Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Cage, born in 1960, has an extensive medical history. She offered evidence of: bipolar disorder, depression, suicidal ideation, dizziness, blackouts, memory loss and chest pain. She has not worked since November 2003. Before then, she had worked as a retail cashier, hotel maid and home healthcare aide. Cage also has a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. Her ongoing medical care has included treatment for drug addiction and alcoholism and her other conditions. An Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security Administration denied Cage’s application for Supplemental Security Income benefits, finding that although Cage met certain requirements for being “disabled” under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301, she was ineligible for SSI because drug addiction or alcoholism was a contributing factor material to that determination. The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The ALJ properly imposed upon Cage the burden of proving that she would be disabled in the absence of drug addiction and alcoholism and the record supported the ALJ’s finding that she would not be disabled absent drug addiction and alcoholism. View "Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Applicants for and recipients of Medicaid home health Services claimed that the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and the New York State Department of Health, violated their statutory right, enforceable under 42 U.S.C.1983, to an opportunity for Medicaid fair hearings. They claimed that this right, as construed by federal regulation, entitles them to “final administrative action” within 90 days of their fair hearing requests. The district court declared that “final administrative action” includes the holding of Medicaid fair hearings, the issuance of fair hearing decisions, and the implementation of any relief ordered in those decisions and permanently enjoined the state agencies to ensure that “final administrative action” implemented within 90 days of fair hearing requests. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the plaintiffs have a right to a Medicaid hearing and decision ordinarily within 90 days of their fair hearing requests, and that such right is enforceable under section 1983. The permanent injunction was, however, overbroad because “final administrative action” refers not to the implementation of relief ordered in fair hearing decisions, but to the holding of fair hearings and to the issuance of fair hearing decisions. View "Shakhnes v. Eggleston" on Justia Law

Brault applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in 2007, claiming that he became disabled in 2006 because of nerve damage in his left arm and a cervical spine injury he sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested an administrative hearing. Brault’s counsel asserted a Daubert-like objection to the vocational expert’s testimony, contending it was unreliable. The ALJ never directly responded to the objections, but issued a ruling which relied on the VE’s testimony, agreed that positions existed in the eight DOT positions the VE had identified at the numbers the VE had given, and denied Brault’s application for benefits. The district court affirmed the denial. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge was not required to state expressly his reasons for accepting a vocational expert’s challenged testimony.View "Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed the district court's order denying his post-judgment motion for an order directing the Social Security Administration (SSA) to re-tender a check for retroactive supplemental social security benefits that he was owed. The court held that the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act, Pub. L. No. 111-114, 123 Stat. 3029, barred the SSA from making any payment to an incarcerated individual covered by the Act, regardless of when the underlying obligation to pay the individual arose. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion. View "Fowlkes v. Thomas, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from an order of the district court that reduced by two-thirds the attorney's fees award she requested for successfully appealing from the administrative denial of her application for disability benefits. The district court, attributing gaps in the administrative record to plaintiff's counsel, concluded that the alleged deficiency constituted "special circumstances" justifying a reduction in the attorney's fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The court held that the failure of a claimant's attorney to develop the administrative record on issues collateral to the disability determination did not constitute a "special circumstance" warranting a reduction in attorney's fees. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the fee award based on its sua sponte critique of counsel's billing records and its conclusion that the time billed was excessive because no novel issues were raised. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, alleging that defendants discriminated against them in administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section 8") program in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, 100.204. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, and 100.204 could not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. 1983; in the analysis of plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim under the FHAA; in factual findings regarding the provision of Section 8 services to the class; in rulings on certain discovery issues; and in decertification. The court adopted the district court's findings and conclusions and held that the district court carefully considered and thoroughly discussed these issues. The court also considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit.

Plaintiff filed a qui tam action pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3729 alleging that defendants fraudulently billed Medicare/Medicaid for medical procedures performed by unsupervised residents. At issue was whether the court had appellate jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal from the district court's judgment and order dismissing his complaint and denying leave to amend. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to reconsider its order that denied plaintiff's request for leave to amend. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in imposing an order granting sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or, alternatively, 28 U.S.C. 1927. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction where plaintiff's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion failed to toll his deadline to timely file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it denied plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion where plaintiff had not requested permission to amend as of right and that it made no mistake in not divining that he actually intended to do so. The court further held that the district court properly exercised its discretion to sanction pursuant to section 1927 and did not need to reach the court's alternative Rule 11 sanctions ruling.