Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Fitschen was diagnosed with advanced cancer and stopped working. In 2000 the Social Security Administration (SSA) found Fitschen eligible for disability benefits. Fitschen returned to work in 2001 but continued to receive benefits for a nine-month “trial work period,” 42 U.S.C. 422(c)(4). After that period, he could continue to work and receive benefits for another 36-month period if his wages did not exceed the level at which a person is deemed to be capable of engaging in substantial work activity. The SSA's 2003 review determined that Fitschen had engaged in substantial work and should not have received benefits for much of 2002-2003. The SSA notified him of his overpayment liability but his benefits continued because he had again ceased substantial work. Fitschen again returned to work in 2004 but did not report the change. The SSA initiated another review in 2007 and suspended his benefits. The SSA may waive recovery of overpayments if the recipient was without fault.In 2019 the Commissioner of Social Security found Fitschen liable for an overpayment of $50,289.70 and declined to waive recovery. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the SSA was procedurally barred from recovering the overpayment because it failed to comply with its “reopening” regulation; the overpayment assessment did not “reopen” Fitschen’s initial eligibility determination or any later determination concerning the continuation or recomputation of his benefits. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Fitschen was at fault. View "Fitschen v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Following a 2013 car accident, Michelle Baptist, then 50 years old, began experiencing significant neck and shoulder pain, as well as headaches. She had one, possibly two, aneurysms. She applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income the following year. After reviewing her medical records and conducting a hearing, an administrative law judge concluded that Baptist retained the capacity to perform light work and, therefore, was not disabled.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision as supported by substantial evidence. Despite initial complications from an aneurysm clipping procedure, Baptist’s medical records indicate that she made a full recovery and experienced no ongoing aneurysm-related symptoms. Two doctors reviewed Baptist’s 2018 MRI. Neither recorded any concerns nor did they observe any impact the MRI results would have on Baptist’s functional capacity. They noted that Baptist presented with full upper and lower extremity strength, normal reflexes, a normal gait, and “no overt weakness.” View "Baptist v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Crowell sought Supplemental Social Security Insurance benefits in 2010, alleging that she was unable to work due to ADHD, social anxiety, fibromyalgia, bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, chronic pain, panic attacks, arthritis, shoulder pain, back pain, OCD, anxiety, depression, insomnia, asthma, and COPD. The ALJ agreed that certain impairments were severe as defined under the regulations: fibromyalgia, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and impairments of her left shoulder which remained after surgical correction, and also considered Crowell’s claims that she suffered from asthma, back problems, substance abuse, and “absence” spells, but deemed that none of those conditions met the criteria of severe impairments. The Social Security Administration denied her application.After several appeals and remands, the district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ALJ appropriately followed the five-step process for evaluating whether a plaintiff is disabled, 20 C.F.R. 416.920, considering whether the claimant is currently employed, has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, has an impairment that meets or equals any impairment listed as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity, has residual functional capacity that leaves her unable to perform past relevant work, and is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. View "Crowell v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Martinez applied for supplemental security income. An ALJ reviewed the record and found that Martinez suffered from severe impairments but could nonetheless “perform the requirements of representative unskilled occupations such as a checker, routing clerk, and mail sorter.” After the Appeals Council denied Martinez’s request to review the decision, Martinez filed suit, then notified the Commissioner that the administrative record (pages within exhibit B15F) included medical records regarding a different claimant. In filing the administrative record with the court, the Commissioner noted that it was the full record. The pages relating to the other claimant were removed and replaced with a placeholder reading: “THIS PAGE WAS REMOVED AS AN EXHIBIT BY THE APPEALS COUNCIL BECAUSE IT DOES NOT REFER TO THE CLAIMANT.” Neither Martinez nor the district court saw the omitted pages. The Commissioner refused to produce the pages. Martinez moved to compel the Commissioner to include the full exhibit in the administrative record. The district court denied that motion, stating that “[t]he ALJ [only] cited the third-party records in exhibit B15F … as additional potential evidence that Mr. Martinez had an impairment.” The district court then affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence because it relies on medical records belonging to someone other than Martinez; it is impossible to determine whether that error was harmless. View "Martinez v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Hohman, age 53, applied for Social Security benefits after she stopped working. She suffers from fibromyalgia, PTSD, depression, and anxiety, and alleged that the combined effects of these conditions left her unable to work as a medical records clerk or patient access representative. A vocational expert testified that someone with Hohman’s limitations could work as a photocopy machine operator, small products assembler, or mail clerk. Relying on that testimony, an ALJ denied the claim for benefits, finding that despite her limitations, Hohman still had the capacity to perform light work with physical and social limitations available in significant numbers in today’s economy. The vocational expert stated that he arrived at his final numbers about jobs available in the economy through a “weighted estimate" based upon professional experience, 25 years of both placement and labor market survey work, and 2,000 labor market surveys, explaining that many of the job titles in the database had been merged or had been eliminated by technology, so he decided that the job titles should not receive equal weight.The Seventh Circuit and the district court affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the denial. The court acknowledged Hohman’s frustration with the equal distribution method and concerns about the method’s reliability but stated that it is not, by itself, reversible error for an ALJ to rely on the equal distribution method to make a job-number determination. View "Hohman v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Leisgang suffers from