Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Griglock, a 70-year-old retired woman, received an influenza vaccination in 2005. Weeks later, she went to her doctor, complaining of weakness, and was admitted to the hospital. Her treating neurologist determined that she suffered from Guillain-Barré Syndrome. She improved initially, but soon developed respiratory failure and was placed on a ventilator. She died about 18 months later; her death certificate lists “ventilator-dependent respiratory failure due to GBS” as the immediate cause of death. Her estate filed a petition for compensation under the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1, 300aa-10(a). The government responded that there was insufficient evidence to find that the influenza vaccine caused her GBS and death, but that it would not contest the issue and recommended an award of up to $250,000. The estate then sought unreimbursable medical expenses and compensation for pain and suffering. The Special Master determined that Griglock’s death was caused by an influenza vaccination, that her estate had standing, but that entitlement was limited to death benefits because injury benefits were barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Griglock v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Watson’s father, Hickle, worked for the Department of Energy, 1954 to 1962. Hickle died of Hodgkin’s disease in 1964. Congress enacted the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act in 2000 to compensate for illnesses caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic substances while working for the Department of Energy. Covered employees or eligible survivors may receive compensation in a lump sum payment; under specific circumstances, a covered employee’s child is also eligible, 42 U.S.C. 7385s-3(d)(2). When her father died, Watson was 19 years old, not a full-time student; she lived with her parents, worked as a waitress, relied on her parents for support, and was listed as a dependent on their income tax returns. She sought survivor benefits in 2002 and received a lump-sum payment of $150,000. She later claimed further compensation as a “covered child,” under a different section of the Act, arguing that she was “incapable of self-support” at the time of Hickle’s death. The Department of Labor denied her claim. Before the district court, Watson challenged the interpretation of “incapable of self-support,” claiming that the Department impermissibly required a showing of physical or mental incapability. The district court denied her motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Watson v. Solis" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed a district court judgment affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) decision finding him disabled from September 26, 1997 through December 3, 1998, and concluding that the disability ended on December 4, 1998 due to medical improvement. Appellant contended that the ALJ's medical improvement finding was not supported by substantial evidence because she erred in relying on a single proposed rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (the 2001 decision). Appellant also claimed that the ALJ erred by failing to mention the opinion of his treating physician. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in relying solely on the 2001 decision, as (1) the 2001 only proposed changes while ignoring two other decisions that rejected the proposed changes recommended in the 2001 decision; and (2) the ALJ's misunderstanding led her to inaccurately conclude that her finding that Appellant's disability terminated on December 4, 1998 was consistent with the VA's ratings. View "Hiler v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Banks worked as a coal miner for 17 years and smoked about one pack of cigarettes per day for 38 years. His employment ended in 1991. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2003, Banks filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which provides benefits to coal miners who become disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 901. An ALJ found that Banks had shown a change in his condition and that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis which substantially contributed to his total disability. Banks was awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the regulatory interpretation urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The ALJ relied on reasoned medical opinions. View "Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration denied Hill's application. An ALJ also denied Plaintiff's application, and the appeals council denied Plaintiff's request for review. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the ALJ failed to consider evidence favorable to Plaintiff and posed an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert; and (2) therefore, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. View "Hill v. Astrue " on Justia Law

Perks applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. An ALJ denied Perks's application. On appeal to the appeals council, Perks submitted additional evidence. The appeals council noted the receipt of the additional evidence but denied further review of Perks's claim. The district court affirmed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Perks was not disabled; and (2) the additional evidence submitted to the appeals council did not undermine the ALJ's determination, as the ALJ would not have reached a different result with the additional evidence and the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. View "Perks v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Kevin Byes applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on July 30, 2007, claiming disability since November 1, 2005. The Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denied benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Commissioner's decision, concluding that Byes was not disabled from November 1, 2005 through the date of the decision. The district court agreed with the ALJ's decision. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding of no severe mental impairment; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that the ALJ had applied the incorrect grid rule in order to determine Byes was not disabled but that the error was harmless. View "Byes v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Palmquist, a veteran, injured in a helicopter crash that caused residual brain injury, was entitled to preference in federal employment, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C), 3309(1), 3313(2)(A). The VA hired him as a medical support assistant. Aichner was his supervisor. Palmquist applied for promotion but did not receive an interview. He believed that the VA had not honored his preference, and told Aichner that he was going to complain to the equal employment opportunity specialist and his congressman. He did so. Aichner and Palmquist maintained a generally positive relationship for the next two years, but Palmquist was sometimes preoccupied, left the unit during working hours to do personal business, distracted other employees, and used his computer for personal purposes. Palmquist sought a new position. An interview went well. Interviewers warned Palmquist against unsolicited post-interview contact, but he e-mailed both to reiterate his qualifications. Aichner gave a generally favorable recommendation, but the recommendation was one factor in Palmquist not getting the job. The court rejected his claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701-796. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act does not entitle a plaintiff to relief when retaliation for complaints about disability discrimination is a motivating factor in, but not the “but-for” cause of, adverse employment action. View "Palmquist v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Gallo served as an FAA air traffic control specialist from 1982 until 1995 when she experienced a job-related injury for which she received OWCP benefits. Gallo recovered enough to return to light duty. In 1996 she lost her medical certification to continue as an operational ATCS. Until 2000 she was assigned to a “non-operational” automation specialist position, which did not provide the same retirement credit or weekend pay. She received OWCP benefits for the differential. Gallo fully recovered in 2000 and received medical clearance; the Agency terminated OWCP benefit. She applied for restoration under 5 U.S.C. 8151(b)(2), which provides the right to priority consideration for restoration to federal employees who have overcome a compensable injury. The Agency assigned Gallo to a supervisory ATCS position. In setting her salary, the Agency did not take into account pay increases granted to operational ATCS employees during while Gallo was working as an automation specialist. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied her claim. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting “resumes employment with the Federal Government” under section 8151(a), and any pay increases that Gallo would have received based on her creditable service time with the federal government are “benefits based on length of service.” View "Gallo v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rebecca Gonzalez (Relator) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Defendants, Fresenius Medical Care N.A., Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., Bio-Medical Applications of Texas, Inc. (collectively, Fresenius), and Dr. Alfonzo Chavez. Relator also brought retaliation claims against Fresenius and her former supervisor Larry Ramirez. The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on the remaining claims. The district court then awarded Fresenius $15,360 in attorney's fees from Relator's counsel. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in all instances, holding (1) the district court correctly granted Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Relator's FCA claims, and the court's FCA jury instructions were not in error; (2) the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Relator's retaliation claims; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927. View "Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N.A." on Justia Law