Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Norma married veteran Glenn Dodson in 1949. They remained married until Glenn’s death in 1992 from cardiac arrhythmia due to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Norma did not seek Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits as the “surviving spouse” of a veteran whose death resulted from a service-related injury or disease, 38 U.S.C. 1310–1318. Her eligibility for DIC benefits terminated upon her remarriage at age 64 in 1994. The Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 amended Title 38 to authorize DIC benefits for surviving spouses who remarry after attaining age 57 but before enactment of the amendment. Norma, who was over the age of 57 when she remarried in 1994, did not seek DIC benefits during the amendment’s one-year window. During that time, ALS was recognized as a condition that could be service-related, though not presumptively so. In 2008 the VA established a presumption of service connection for ALS. In 2009, Norma filed an application for DIC benefits as Glenn’s widow. The regional office denied the claim. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the claim untimely and holding that the amendment did not contemplate shifting circumstances. View "Carroll v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of social security benefits on the basis that she was not intellectually disabled. Plaintiff had received social security benefits because of her intellectual disability but the SSA concluded that she no longer qualified as disabled once she reached the age of 18. The court concluded that the ALJ had a duty to order further IQ testing and the ALJ's failure to do so was not harmless error. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia v. Comm's of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, C.M's parents challenged the district court's decision affirming the OAH judge's conclusion that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1487. The parents argued that the District violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA because it failed to properly incorporate C.M's Response-to-Intervention (RTI) data into C.M.'s initial evaluation and it failed to provide them with C.M.'s RTI data. The court concluded that the District did not fail to incorporate the RTI data into the evaluation, but that it violated the IDEA's procedural requirements by failing to provide the parents with the RTI data; the District's procedural violations prevented the parents from meaningfully participating in the individualized education program (IEP) process; and the court remanded for reconsideration of whether the parents were entitled to reimbursement for the cost of private instruction because C.M. was denied a free appropriate public education, and for attorneys' fees. The parents also contested three of the district court's rulings related to the first two OAH proceedings. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that the parents' claim for reimbursement of the cost of Dr. Guterman's evaluation was moot; properly concluded that the parents' due process rights were not violated by a change in the wording of the issue presented; and correctly determined that two of the three claims raised in the second OAH proceeding were time-barred. Finally, the court remanded for consideration of the parents' reevaluation retaliation claim and affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a mandate petition challenging the board's decision denying his request for unemployment compensation benefits. The trial court subsequently issued a writ of mandate directing that plaintiff receive the requested benefits. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff's actions in exceeding his break times on four separate occasions and then falsifying his time sheets constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256. Plaintiff may not receive unemployment compensation benefits because he committed misconduct within the meaning of section 1256. View "Irving v. California Uninsurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Forester was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, after the ALJ determined that Forester’s five years of private coal mine employment with Navistar’s predecessor, combined with his16 years of employment as a mine inspector with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration , rendered him eligible for the rebuttable presumption that, having been employed for at least 15 years in underground coal mines, and having a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, commonly known as black lung disease. The Benefits Review Board upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that a federal mine inspector is not a “miner” for purposes of the BLBA, and remanding for determination of whether Forester is entitled to an award of BLBA benefits without the benefit of the 15-year presumption. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Forester" on Justia Law

Beraud served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, 1974-1977, and in the reserves until 988. In 1985, Beraud filed a claim with a VA Regional Office for a headache disorder, allegedly caused by trauma suffered while on duty. Although Beraud did not appeal the RO’s denial of his claim, he sent a letter, indicating the location of additional service medical records. The RO never responded. The RO reopened the claim, but denied it on the merits in 1990, finding that Beraud did not incur the headache disorder, or aggravation thereof, during service. The RO did not refer to Beraud’s 1985 letter, nor did it mention the medical records that were the subject of the letter. Beraud did not appeal. The RO denied two later requests to reopen, finding that Beraud had not submitted new and material evidence. In 2004, Beraud submitted an informal claim for disability compensation for the same headache disorder. This time, the RO granted Beraud service connection and assigned a 50 percent disability rating, effective 2004. In 2010, the Board denied Beraud’s appeal, finding that the decisions on his 1985, 1990, 1992, and 2002 claims were final, so that an effective date prior to 2004 could not be granted. Beraud argued that his 1985 letter constituted new evidence, giving rise to a pending, unadjudicated claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. Because the VA failed to determine whether evidence Beraud timely submitted in 1985 claim was new and material under 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b), that claim remained pending, despite the subsequent final decision.View "Beraud v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Darlene Devlin had been married for more than 40 years when her husband died, then a civilian federal employee for nearly six years, entitling Darlene to Basic Employee Death Benefits (BEDB), 5 U.S.C. 8442(b)(1)(A), 8466(b). However, Darlene died before she could sign or file an application for BEDB. Her son, Devlin, completed, signed, and filed an application for BEDB on her behalf. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) denied the application, concluding that Darlene was not entitled to BEDB because she failed to submit an application for those benefits before her death. Devlin argued that his appointment as a co-administrator of his mother’s estate permitted him to sign and file the application for BEDB on her behalf. The e Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed the denial. View "Devlin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Joyner served in the Marine Corps and completed a tour of duty in the Persian Gulf. During service, he was treated twice for neck pain. However, his separation from service examination indicated that his neck was “normal.” Joyner later filed a claim with the VA for disability compensation for chronic neck pain and other conditions. The VA regional office denied his claim for benefits for his neck pain. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, concluding that Joyner did not have a diagnosed neck condition and was not entitled to service connection under 38 U.S.C. 1110, a general provision that provides compensation for disabilities suffered in the line of duty. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1117, an additional disability compensation provision that applies to Gulf War Veterans. