Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Dean, a preference-eligible veteran, applied for a position as a “Recent Graduate” Wage and Hour Specialist within the Department of Labor. The announcement stated that the position “is a part of the Pathways Employment Program,” open only to “[e]ligible recent graduates from qualifying educational institutions” and separately identified job qualifications (which did not include a minimum educational requirement) and program eligibility, which required a “degree or certificate from a qualifying educational institution within the previous two years,” or previous six years for certain veterans; 34 veterans met the requirements. Dean was not considered because he had not graduated within the timeframe. Dean filed an unsuccessful Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA) appeal. The Board cited 5 U.S.C. 3302(1), authorizing the President to except positions from the competitive service, and 5 U.S.C. 3308, limiting OPM’s ability to include minimum educational requirements for positions in the competitive service that are subject to examination. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that that the Board had jurisdiction under section 3330a of the VEOA because sections 3302(1) and 3308 are statutes relating to veterans’ preference, and that Dean’s veterans’ preference rights under those sections were not violated. View "Dean v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, contending that the ALJ failed to properly weigh certain medical opinions in the record. The court concluded that the ALJ did not err in discussing, reviewing or giving less weight to plaintiff's primary treating psychiatrist's opinion. In this case, the ALJ noted that the psychiatrist's opinion was inconsistent with the totality of the medical evidence and not supported by petitioner’s demonstrated level of functioning. Further, the court concluded that the ALJ properly explained her reasons for giving little weight to the “other” medical sources, and the ALJ did not err in finding the totality of the medical evidence and plaintiff's demonstrated level of functioning were inconsistent with these “other” medical sources’ opinions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lawson v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of supplemental security income (SSI) where the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform sedentary work. The court concluded that the ALJ correctly gave less weight to the nurse practitioner's medical opinion where it was inconsistent with other opinions from plaintiff's treating physicians. Further, the ALJ did not err by failing to obtain vocational expert testimony and instead relying solely on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of supplemental security income (SSI) and disability insurance benefits (DIB). The court concluded that there is no proof that the ALJ did not consider the nurse practitioner's opinion as an "other" medical source; the ALJ rightly disregarded the nurse practitioner's opinion that plaintiff was unable to work because that involves an issue reserved for the Commissioner and is not the type of "medical opinion" to which the Commissioner gives controlling weight; and the ALJ's determination of plaintiff's residual functioning capacity (RFC) that she could perform the standing and walking requirements of light work is supported by substantial evidence. Further, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to not include additional manipulative limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order upholding the denial of SSI and DIB benefits. View "Cypress v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, listing eight impairments. The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s application and did so again on reconsideration. The next year, Plaintiff testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ disbelieved Plaintiff’s testimony that she could not sit, stand, or walk for extended periods of time and denied Plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding on appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ’s analysis was flawed in several respects, and the ALJ’s mistakes in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility were not harmless. Remanded. View "Hill v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that the Appeals Council committed legal error when it failed to consider materials from a psychologist who examined plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Washington v. SSA" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1989, Petitioner received public assistance from New York City Department of Social Services. Petitioner gave birth to a son, Michael, the next year. Michael was added to Petitioner’s public assistance case, and Petitioner assigned her right to child support for Michael. In January 2007, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that Michael was eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), retroactive to September 2005. Because Michael’s eligibility for SSI made him ineligible for public assistance, the City removed him from Petitioner’s case in January 2007 but continued to collect child support arrears that had accrued prior to January 2007. In 2011, Petitioner requested a review from the City to determine whether she was owed any excess child support payments. The City determined that it owed no payments because it had not collected sufficient child support arrears to exceed the public assistance provided to Petitioner’s household. The State confirmed the City’s determination. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding challenging Respondents’ determinations as arbitrary, capricious and erroneous as a matter of law. Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the City had not yet collected child support arrears that exceeded the unreimbursed benefits Petitioner’s family received. View "Hawkins v. Berlin" on Justia Law

For more than a decade, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) has paid directly to qualified attorneys who bring Supplemental Security Income (SSI) claims a fee of no more than twenty-five percent of the successful recovery of past-due benefits to clients. When a state chooses to administer its own payments, the amount of state payments are not included as “past-due benefits” for the purpose of attorney compensation. In 2012, Attorney represented a client in a claim for SSI benefits before the SSA. In 2013, Attorney’s client received a partially favorable decision. In 2012, however, Massachusetts changed its practice and began administering its own program of supplementary payments rather than rely on federal administration of its supplementary payments. Upon learning that the SSA attorney’s fee award did not include twenty-five percent of the Massachusetts state-administered state supplementary payments, Attorney filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandamus in the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Commissioner’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1383(d)(2)(B) was reasonable. View "Moriarty v. Colvin" on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law

Mulder served in the Army for three separate periods between 1982 and 1994, accumulating about two years of honorable service. In 1998, the VA assigned Mulder a 50% disability rating for two service-connected conditions. Mulder was arrested and charged with felonies. Because Mulder was unable to post bail on July 11, 2005, he remained in custody pending trial. On May 19, 2006, Mulder pleaded no contest and a conviction was entered. On June 16, 2006, the court ordered that Mulder serve an initial term of confinement of eight years, six months, followed by six years of supervised release, with credit for the 384 days he had been in custody, specifying May 19, 2006, as the “Date(s) Convicted.” The VA must reduce benefits payments if the recipient is incarcerated for a period in excess of 60 days for conviction of a felony, 38 U.S.C. 5313(a)(1), beginning on the sixty-first day of such incarceration. In July 2007, the VA notified Mulder that his felony conviction and resulting incarceration required it to reduce his disability compensation, effective July 19, 2006. The Board, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit agreed with the VA’s use of the date of the plea and conviction in calculating the reduction. View "Mulder v. McDonald" on Justia Law