Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, complaining of right-shoulder and arm pain, appealed the denial of his application for disability benefits. The court concluded that the ALJ's denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence because plaintiff has the residual functioning capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work, and the ALJ limited plaintiff to work involving no overhead reaching with his right arm. Further, the medical evidence supports the RFC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Liner v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 2012, one in five female veterans and one in 100 male veterans reported that they experienced sexual abuse in the military, and an estimated 26,000 service members “experienced some form of unwanted sexual contact.” The trauma stemming from sexual abuse in the military (military sexual trauma (MST)) can result in severe chronic medical conditions, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and anxiety. Generally, veterans with service-connected disabilities are entitled to disability benefits, 38 U.S.C. 1110, 1131. In response to what they viewed as the VA’s inadequate response to MST-based disability claims, veterans’ groups submitted a petition for rulemaking which requested that the VA promulgate a new regulation regarding the adjudication of certain MST-based disability claims. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs denied the petition. The Federal Circuit upheld the denial, noting its limited and deferential review and stating that the Secretary adequately explained its reasons for denying the petition. The court rejected a claim that in denying the petition, the Secretary violated the equal protection clause by intentionally discriminating against women without providing an exceedingly persuasive justification or discriminating against survivors of MST-based PTSD without providing a legitimate reason. View "Serv. Women's Action Network v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, suffering a combination of impairments such as paranoid schizophrenia and depression, appealed the denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s residual functioning capacity (RFC) assessment does not adequately account for all the limitations he suffers due to the combination of paranoid schizophrenia, panic attacks, and chronic depression. The court found that the the ALJ did not rely solely on the opinions of the state agency doctors and sufficiently considered the medical records provided by plaintiff in assessing his RFC. The ALJ did consider the opinion of plaintiff's expert, but concluded that it was inconsistent with the rest of the doctor's report. Further, the ALJ also considered plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores, but found that they were not controlling. In this case, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's symptoms were reasonably controlled by medication and treatment. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC determination and the RFC determination included the necessary limitations to account for plaintiff's mental impairments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mabry v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the trial court's denial of her petition for a writ of mandate. The trial court concluded that the Board correctly calculated plaintiff's effective date of disability retirement. Plaintiff raised two questions on appeal: (1) whether donated sick leave or vacation time from co-workers is considered "regular compensation" of the disabled employee under Government Code section 31724, and (2) whether the incremental payments of sick leave, vacation and holiday pay should be "compressed" to achieve an earlier date of retirement. The court concluded that the first question is not properly before it. In regards to the second question, the court concluded that Katosh v. Sonoma County Employees' Retirement Assn. confirmed the bright line rule that disability retirement benefits are not available until the day following the day paid leave was last received. Therefore, the trial court properly denied her petition for writ of mandate challenging that date. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Astorga v. Retirement Board" on Justia Law

Bozeman served in the Army, 1967-1970, including one year in Vietnam. In 1993, Bozeman sought disability benefits after substance abuse treatment at a VA Medical Center. The VA awarded him service-connected benefits for PTSD, rated as 10 percent disabling. Bozeman’s condition deteriorated. His disability rating was increased to a 50 percent rating in 1999. In 2000, the VA denied an increased rating. Bozeman underwent a VA Compensation and Pension Examination (C&P) in 2002. Bozeman submitted a Notice of Disagreement with its conclusion. He was hospitalized in 2003 and 2004, for “suicidal and homicidal thoughts[,] . . . severe depression.” In 2005 a C& P examiner concluded that Bozeman suffered from “chronic PTSD symptomatology off and on for the last 25 years” and that he would have “difficulty . . . work[ing] in gainful employment.” In 2006, Bozeman’s rating was increased to 70 percent, effective February 2003, with a temporary 100 percent rating for the hospitalization. The Board denied a rating in excess of 50 percent prior to February 2003, and a rating in excess of 70 percent after February 2003, but granted a rating of 100 percent, effective November 2010. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated. Bozeman’s argument that the Board failed to consider relevant evidence was not a new legal argument raised for the first time on appeal; the Board’s reliance on issue exhaustion was improper View "Bozeman v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 1998, Dickens filed a claim for PTSD caused by in-service events, stating that he received a Purple Heart and Bronze Star in connection with these events. His file was never located despite extensive searching. Dickens passed away in 2006 while his claim was pending, and Mrs. Dickens sought accrued benefits. In 2011, she testified that she did not know what had happened to her husband’s proof of a Purple Heart. In 2012, the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, finding no evidence that Dickens was involved in combat during his military service. On remand, in 2013, the Board denied the claim, again finding insufficient evidence to establish that Dickens engaged in combat. Mrs. Dickens argued that the VA violated its duty to assist her with her claim