Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Paso Robles was responsible for providing Luke, a child with autism, with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1487. At the time of Luke’s initial evaluation, Paso Robles was aware that Luke displayed signs of autistic behavior, and therefore, autism was a suspected disability for which it was required to assess him. Paso Robles chose not to formally assess Luke for autism because a member of its staff opined, after an informal, unscientific observation of the child, that Luke merely had an expressive language delay, not a disorder on the autism spectrum. The court held that, in so doing, Paso Robles violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA and, as a result, was unable to design an educational plan that addressed Luke’s unique needs. Accordingly, the court held that Paso Robles denied Luke a free appropriate public education, and remanded for the determination of an appropriate remedy. View "Timothy O. v. Paso Robles USD" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the denial of her application for supplemental security income. At issue is whether the ALJ erred in according “limited weight” to the opinion of a nurse practitioner. The court held that an ALJ errs when he discounts an other source’s entire testimony because of inconsistency with evidence in the record, when the ALJ has divided the testimony into distinct parts and determined that only one part of the testimony is inconsistent. Thus, the ALJ’s determination in this case that the nurse practitioner’s opinion regarding Claimant’s “exertional and postural” limitations was inconsistent with other evidence in the record was an insufficient reason to reject her testimony regarding Claimant’s manipulative and mental limitations. That error was not harmless, because the vocational expert opined that a person with the mental limitations identified by the nurse practitioner could not work. The court concluded that further proceedings are required to reconcile all the record evidence and to consider additional issues. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dale v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Mission purchased the assets of South Coast and attempted by an assets-only purchase to avoid South Coast's potential liabilities under South Coast's Medicare provider agreement. These liabilities encompassed potential mandated reimbursement to Medicare for any previous overpayments made to South Coast. The Secretary determined that Mission was not entitled to bill Medicare for patient services at its new facility until that facility had a provider agreement of its own. Mission appealed the Secretary's decision. The court rejected Mission's assertion that former 42 C.F.R. 489.13(d)(1)(i) permitted it to avoid South Coast’s Medicare liabilities. The court cited to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Vernon Home Health, Inc.: “federal law governs cases involving the rights of the United States arising under a nationwide federal program such as the Social Security Act. The authority of the United States in relation to funds disbursed and the rights acquired by it in relation to those funds are not dependent upon state law.” It is equally true that private parties have no power to alter their legal obligations with Medicare under their provider agreements. The court also rejected Mission's argument that it is entitled to the benefit of the retroactivity provision in 42 C.F.R. 489.13(d)(2). The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretations and decisions rendered by the DAB in this case were reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mission Hosp. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her son prevailed at both hearings concerning their due process complaint against the District. At issue on appeal is the district court's award of attorney fees, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415, to petitioner's attorney, Tania Whiteleather. The district court awarded $7,780 in fees, substantially less than the $66,420 requested. The court concluded that the outcome of the administrative hearing was not more favorable to petitioner than the District's settlement offer and petitioner was not substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply the $400 rate without seeking additional rebuttal evidence from the District. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's claim for paralegal fees was barred by collateral estoppel because the district court had already concluded that Dr. Susan Burnett was an education consultant in the expedited hearing appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After plaintiff's second application for disability benefits was denied by the ALJ, the government conceded that the ALJ made a legal error when it rejected the opinions of plaintiff's treating physician without giving sufficient reason. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's decision to exercise its discretion and remand to the ALJ for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court did not err in remanding this case to the ALJ for further factual proceedings, rather than for payment of benefits. Further, in light of the inconsistencies, conflicts, and gaps in the record that require further administrative proceedings, the court did not proceed to the next question: whether the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled if the physician's inconsistent reports were credited as true. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dominguez v. Colvin" on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law