Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the Center for Special Needs Trust Administration, Inc., as trustee of a polled special needs trust held for the benefit of Scott Hewitt, and dismissing this action brought by the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) claiming it was entitled to a detailed accounting, holding that the trustee provided an adequate accounting.Title XIX of the Social Security Act required that the funds remaining in Hewitt's trust subaccount when he died must first be used to reimburse the state for its Medicaid expenditures. DHS filed a petition to invoke jurisdiction over the irrevocable trust, claiming that it was entitled to a detailed accounting to ensure that the funds retained by by the pooled special needs trust were used for a proper purpose. The district court granted summary judgment for the Center, concluding that no further accounting was required absent evidence that the Center breached its duties as trustee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DHS was not entitled to relief on its claims of error. View "In re Medical Assistance Pooled Special Needs Trust Of Scott Hewitt" on Justia Law

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Bean served in the U.S. Army from 1966-1969. In 1997, he sought disability compensation. Bean was diagnosed with major depression and generalized anxiety disorder, but not PTSD. The VA denied him entitlement to service connection for PTSD. In 2006, Bean sought service connection for major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and PTSD. In response, the VA notified Bean that it was “working on [his] application for service-connected compensation” for major depression and generalized anxiety disorder and his “claim to reopen for” his PTSD-related claim. In 2007, he was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder. The VA found service connection for PTSD, deemed the PTSD 30% disabling, and assigned an August 2006 effective date. Bean filed a Notice of Disagreement, concerning the disability rating and effective date.In 2012, the Board of Veterans Affairs addressed Bean’s rating. Bean sought reconsideration. In 2019, the Board dismissed Bean’s appeal of the 2013 denial of his claim without addressing the merits.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. When a claim is adequately presented to, but is not addressed by the Board, the Board’s disposition of the appeal constitutes the Board's decision on that claim that may be appealed to the Veterans Court. The Veterans Court's jurisdiction is not limited to the Board's affirmative determinations and covers the disposition of an appeal that is challenged as improperly failing to address contentions clearly before the Board. View "Bean v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Crawford served in the U.S. Army and Florida National Guard for two decades. He was discharged in 2011 due to his service-connected PTSD. Crawford’s PTSD began after his second tour of duty in Iraq. The Florida State Surgeons Medical Discharge Review Board (SSMDRB) found Crawford did not meet medical retention standards and that his PTSD was incurred in the line of duty. It recommended a fitness determination by a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB), a prerequisite for medical retirement, 10 U.S.C. 1201. Crawford was not referred to a PEB but was discharged as if his PTSD was not service-related, without medical retirement.Crawford sought correction of his records and retroactive benefits before the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). Notwithstanding the SSMDRB’s findings and the fact that Crawford was discharged for failure to meet medical retention standards, a doctor opined Crawford met retention standards at the time of his discharge. Crawford filed suit. On the government's motion, the court remanded for a fitness determination and development of the record. On remand, the ABCMR found Crawford was entitled to medical retirement based solely on the evidence available at the time of his separation and granted him complete relief, including the correction of his records and retroactive medical retirement benefits.The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of Crawford’s subsequent motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Crawford was a prevailing party. View "Crawford v. United States" on Justia Law

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Pitts, the surviving spouse of an Army veteran, filed for dependency and indemnity compensation from the VA in 2001. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. In 2012, Pitts employed attorney Viterna. Their fee agreement was filed with the VA and provided that Viterna was owed 20% of any past-due benefits Pitts recovered, less certain expenses but applied only to claims for which a notice of disagreement was filed after June 20th, 2007; the NOD covering the 2001 claim was filed in 2005. Viterna asserts that this was an “unintentional drafting error.”In 2014, Viterna secured past-due benefits for Pitts, which related back to the 2005 NOD. The agency refused to pay Viterna 20% of those benefits. The Board affirmed. Before the Veterans Court, Viterna argued that Congress only gave the VA the power to assess whether a fee agreement was valid and if its terms were excessive or unreasonable—not whether the agreement covered the claim at issue.The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit disagreed. There was no qualifying agreement between Viterna and Pitts providing for payment of a fee for the claim in question. The court noted that between 1988-2006, attorneys could only charge fees for representing claimants after the Board’s “final decision.” In 2006, Congress amended 38 U.S.C. 5904, effective June 20th, 2007, to allow attorneys to charge for VA representation as soon as a claimant had filed a NOD seeking review of a regional office decision. View "Viterna v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC (“MSP”) appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of standing its putative class action against Defendant Hereford Insurance Company (“Hereford”) and denying leave to amend. MSP has brought several lawsuits around the country seeking to recover from insurance companies that allegedly owe payments to Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”) under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (the “MSP Act”). In the putative class action brought here, MSP charges Hereford with “deliberate and systematic avoidance” of Hereford’s reimbursement obligations under the MSP Act.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that MSP lacked standing because its allegations do not support an inference that it has suffered a cognizable injury or that the injury it claims is traceable to Hereford. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied MSP leave to amend based on MSP’s repeated failures to cure. The court explained that the plain language of Section 111 provides that when a no-fault insurance provider such as Hereford reports a claim pursuant to Section 111, it does not thereby admit that it is liable for the claim. The statutory context of the section’s reporting obligation and the purpose of the reporting obligation confirms the correctness of this interpretation. Because MSP’s argument that the payments made by EmblemHealth are reimbursable by Hereford rests entirely on its proposed interpretation of Section 111, MSP has not adequately alleged a “concrete” or “actual” injury or that the injury it alleges is fairly traceable to Hereford. View "MSP v. Hereford" on Justia Law