because the Board hearing officer failed to suggest that she seek a copy of Mr. Dickens’s service records 2011. The Veterans Court rejected that argument and affirmed the denial, noting that if Mrs. Dickens believed that the hearing officer committed an error, she should have included that issue in the 2012 joint motion for partial remand. The Federal Circuit affirmed, citing principles of issue exhaustion. View "Dickens v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 2008 plaintiff began having back pain that radiated to his legs due to a herniated disk and mild arthritis in his lumbar spine region; he also suffers from narcolepsy or obstructive sleep apnea, migraine headaches, numbness in his right leg, fibromyalgia, left-knee pain, and fatigue. He has limited mobility Dr. Imlach, his primary treating physician, concluded that the plaintiff’s conditions limited him to standing for a total of no more than half an hour, and sitting for no more than an hour, in an 8-hour workday and that plaintiff’s medications markedly limit the plaintiff’s ability to sustain concentration and pace. Plaintiff lives with his parents; he weighs 280-310 pounds, with a height of 6’2” to 6’3”. An administrative law judge denied his application for Social Security Disability benefits and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the ALJ failed to explain why she gave little weight to Imlach’s findings and erred in finding the plaintiff not credible on the ground that he had “not been forthright in his allegations of … inability to perform work related activities.” The court concluded that plaintiff does not appear to be capable of any full-time gainful employment, given his hypersomnia. View "Allensworth v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of their minor son seeking attorneys' fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B), fee-shifting provision. The district court held that plaintiffs were the prevailing party by virtue of having obtained a “stay-put” order under the IDEA and awarded plaintiffs attorneys’ fees. The court held that plaintiffs are not the prevailing party by virtue of having invoked the IDEA's stay-put provision and the court concluded that its holding is consistent with several other circuit courts that have addressed the issue. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the ALJ’s stay-put order was not a ruling on the merits; nor is the stay-put order a “similar form of judicially sanctioned relief” sufficient to confer prevailing party status; the court disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the stay-put order was essentially a preliminary injunction and that pursuant to the court's case law in this context, plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees; and, in Davis v. Abbott, the court recently reiterated the importance of a party having achieved relief on the merits for the purposes of determining prevailing party status in the context of interlocutory injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for defendants. View "Tina M. v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2011, the California Legislature adopted legislation which dissolved the redevelopment agencies (RA's) that had been formed by municipalities throughout the state under the provisions of the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL). Before their dissolution, the operations of RA's were funded by way of so-called "tax increment" financing. Shortly before the Legislature dissolved RA's, plaintiffs-appellants Virginia Macy, a low-income resident of the city; Libreria Del Pueblo, Inc.; and California Partnership filed a petition for a writ of mandate against the Fontana Redevelopment Agency alleging the agency failed to provide the low- and moderate-income housing required under the CRL. Plaintiffs asked for relief in the form of the payment of $27 million into the agency's low- and moderate-income housing fund (LMIHF). AB 26 created successor agencies that were given responsibility over certain obligations of each dissolved RA. Importantly, under the dissolution legislation, the liability of successor agencies was limited to the value of the assets those agencies received from their respective predecessor RA's. After enactment of AB 26, plaintiffs amended their petition and added defendant and respondent City of Fontana (the city), initially in its role as the successor agency provided by AB 26, and later also in its separate capacity as a municipal corporation. In its capacity as a municipal corporation, the city filed a demurrer to the petition, arguing that under AB 26 only a successor agency may be held liable for the preexisting obligations of an RA. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiffs appealed, but the Court of Appeal affirmed: the low- and moderate-income housing were never the liabilities of municipalities and their general funds. "An extension of RA statutory liabilities to municipalities and their general funds would require a very clear expression of the Legislature's intention to depart from the historical treatment of low- and moderate-income housing obligations; no such expression appears in AB 26 or later amendments to the dissolution legislation." View "Macy v. City of Fontana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Michael Allman applied for Social Security disability benefits, claiming he could not work due to spina bifida, a shunt in his brain, chronic back pain, headaches, depression, and anxiety. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) permitted him to perform a number of jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, defeating his disability claim. At step two of the applicable five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's headaches were not a “severe impairment” within the meaning of the Social Security Act and its corresponding regulations. Nevertheless, the ALJ discussed and considered plaintiff's headaches in assessing his RFC to work. After the ALJ denied his claim, the Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed after adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and overruling plaintiff's objections. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his headaches qualified as a severe impairment and that the ALJ had provided sufficient bases for not assigning more weight to his doctor's opinion. On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court’s findings regarding the ALJ’s determinations at steps two and four. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Allman v. Colvin" on Justia Law