinas’s May 2014 claim did “not mention a psychiatric disability” (PTSD), and that the claim contained no reference to an increase in the PTSD rating. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Even if Gudinas’s claim for sleep apnea were considered secondary to his PTSD claim, the two claims would not need to be treated as the same claim for purposes of determining their effective dates; the Board is not required to explicitly determine whether a submission constitutes “new and material evidence” where, as here, the conditions underlying the two claims have no apparent connection. View "Gudinas v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Rhone served in the military 1950-1953 and 1959-1988. In 1986, Rhone and JoAnne, divorced; the Florida Divorce Decree stated that JoAnne would receive 40% of Rhone’s military retirement benefits. In 1988, Rhone left military service due to disability. To receive disability compensation, Rhone waived part of his military retirement pay (38 U.S.C. 5305). The state court denied Rhone’s motion to modify the Divorce Decree, stating that the payment of retirement benefits constituted alimony, not a property division. The state court issued a Continuing Writ of Garnishment directing the VA to withhold that payment from Rhone’s retirement pay. The VA determined that the order obliged the VA to make payments from Rhone’s disability compensation. After Rhone attempted to avoid garnishment by renouncing benefits, in 2002 the VA determined that Rhone's compensation benefits were not subject to garnishment and had been erroneously withheld. Rhone was reimbursed for $27,664. In 2005, the VA determined that it must comply with the alimony award and resumed garnishing Rhone’s disability compensation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals issued a 2020 decision, finding the 1991 order “valid on its face” and providing for “permanent periodic alimony” so that the VA legally garnished Rhone’s disability compensation under 42 U.S.C. 659(a); (h)(1)(A)(ii)(V). The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. The statutes authorize the VA to withhold a portion of a veteran’s VA disability payment for alimony or child support pursuant to legal process when a veteran has waived a portion of military retirement pay to receive VA benefits. The VA lacks jurisdiction to decide questions associated with a state garnishment order. View "Rhone v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Department of Veterans Affairs rating schedule standardizes the evaluation of how severely diseases and injuries resulting from military service impair veterans’ earning capacity, 38 C.F.R. 4.1. The rating schedule is divided into diagnostic codes that provide disability ratings for various symptoms or conditions. The Federal Circuit, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 502, reviewed the VA’s interpretation of two diagnostic codes: DCs 5055 and 5257: the “Knee Replacement Manual Provision” and the “Knee Joint Stability Manual Provision.” The court concluded that DC 5055 is ambiguous as to whether it includes partial knee replacements and, that under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Secretary’s interpretation is not entitled to deference. A “Guidance” promulgated to clarify that the Provision applied only to total joint replacement did not go through the notice-and-comment procedure followed when the original Diagnostic Code was enacted. The court, therefore, applied the “pro-veteran” canon of construction. The court dismissed the challenge to the Knee Joint Stability Manual Provision as moot because the Secretary rescinded the Manual provision. View "Nova v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Air Force veteran Skaar was exposed to ionizing radiation while participating in a cleanup operation in Palomares, Spain following a 1966 midair collision involving a plane carrying nuclear weapons. In 1998, he was diagnosed with leukopenia. His doctor opined that exposure to ionizing radiation “appear[s] to be the positive agent” that historically causes leukopenia. Skaar filed an unsuccessful claim with the VA for service-connected benefits. Before the Veterans Court, he challenged the radiation dose estimates provided by the Air Force. The Veterans Court certified a class of similarly situated veterans who had participated in the Palomares cleanup operation, including veterans who had not received a Board decision but excluding veterans whose claims had been denied but not timely appealed.The Federal Circuit vacated. The Veterans Court lacked authority to certify a class that includes veterans who had not received a Board decision, a statutory prerequisite for the court’s jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. 7252(a). Jurisdiction over Skaar’s individual claim did not create further jurisdiction over similarly situated veterans whose individual claims were beyond the court’s jurisdiction. The court rejected Skaar’s argument that the Veterans Court should have equitably tolled the appeal period for veterans whose claims had been denied but not timely appealed and should have included such veterans as members of the certified class. None of the claimants alleged the requisite due diligence in pursuing their rights. View "Skaar v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Carter served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1979-1980; he was identified as having damaged a government vehicle. According to the military police (MP), Carter became combative during his apprehension and struck an MP. Another MP then struck Carter in the head with his nightstick, resulting in an in-service head injury. Carter has residuals of a traumatic brain injury due to the incident. In 1981, Carter filed a VA claim seeking benefits for his head injury. The regional office denied his claim, Under 38 C.F.R. 3.301(a), service connection may be granted only when a disability was incurred or aggravated in the line of duty “and not the result of the veteran’s own willful misconduct.” The office concluded Carter’s own action “was the proximate cause of his injuries.”The Board of Veterans’ Appeals reopened the matter in 2014. After the regional office completed additional fact-finding on remand, the Board concluded that Carter’s combative behavior during his arrest “represent[ed] deliberate or intentional wrongdoing on the part of [Carter] and reckless disregard of its probable consequences,” and that the MP’s use of force in response “reasonably f[ell] within the realm of ‘probable consequences.'” The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board applied the correct legal standard in determining that Carter’s injury was the result of his willful misconduct. View "Carter v. McDonough" on Justia Law

In 2006, LaBonte went absent without leave (AWOL) from the Army for six months. He voluntarily returned to his base, pleaded guilty to desertion in a court-martial proceeding, and received a Bad Conduct Discharge. In 2012, LaBonte was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), stemming from his combat service in Iraq. In 2014, he was found eligible for VA benefits for service-connected PTSD, traumatic brain injury, depression, headaches, back pain, tinnitus, a painful scar, and ulcers. In 2016, LaBonte received a 100% service-connected disability rating.In 2015, LaBonte applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), seeking retroactive medical retirement. He alleged that, while in the Army, he had permanent disabilities incurred during service that rendered him unfit for service before his absence without leave. In 2020, on remand, ABCMR again denied LaBonte’s claim. The Claims Court dismissed an appeal, finding that, in order for ABCMR to grant LaBonte disability retirement, it would have to correct LaBonte’s DD-214 Form to show that he was separated due to physical disability rather than due to a court-martial conviction and that 10 U.S.C. 1552(f), prohibited such a correction. The Federal Circuit reversed. ABCMR was not required to change LaBonte’s DD-214 in order to grant him disability retirement. The 214 is a record of events, not intended to have any legal effect on the termination of a soldier’s service. View "LaBonte v. United States" on Justia Law