Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

The Section 8 low-income housing assistance voucher program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(o), is administered by public housing agencies such as Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA). Program regulations define “rent to [the] owner” as “[t]he total monthly rent payable to the owner under the lease for the unit. Rent to owner covers payment for any housing services, maintenance and utilities that the owner is required to provide and pay for.” Velez and Hatcher, voucher recipients, entered into one-year leases with K&D. The leases provide: “If Resident(s) shall holdover after the end of the term of this Rental Agreement, said holdover shall be deemed a tenancy of month to month and applicable month to month fees shall apply.” Velez entered into a month-to-month tenancy after her one-year term expired; Hatcher entered into month-to-month tenancies, and, later, a nine-month agreement. K&D charged fees of $35.00 to $100.00 per month. CMHA did not treat these short-term rental fees as rent under the voucher program. Velez and Hatcher were required to pay the fees and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted CMHA summary judgment, holding that the fees were not rent. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Recasting the charge as a short-term fee, rather than rent, does not change that it is consideration paid by the tenant for use of the rental unit. View "Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

The federal government provides low-income housing tax credits that are distributed to developers by state agencies, including the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), which assists low-income families in obtaining affordable housing, brought a disparate-impact claim under Fair Housing Act sections 804(a) and 805(a), alleging that allocation of too many credits to housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods resulted in continued segregated housing patterns. Relying on statistical evidence, the district court ruled in favor of ICP. While appeal was pending, HUD issued a regulation interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability and establishing a burden-shifting framework. The Fifth Circuit held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, but reversed, concluding that the court had improperly required proof of less discriminatory alternatives. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The Court noted that the statute shifts emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions. Disparate-impact liability must be limited so that regulated entities can make practical business choices that sustain the free-enterprise system. Before rejecting a business justification—or a governmental entity’s public interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown “an available alternative . . . that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.” A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a policy causing that disparity. Policies, governmental or private, are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” When courts find disparate impact liability, their remedial orders must be consistent with the Constitution and should concentrate on eliminating the offending practice. Orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise difficult constitutional questions. View "Texas Dep't of Hous, & Cmity Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) provided Medicaid benefits to Darlene Hollman while she was in a nursing home. Hollman had an interest in real estate at the time, but DSS did not record a lien on the property for the benefits it had provided until after Hollman died. Hollman’s children challenged the validity of the lien. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of DSS, concluding that an enforceable medical assistance lien was created on the property at the time the nursing home assistance was provided and that Hollman’s interest in the property transferred at death to the children subject to the lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DSS’s medical assistance lien did not attach to Hollman’s interest in the property before her death, and Hollman’s interest passed to her children immediately upon her death; (2) because the lien had not been recorded at the time of Hollman’s death, Hollman had no interest upon which the lien could attach; and (3) therefore, Hollman’s interest passed to her children free of DSS’s lien. View "Hollman v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Debtor lived in a rent-stabilized apartment for over forty years. Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her unexpired rent-stabilized lease as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate under N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law 282(2) as a “local public assistance benefit.” The bankruptcy court struck the claimed exemption, concluding that the value of the lease did not qualify as an exempt local public assistance benefit. The district court affirmed. Debtor appealed, arguing that the value of her lease was a local public assistance benefit that was exempted from her bankruptcy estate. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the issue. The Court of Appeals answered that section 282(2) exempts a debtor-tenant’s interest in a rent-stabilized lease. View "Matter of Santiago-Monteverde" on Justia Law

Debtor, a New York City tenant, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her apartment lease on Schedule B as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit." At issue was whether the value inherent in debtor's rent-stabilized lease as a consequence of the protections afforded by New York's Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 9, 2520.1 et seq., made the lease, or some portion of its value, exempt from debtor's bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit" within the meaning of New York Debtor and Creditor Law 282(2). The court certified this unsettled issue to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Santiago-Monteverde v. Pereira" on Justia Law