depression, anxiety, and a personality disorder, among other conditions. He sought supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. The ALJ concluded that Leisgang could undertake only simple, routine, and repetitive work; could not work at a rapid, production-rate pace; could tolerate few changes in routine work settings; and could interact only occasionally with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Those limitations precluded Leisgang from performing his past work. To determine whether Leisgang could perform other available jobs, the ALJ sought assistance from a vocational expert, who testified that someone with Leisgang’s limitations could work as a kitchen helper, sweeper/cleaner, or hospital cleaner. The expert estimated that there were meaningful numbers of each job across the country, identifying job titles using the Department of Labor's 1977 dictionary, not revised since 1991. The primary data came from the Occupational Employment Quarterly, which applies the equal distribution method to estimate the distribution of job numbers within a larger group of occupations. When Leisgang asked if that method was reliable, the expert reported that it was the only method he had available. Leisgang asked no further questions about the methodology.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits. Leisgang forfeited his argument that the ALJ should have done more to ensure the soundness of the vocational expert’s methodology by failing to object at the hearing. Substantial evidence otherwise supports the ALJ’s determination. View "Leisgang v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Combs suffers from several physical and mental impairments. An ALJ found that she suffers from lumbar spondylosis, asthma, migraines/headaches, chronic pain syndrome, diabetes with diabetic polyneuropathy, obesity, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, posttraumatic stress disorder, social anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Combs sought treatment for lower back pain in March 2018 at PPG, where she received various tests, treatments, and prescriptions through 2020.Combs applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in August 2019, alleging an onset of disability on December 24, 2015. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. The district court concluded the ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the ALJ should have concluded that Combs suffered a closed period of disability from June 2019 to July 2020 due to her back impairment, pain, and multiple invasive procedures that would have rendered her off task or absent beyond employer tolerances. The record amply supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Combs was not disabled at any time, including during that period. View "Combs v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Bakke, a Wisconsin beef farmer, began suffering from serious back pain in 2017. He has had temporary relief from epidural steroid injections, spinal fusion surgery, physical therapy, and pain medications. Bakke sold his farm because the upkeep was too physically demanding and applied for disability benefits in 2019. Two state agency physicians examined him and concluded that Bakke was capable of light, full-time work. His general practitioner concluded that he could tolerate no more than four hours of work per day. At a hearing, Bakke testified about intense pain, with some days so bad he could not get out of bed; that he could not sit for more than two hours; that pain often required him to lay down during the day; that he could not lift or carry much weight; and that he was unsteady on his feet.An ALJ performed the Social Security Administration’s five-step disability analysis and agreed that Bakke could not engage in substantial gainful activity due to his back injury and obesity but concluded that his impairments were not as severe as those listed in 20 C.F.R. 404. Considering residual functional capacity, he determined that Bakke could still perform light, full-time work. Citing the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ decided that light, full-time work was available in significant numbers in the national economy, precluding a finding that Bakke was disabled. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Bakke v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Fetting, 50 years old and suffering from back pain, headaches, depression, and anxiety, unsuccessfully applied for supplemental security income. During an administrative hearing, a vocational expert (VE) testified to Fetting’s physical and mental limitations and his ability to perform certain jobs, stating that Fetting could perform the representative occupations of a cleaner/housekeeper, routing clerk, and marker. The VE estimated that, in the national economy, there were 200,000 cleaner/housekeeper jobs, 40,000 routing clerk jobs, and 200,000 marker jobs. During cross-examination, the VE stated that he calculated his estimates from numbers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, using his “knowledge of the labor market, [acquired] over 30+ years of job placement activities.” He stated: “It’s not a hard and fast scientific type formula” and that he had not conducted any “formal analysis” to validate his estimates but had “in the past checked numbers in other reporting formats.”The ALJ found that Fetting did not have a disability under the Social Security Act based on the VE’s testimony. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the VE’s methodology for calculating his job number estimates was unreliable. Substantial evidence supports the finding that a significant number of the identified jobs exist in the national economy. View "Fetting v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Sevec filed for disability social security benefits, alleging an onset of disability in 2014. At the time of her hearing, Sevec was 60 years old and suffered from knee pain caused by osteoarthritis. Sevec stated that she worked as a registered nurse until 2014, doing narcotics counts, answering call lights and bed alarms, assisting patients to the bathroom; administering IV medications, doing breathing treatments; and taking care of feeding tubes. After leaving that job, she provided care for a neighbor. A vocational expert (VE) stated Sevec’s work as an RN was “level 7, medium in its physical demand, medium as performed. And then we also have home health nurse … also, level 6. Medium in its physical demand; light as performed.” The ALJ asked whether “any of the past work [would] be available?” The VE replied, “Possibly the home health being as performed at a light level, not per the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles], though, but as performed.”The ALJ concluded that Sevec was not disabled. The Appeals Council and the district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The VE’s testimony is not well grounded in the record, and is not sufficient, standing alone, to support the ALJ’s determination. The record does not contain evidence from which the ALJ could determine, with any degree of confidence, that Sevec is capable of performing her past work; the ALJ specified that her “past work” did not include "home health nurse." View "Sevec v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law