Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

This appeal by Dorothy Knight arose from a 2011 circuit court order. In it, the circuit court affirmed an administrative decision by the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) denying disability benefits. Upon review, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Knight met her burden, and that PERS' decision to deny her claim was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate and circuit courts' rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Knight v. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Petitioner Vincent James Hogg, Sr. sought review of a Workers' Compensation Court order which denied his workers' compensation benefits based upon the court's interpretation of 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). Petitioner was employed by the Oklahoma County Juvenile Detention Center when in late 2011, he sustained an injury to his right shoulder and neck while subduing an unruly and combative juvenile. Petitioner was given a post-accident drug screen and a follow-up screen the next day. Both screens showed a "positive" result for the presence of marijuana in his system. Petitioner did not dispute the test results but Petitioner denied ever smoking marijuana. The trial court ultimately found there was no evidence presented to establish Petitioner was "high," nor was there any evidence to establish the marijuana in his system was the "major cause" of the accidental injury. The trial court did, however, deny Petitioner's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits by reason of its interpretation of the newly created 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. The trial court found the last sentence of paragraph 3 expressed the legislative intent of the entire paragraph without giving any weight to the other sentences in the same paragraph. In its order, the trial court indicated this sentence created an irrebuttable presumption. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that Petitioner overcame the rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hogg v. Oklahoma Cty. Juvenile Bureau" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a superior court order that reversed an order denying appellee's petition for post conviction relief and for remanding for an evidentiary hearing. Appellee Joseph Abraham was accused of soliciting a former student for sex, and for allegedly sexually assaulting her. When the allegations surfaced, the then 67-year-old Appellee retired from teaching and began receiving pension payments. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellee pled guilty to corruption of a minor and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age. He was sentenced to probation; no direct appeal was filed. Because the crime of indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age is one of the enumerated offenses in the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA), appellee forfeited his pension when he pled guilty to this charge. He filed a motion to withdraw his plea nunc pro tunc, alleging he was not informed of his right to seek withdrawal of his plea or of the possible sentences he faced. The trial court denied the motion. Appellee filed a timely PCRA petition alleging plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him he would forfeit his pension upon pleading guilty. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed. "Because counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advise a defendant regarding the collateral consequences of a plea, appellee's ineffectiveness claim fails." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court granting appellee a PCRA hearing on the issue of prejudice, and remanded the case to reinstate the PCRA court's order denying appellee relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Five disabled Alaskans sued their former representative payee. At the conclusion of trial, the superior court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs; it also entered injunctive relief against the representative payee as to both parties and non-parties. But it declined to enter other injunctive relief as to non-parties. Three of the plaintiffs appealed. They argued that the superior court failed to understand that non-party injunctive relief was available under Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Because the superior court actually entered non-party injunctive relief, the Supreme Court after its review of the case disagreed with the plaintiffs' characterization of the superior court proceedings and affirmed the superior court in all respects.View "Osbakken v. Whittington" on Justia Law

After her Father's death, Mother underwent intrauterine insemination using Father's cryopreserved sperm. The procedure was successful, and Mother gave birth to a child. Mother subsequently applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the child. SSA denied the application. An ALJ decided that the child was entitled to child's insurance benefits on Father's Social Security record. SSA's appeal council reversed. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the following question to the Nebraska Supreme Court: "Can a child, conceived after her biological father's death through intrauterine insemination using his sperm, and born within nine months of his death, inherit from him as the surviving issue under Nebraska intestacy law?" The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that under the relevant Nebraska statutes, a child conceived after her biological father's death cannot inherit from her father as surviving issue for purposes of intestacy.View "Amen v. Asture" on Justia Law

Applicant Marilyn Clifford appealed the denial of long-term home-care benefits under the Medicaid-funded Choices for Care program, arguing that a second home on an adjacent piece of property should have been excluded from the financial-eligibility calculation. Given the language of the regulation, the legislative history that led to its promulgation, and the policy considerations attending the Medicaid program, the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary correctly interpreted the home-exclusion rule when he reinstated the determination of the Department of Children and Families denying the benefits. Thus, the Court found no compelling indication of error in the Secretary’s determination and affirmed. View "In re Marilyn Clifford" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Bishop appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative law judge's order ("ALJ") which affirmed an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") denying further vocational rehabilitation benefits and temporary total disability benefits to Bishop. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding the ALJ's finding that Bishop was capable of performing the return-to-work options identified in her vocational rehabilitation plan was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Bishop v. No. Dakota Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kenneth Bond and Deborah Thibault, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to the defendants, the City of Manchester and Paul Martineau in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Manchester Welfare Department (collectively, the City). In January 2010, the plaintiffs applied for general assistance from the City pursuant to RSA chapter 165. See RSA 165:1, I (2002). On February 24, 2010, the City approved $140.00 per week in rental assistance. On March 18, 2010, the City suspended this assistance for seven days because of the plaintiffs' failure to provide certain documentation, including that which related to $30 the plaintiffs used to buy gas for a vehicle. The City lifted this suspension on March 25, 2010, noting that the plaintiffs were "unable to show compliance with the $30 purchase of vehicle gas that [they] stated [they] had previously purchased through an alternate financial resource." On April 9, 2010, the City revoked an April 8 voucher and denied the plaintiffs all assistance for six months because they had misrepresented information related to their vehicle. The plaintiffs petitioned the superior court to enjoin the City from suspending their assistance. Because the Supreme Court held that RSA 165:1-b and the Guidelines pertaining to rental assistance actually conflict, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Bond v. Martineau" on Justia Law

Brian Ross had been absent from the State of Alaska since 1990, first as a student at the United States Naval Academy and later as a career Marine Corps officer. Despite his absence, Ross maintained Alaska residency and received a permanent fund dividend each year. In 1998 the Alaska Legislature amended the dividend qualifications to provide that anyone who was allowably absent for ten consecutive years would no longer be eligible for dividends. This ten-year rule, however, does not apply to members of the United States Congress, their staffs, or the families of either. In 2009 Ross and his children applied for dividends but were denied because Ross had then been absent for ten consecutive years from the enactment of the ten-year rule. They appealed the denial, but the denial was upheld at an informal agency appeal, a formal agency appeal, and by the superior court. Ross appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the ten-year rule violates his equal protection and substantive due process rights. Because the ten-year rule and congressional exception are fairly and substantially related to the legitimate state interests of limiting dividends to permanent Alaska residents and preventing fraud, and because the ten-year rule is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing administrative burdens, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court as to these claims. View "Ross v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law