The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C. 6301, states that an executive agency must use: “a procurement contract . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to acquire … property or services for the direct benefit or use” of the government and must adhere to the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation However, an “agency shall use a cooperative agreement . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to transfer a thing of value … to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation … instead of acquiring . . . property or service” and can avoid procurement laws. Under Section 8 of the Housing Act, HUD provides rental assistance, including entering Housing Assistance Program (HAP) contracts and paying subsidies directly to private landlords. A 1974 amendment gave HUD the option of entering an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with a Public Housing Agency (PHA), which would enter into HAP contracts with owners and pay subsidies with HUD funds. In 1983, HUD’s authority was amended. HUD could administer existing HAP contracts, and enter into new HAP contracts for existing Section 8 dwellings by engaging a PHA if possible, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(b)(1). Later, HUD began outsourcing services and initiated a competition to award a performance-based ACC to a PHA in each state, with the PHA to assume “all contractual rights and responsibilities of HUD.” After making an award, HUD chose to re-compete, seeking greater savings, expressly referring to “cooperative agreements,” outside the scope of procurement law. The Government Accountability Office agreed with protestors that the awards were procurement contracts. HUD disregarded that recommendation. The Claims Court denied a request to set aside the award. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the awards are procurement contracts, not cooperative agreements.View "CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

The federal government holds, in trust for three Indian communities, certain Minnesota land acquired in the late 1800s, with federal funds appropriated for a statutorily identified group of Indians. That beneficiary group and the three present-day communities that grew on the land overlapped but diverged. Many beneficiaries were part of the communities, but many were not; the communities included many outside the beneficiary group. In 1980 Congress addressed resulting land use problems by putting the land into trust for the three communities that had long occupied them. Since then, proceeds earned from the land, including profits from gaming, have gone to the three communities. Descendants of the Indians designated in the original appropriations acts allege that they, rather than the communities, are entitled to benefits. In earlier litigation the Federal Circuit rejected a claim that the appropriations acts created a trust for the benefit of statutorily designated Indians and their descendants. On remand, the Court of Federal Claims rejected several new claims, but found the government liable on a claim for pre-1980 revenues from the lands acquired under the 1888-1890 Acts. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, finding that the descendants had no valid claim. View "Wolfchild v. United States" on Justia Law

A 2010 fire at an apartment in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of a tenant and her guest. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a smoke detector and an alternate means of egress, both of which are required under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) in which Richardson participated. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the estates of the deceased. The Third Circuit reversed. State officials’ approval and subsidization of the apartment for the Section 8 program, even though the apartment allegedly failed to comply with Section 8’s standards, did not constitute a state-created danger toward the apartment’s tenant and her guest in violation of their constitutional substantive due process rights. View "Henry v. City of Erie" on Justia Law

The County appealed from a judgment of the district court finding that the County was in violation of its duty to promote source-of-income legislation under a Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal (consent decree) entered into by the County with the United States to resolve a qui tam action initially brought by relator, ADC, under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, alleging the submission of false claims by the County to HUD in order to obtain federal grant monies for fair housing. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the reviewing magistrate judge under the consent decree. On the merits, the court held that the County violated the terms of the consent decree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Westchester County, New York" on Justia Law

Rohrer Towers is a housing facility for low-income elderly residents in Haddon Township, Camden County, New Jersey. Haddon leased Rohrer Towers to Housing Authority of the Township of Haddon, which entered into a housing assistance payments contract (HAP) with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Housing Act of 1937, 88 Stat. 633, 662–66. Haddon sued in 2007 alleging that HUD breached the HAP Contract from 2001-2006 by requiring rent “comparability studies” to be submitted along with requests for annual rent adjustments and adopting a one-percent reduction of the annual adjustment factors for units occupied by the same tenants from the previous year. The Claims Court agreed and ordered rent adjustments for all years other than 2002. The government claimed that the complaint should have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and appealed the decision that regulatory imposition of a mandatory one-percent rent reduction for non-turnover units was arbitrary, and beyond HUD’s authority. The Federal Circuit reversed the holding that the prevention doctrine applied to the circumstances surrounding Haddon’s 2001 and 2003 rent adjustment, but affirmed the holdings with respect to the contract years 2002 and 2004-2006. View "Haddon Housing Assocs. v. United States" on Justia Law