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Appellants challenged the appointment of Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). They argue that no one may serve as an acting officer under 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(2), which allows acting service while a nomination is pending in the Senate unless that nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period of acting service allowed by 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(1). Appellants assert that Section 3346(a)(2) serves only to toll Section 3346(a)(1)’s time limit and does not authorize an independent period of acting service.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Appellants’ argument because Section 3346(a)(1) and Section 3346(a)(2) are, by their plain text, disjunctive and independent. Because Berryhill was legally serving as Acting Commissioner, her appointments of the ALJs who decided Appellants’ cases were valid. The court explained that Appellants’ reading of the statute would shift the balance against the President. It would prevent him from designating anyone to serve as an acting officer if he submits a nomination after the 210-day period has elapsed, thus leaving the office vacant for as long as the Senate takes to consider it. View "Barbara Rush v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C 405(g), believing the Social Security Administration miscalculated his benefits. He filed his claim more than one year after the SSA verbally denied his request for review, and after he did not receive the requested written documentation of the SSA's denial.The SSA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Sec. 405(g)’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied only with respect to judicial review of a “final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security” and that Plaintiff had not obtained a final decision, having refused to exhaust the four-step administrative process. The district court granted SSA’s motion.Finding that Sec. 405(g)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that exhaustion is a mandatory requirement of the Social Security Act that may be excused only in a narrow set of circumstances, which were not present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "L.N.P. v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

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Pickett served in the Army from 1969-1971, including service in Vietnam. In 2004, sought service-connected compensation for an anxiety disorder, which he attributed to exposure to Agent Orange or other herbicides. The VA eventually granted Pickett service-connected compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and coronary artery disease (CAD) effective 2004. Pickett appealed, seeking a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU), starting in 2007, the date he last worked. A 2013 VA decision denied the application. The VA notified Pickett that he had a year to appeal. He did not appeal. A 2014 decision listed the 2013 decision and proposed decreasing Pickett’s PTSD rating. Pickett only challenged the proposed reduction.In 2017, Pickett filed a supplemental claim and new TDIU application, again citing service-connected CAD and PTSD. The VA awarded Pickett TDIU due solely to PTSD and increased his ratings, effective January 2017. Pickett filed a notice of disagreement, citing 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b), and arguing he was entitled to “an extra-schedular total rating,” which could include TDIU, effective from 2007.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Veterans’ Court, and Federal Circuit denied Pickett an earlier effective date. Pickett’s failure to perfect an appeal following the 2013 or 2014 decisions meant that his 2004 claim for the maximum CAD evaluation—including entitlement to TDIU—became final by 2017. The finalized claim could not provide a basis for an earlier entitlement to TDIU. View "Pickett v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Roane served in the Navy from 1981-1991. In 2013, he underwent vocational rehabilitation for disabilities, including sciatic nerve paralysis, degenerative spinal arthritis, and limited knee flexion. In 2017, he applied for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU), alleging that he was unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation due to his service-connected disabilities. He then had a combined disability rating of 70 percent, 38 U.S.C. 1117. Between 2016-2019, several VA examinations established his inability to sit or stand for extended periods and difficulty changing positions from sitting to standing. In 2017, a peripheral nerve examiner opined that despite these limitations, he should be able to “seek and maintain a substantially gainful light physical or sedentary type of employment.” The VA regional office denied his TDIU claim. Roane submitted additional evidence, including a private vocational assessment where the expert opined that his difficulties with prolonged sitting, standing, and walking “affect his ability to perform any type of substantially gainful employment, even sedentary employment.”The Board found that Roane’s service-connected disabilities met the rating requirement of 70 percent for TDIU, noting Roane’s college education, skills, and experience. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The Veterans Court properly interpreted the benefit-of-the-doubt rule under 38 U.S.C. 5107 and applied the appropriate standard of review to the Board’s application of that rule under 7261(b)(1). View "Roane v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed suit under 38 U.S.C. 502, seeking review and revision of certain instructions and practices set forth in the Veterans Affairs Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1 Manual), which provides guidance and instructions to the administrators of veterans’ benefits and claims, by interpreting and coordinating the application of statutes, regulations, policies, and judicial decisions. The M21-1 Manual “limits VA staff discretion, and, as a practical matter, impacts veteran benefits eligibility for an entire class of veterans.”The Federal Circuit dismissed challenges to presumptions and procedures concerning Vietnam-era exposure to the Agent Orange defoliant. MVA waived its challenge to the “Thailand Rules.” The VA’s interpretation of the “Blue Water Navy Rule” of 2019 did not unduly narrow the presumption of exposure and service connection as applied to shipboard service. MVA’s challenge to the “Airspace Rule” is barred by the six-year limit provided in section 2401(a) because the rule has been in full force and effect since 1993. Even if the time bar did not apply, Congress has consistently preserved the high-altitude exception to the presumption of exposure since its adoption in 1993. View "Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law