Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Massie served on active duty in the Army, 1968-1970 and was awarded VA benefits for varicose veins and related surgery, initially at 10% and increased to 50%, disability effective in 1990. In, 2001, Massie sought an increased disability rating. He submitted a letter from a VA physician who had treated Massie for “multiple medical problems” including “chronic venous insufficiency” that had “persisted in spite of prior surgical treatment with vein stripping” and that left Massie with significant pain when he was on his feet for any period of time. The regional office increased Massie’s rating to 100%, as of the 2001 date of his filing. The Veterans Court determined that the physician’s letter, dated 1999, did not qualify as an informal claim that would entitle Massie to an earlier effective date for the 100% rating. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the letter was not a “report of examination” because it did not describe the results of a “specific, particular examination” and did not suggest that Massie’s condition had worsened. View "Massie v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Louis Burden, a Vietnam veteran, served on active duty in the Army from 1948 until 1968. He married Michele in a ceremonial marriage in April, 2004. Two months later, Burden died. In August 2004, Michele applied for dependency and indemnity compensation. A VA regional office denied her claim because she had not been married to Burden for at least one year prior to his death, 38 U.S.C. 1102(a). Michele asserted that she and Burden had been living in a common law marriage for five years prior to his death. The board acknowledged that she had provided some evidence to support her claim, but concluded that it did not constitute the “clear and convincing proof” required to establish a valid common law marriage under Alabama law. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit upheld the denial. State law, including state law evidentiary burdens, applies in determining the validity of a purported common law marriage View "Burden v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Yonek served on active duty in the Navy from 1973 to 1977 and in 1991-1992. In 1991, Yonek aggravated a preexisting injury to his right shoulder, leaving the motion of his arm permanently limited. The VA regional office granted service connection for the injury, assigning a rating of 10 percent. Over the next 17 years, Yonek underwent at least 15 examinations, measuring his range of motion for flexion, elevation of the arm in a forward direction, and abduction, elevation of the arm outward from the side of the body. The results showed a range of motion of anywhere between 80 and 180 degrees in flexion and 60 and 180 degrees in abduction. In 1999, the RO increased the rating to 20 percent, concluding that motion was limited to a point at or below shoulder level but past the midpoint between the side and the shoulder (between 45 and 90 degrees). The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his appeal. The Veterans Court held that diagnostic code 5201 only allows a single disability rating for each injured shoulder even though Yonek’s shoulder manifests limitation of motion with respect to both flexion and abduction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the schedule in 38 C.F.R. 4.71a only allows a single disability rating. View "Yonek v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Bartlett, who served on active duty from 1943 to 1963, submitted a claim in 2002 to increase his rating for service-connected Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals issued its first final decision in 2005, increasing Bartlett’s rating from 30% to 100% and remanded to the regional office. After that decision, but before a decision on remand, Bartlett entered into a fee agreement with attorney Cameron, calling for a contingent fee of 20 percent of any past due VA benefits awarded on the basis of his claims. The regional office then increased Bartlett’s disability to 100%, effective April 2002, when Bartlett filed his claim. Cameron sought fees for the past-due benefits award. The regional office denied entitlement to attorney fees, finding that, because the decision was the Board’s first final decision in this claim, 38 U.S.C. 5904(c)(1) precluded entitlement to fees based on benefits arising from the decision. Cameron also appealed the assigned effective date. The regional office assigned a new date, approximately 15 months earlier, granted Bartlett $45,995.93 in past-due benefit, and set aside attorney fees for Cameron: 20% of the additional award occasioned by the change in the effective date. The Board, the Veterans’ Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Cameron v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Pirkl served in the Navy, 1947-1949. Effective in 1949, the VA awarded him disability benefits for paranoid schizophrenic reaction, evaluated as 10% disabling. A regional office increased his disability rating to 100%, effective in 1952. In 1953, the office reduced the rating to 70%. Pirkl did not appeal. In 1956, the office reduced Pirkl’s rating to 50%, based on a newly acquired medical examination and changes in Pirkl’s employment status. Pirkl did not appeal. In 1966, the office reduced the rating to 30%. The Board of Appeals affirmed. In 1991, Pirkl was awarded a 100% disability rating, effective 1988. In 2001, Pirkl unsuccessfully sought to revise the 1953, 1956, and 1966 rating decisions based on clear and unmistakable error (CUE). In 2005, Pirkl filed Notice of Disagreement with respect to the 1953 rating. The Board found CUE. The regional office awarded a 100% rating for 1952 to 1957, when the 1956, decision made effective a 50% rating. The Board dismissed Pirkl’s claim for 100% disability for the entire period between 1952 and August 30, 1988. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that the Board did not consider the effect of certain regulations governing a reduction of a total disability rating. View "Pirkl v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Crawford began working for the Department of the Army in 1986, with credit for military service. In 2006, when called to uniformed service, Crawford was an IT Specialist, GS-2210-11, in the Corps of Engineers. The Army subsequently outsourced many IT functions and abolished Crawford’s position, but formed a new organization, the Corps of Engineers Information Technology (ACE-IT). When Crawford completed uniformed service, the Army briefly returned him to an IT Specialist position, but reassigned him as Program Support Specialist, GS-0301-11. Crawford claimed violation of reemployment protections for those in uniformed service under 38 U.S.C. 4313(a)(2). The administrative judge ordered the Army to place Crawford in a position of “like status” to an IT Specialist. The Army later submitted notice that it was not able to find a position of “like status” and had requested the Office of Personnel Management’s placement assistance. Crawford sought enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that the search for positions was limited to vacant positions. The AJ agreed. The Army then reassigned Crawford to a position as an IT Specialist within ACE-IT, with the same duty station, title, and grade as his old position. The Board concluded that the Agency was in compliance and dismissed Crawford’s appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Crawford v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law

Hall entered active duty in the Army in 1990, but refused to go to basic training and asked to go home. He made threats and admitted to an arrest for carrying a gun. A psychiatric evaluation showed that Hall was believed to suffer from an “avoidant personality disorder” and he was discharged after 15 days in service. In 2006, Hall sought VA disability benefits, claiming that he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of an in-service sexual assault perpetrated by a superior officer. The claim was denied because Hall was not regarded as credible and could not prove the assault. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Hall v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Madison received a DTaP vaccination at age seven months and the next day suffered a prolonged seizure. Her temperature was recorded as 103.6 degrees. She continued to experience seizures and was admitted to the hospital again, a year later, with recurrent convulsive episodes. When she was about four years old, genetic testing revealed that Madison had a DNA sequence variation that was not inherited and arose spontaneously. Such mutations have been associated with several epilepsy syndromes. Her parents sued under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa, which established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program through which claimants can obtain compensation for vaccine-related injuries or death. Before the DNA test, a special master concluded that Madison was entitled to compensation, but the DNA test was disclosed during the damages phase. The special master ultimately denied compensation. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the special master properly analyzed whether, after the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the government carried its burden to prove that a factor unrelated to the vaccine was the sole substantial cause of the injuries. View "Deribeaux v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Parks served in Vietnam 1964-1966. Along with 6,000 other soldiers, Parks volunteered for “Project 112” and was intentionally exposed to chemical warfare agents. In 2000 and in 2002, Parks sought service connection for diabetes type II with peripheral neuropathy and heart disability. The Regional Office denied the claims. While appeal was pending, the government declassified details about chemicals used in Project 112. The Department of Defense reported that it did not know of any long-term effects caused by exposure to the chemicals, but the Veterans Health Administration required the VA to provide to Project 112 veterans “a thorough clinical evaluation,” enhanced access to the VA health care system, and free care for any illness possibly related to their participation” and 38 U.S.C. 1710(e)(1)(E) provides specific services for veterans who participated in Project 112. The VA sent Parks a letter identifying the chemicals to which he had been exposed and providing instructions on how to obtain additional medical examinations. Ultimately, the Veterans’ Court denied a service connection. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding reasoning that a nurse practitioner is able to provide a medical examination that meets the regulatory requirements of competent medical evidence and refusal to consider information found on the Internet. View "Parks v. Shinseki" on Justia Law