Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

K.S. is biracial and has been diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, mood disorder, adjustment disorder, and Tourette's syndrome. K.S. was a freshman and sophomore at Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School 2010-12. K.S. is gifted academically, with a full scale IQ of 123. She excels in math and science; successfully took several advanced placement classes, and was involved in show choir, the school musical, and volleyball. K.S. received special education and services under an individualized education program (IEP) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district provided K.S. with one-on-one paraprofessional support throughout the school day. K.S. could return to a special classroom at any time and could use that classroom to take tests in a quiet environment. During winter break, K.S. was raped K.S. returned to class and to participation in the school's show choir in January 2012, but experienced unsettling social interactions with peers and other emotional disappointments during the semester; her IEP was amended to add paraprofessional support for K.S.'s extracurricular activities. K.S. did not make the cut for show choir. Her parents eventually removed K.S. to a private school and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit rejected their claims, finding that the district had provided a Free Appropriate Public Education. View "Sneitzer v. Iowa Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Respondent, the chief investigator for the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) of the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, was investigating Affiliated Counseling Center, LLC (Affiliated) when she applied for and received a search warrant for Affiliated’s premises. The police executed the warrant and seized numerous documents from Affiliated’s office, including patient files. Thereafter, Appellant, the sole owner of Affiliated, sued Respondent, alleging that Respondent committed conversion and trespass to chattels by losing and/or destroying some of Affiliated’s patient files. Respondent moved to dismiss, asserting that she was entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Respondent was entitled to prosecutorial immunity because her challenged conduct was taken pursuant to her statutory authority to investigate Medicaid fraud. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) prosecutorial immunity does not extend to an investigator when the investigator’s conduct is not intimately involved with the initiation and maintenance of criminal charges; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that Respondent was entitled to prosecutorial immunity. View "Stresemann v. Jesson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (Claimant) appealed the denial of her application for supplemental security income. The court concluded that the ALJ did not recognize the apparent conflict between claimant's residual functioning capacity (RFC) and the demands of Level Two reasoning and, therefore, the court could not determined whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's five-step finding. The court vacated as to this issue and remanded for the ALJ to determine whether there is a reasonable explanation to justify relying on the vocational expert's testimony. Because the ALJ has not yet determined whether claimant established fibromyalgia as a medically determinable impairment under the 2010 diagnostic criteria and it may moot claimant's other arguments regarding her fibromyalgia diagnosis, the court need not reach claimant's other arguments at this time. The court held that the ALJ’s RFC determination adequately incorporated the opinions of Dr. McKenna and Dr. Boyd. The court discerned no error in the ALJ's consideration of claimant's testimony. Finally, to the extent the ALJ may have failed to consider lay witness evidence, the error was harmless because it was “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Rounds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (Claimant) appealed the denial of her social security disability benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that when an ALJ determines that a claimant for Social Security benefits is not malingering and has provided objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms she alleges, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of those symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so; an ALJ does not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony by simply reciting the medical evidence in support of his or her residual functional capacity determination; and, in this case, the ALJ committed legal error where the ALJ found generally that the claimant’s testimony was not credible, but failed to identify which testimony she found not credible and why. The court concluded that the error was not harmless because it precluded the court from conducting a meaningful review. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and instructed the district court to remand to the ALJ for further proceedings. View "Brown-Hunter v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The State’s public pension systems were defined-benefit plans, which guaranteed participants a calculable amount of benefits payable upon retirement based on the participant’s salary and time spent in the pension system. In 2011, with the enactment of L. 2011, c. 78 (Chapter 78), the Legislature added language explicitly declaring that each member of the State’s pension systems "shall have a contractual right to the annual required contribution amount" and the failure of the State to make the required contribution "shall be deemed to be an impairment of the contractual right." A separate statutory provision, enacted earlier, required the State to increase its annually required contribution (ARC) beginning with fiscal year 2012 (FY12) over the course of seven years at increments of 1/7 of the ARC per year, until the contribution covered the full ARC. The State made the required contributions in FY12 and FY13, and the Appropriations Act signed into law for FY14 included the required contributions of 3/7 of the ARC. In February 2014, the Governor released the FY15 proposed budget, which also included funding to satisfy the State’s required payment (i.e., 4/7 of the ARC). On May 20, 2014, the Governor issued Executive Order 156, which reduced the State payments into the pension systems for FY14, explaining that the reduction was due to a severe and unanticipated revenue shortfall. Instead of paying the required 3/7 of the ARC contribution, which totaled $1.582 billion, the State made a total contribution of $696 million for FY14. The next day, citing new information that placed the State’s projected revenue at less than previous projections, the State Treasurer announced that the proposed budget for FY15 was being revised to reduce the amount that would be contributed to pension systems. The revised FY15 budget thus advanced would include a total contribution of $681 million, reflecting $1.57 billion less than what was required. Plaintiffs brought this action because the prior Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and current FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for under Chapter 78’s payment schedule. Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The trial court issued a detailed and comprehensive opinion that granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their impairment-of-contract claims and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court accepted the argument that Chapter 78 created a contract and that the State’s failure to appropriate the full value of ARC in the FY15 Appropriations Act substantially impaired plaintiffs’ rights under the contract. In so finding, the court rejected arguments that Chapter 78 was unenforceable as violative of the Debt Limitation Clause, the Appropriations Clause, and the gubernatorial line-item veto power. The court did not order a specific appropriation, but rather determined to give the other branches an opportunity to act in accordance with the court’s decree. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Chapter 78 did not create a legally enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection. The Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution interdicted the creation, in this manner, of a legally binding enforceable contract compelling multi-year financial payments in the sizable amounts called for by the statute. View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Stepp, a former correctional officer, training secretary and coordinator, and parole probation officer, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401. Stepp was 47 years old, 5’6” tall, and weighed 237 pounds. She primarily claimed degenerative disc disease and depression. An ALJ denied Stepp’s claim, acknowledging that Stepp suffered from chronic pain, but finding that surgery, medication, and therapy had resulted in improvement such that she retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work. Stepp submitted to the Appeals Council additional evidence in the form of medical records created just before the ALJ’s denial of her claim. This evidence, the treatment notes of pain management specialist Dr. MacKay, tends to suggest that Stepp’s condition did not improve over the course of the adjudicative period to the extent that the ALJ estimated. The Appeals Council declined to engage in plenary review and did not address Dr. MacKay’s notes. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the ALJ properly analyzed a range of conflicting testimony and medical opinions and reached a conclusion adequately supported by the record, but that the Council erred in not accepting Dr. MacKay’s treatment notes as new and material evidence. View "Stepp v. Carolyn Colvin" on Justia Law

Stepp, a former correctional officer, training secretary and coordinator, and parole probation officer, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401. Stepp was 47 years old, 5’6” tall, and weighed 237 pounds. She primarily claimed degenerative disc disease and depression. An ALJ denied Stepp’s claim, acknowledging that Stepp suffered from chronic pain, but finding that surgery, medication, and therapy had resulted in improvement such that she retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work. Stepp submitted to the Appeals Council additional evidence in the form of medical records created just before the ALJ’s denial of her claim. This evidence, the treatment notes of pain management specialist Dr. MacKay, tends to suggest that Stepp’s condition did not improve over the course of the adjudicative period to the extent that the ALJ estimated. The Appeals Council declined to engage in plenary review and did not address Dr. MacKay’s notes. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the ALJ properly analyzed a range of conflicting testimony and medical opinions and reached a conclusion adequately supported by the record, but that the Council erred in not accepting Dr. MacKay’s treatment notes as new and material evidence. View "Stepp v. Carolyn Colvin" on Justia Law

The Section 8 low-income housing assistance voucher program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(o), is administered by public housing agencies such as Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA). Program regulations define “rent to [the] owner” as “[t]he total monthly rent payable to the owner under the lease for the unit. Rent to owner covers payment for any housing services, maintenance and utilities that the owner is required to provide and pay for.” Velez and Hatcher, voucher recipients, entered into one-year leases with K&D. The leases provide: “If Resident(s) shall holdover after the end of the term of this Rental Agreement, said holdover shall be deemed a tenancy of month to month and applicable month to month fees shall apply.” Velez entered into a month-to-month tenancy after her one-year term expired; Hatcher entered into month-to-month tenancies, and, later, a nine-month agreement. K&D charged fees of $35.00 to $100.00 per month. CMHA did not treat these short-term rental fees as rent under the voucher program. Velez and Hatcher were required to pay the fees and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted CMHA summary judgment, holding that the fees were not rent. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Recasting the charge as a short-term fee, rather than rent, does not change that it is consideration paid by the tenant for use of the rental unit. View "Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Price, an almost illiterate, mentally retarded 44-year-old who also suffers from psychiatric ailments, intermittently received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, having been adjudged disabled in 1988, 1991, and 2007. His benefits should have been terminated in 2005 because he was sent to prison for a felony sex offense, but the record is unclear as to when benefits stopped. Paroled in 2010, he unsuccessfully applied for the same benefits that he had received before he entered prison. After reviewing the history of Price’s mental problems, his inability to function in society, doctor’s assessments, his nocturnal habits, and test scores, the Seventh Circuit remanded, finding the administrative law judge’s reasons for finding that Price was not disabled “unconvincing.” As is common in social security disability proceedings, the administrative law judge inferred from Price’s ability to perform simple household chores, such as cooking food in a microwave oven and mowing the lawn, that he could be gainfully employed, but “it’s easier—especially for someone with an antisocial psychiatric disorder—to work in one’s own home, at one’s own pace, at one’s own choice of tasks, than to work by the clock under supervision in a place of business.” View "Price v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Milam applied for disability insurance benefits in 2011, identifying conditions of back pain, knee pain, hip pain, and osteoporosis and a 2009 disability onset date—the same day she was laid off. Milam had worked for 20 years, most recently as an administrative assistant. The ALJ noted his general suspicions about claimants who are "laid off—they work until the last day and then all of a sudden they're disabled," noting that after alleged onset date, Milam received unemployment benefits and looked for a new job. Milam testified that she can drive for only 20 minutes without back and hip pain, can sit for only 30 minutes continuously before needing to stand, can lift five to ten pounds, has limited ability to bend her back, and has difficulties rotating and squatting. She testified that she is in pain "24/7" and sleeps four to five hours per night. She submitted letters from three former coworkers stating that Milam was absent from work up to five days per month. The ALJ found that Milam was not disabled, but could perform sedentary work with restrictions. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Milam v. Colvin" on Justia Law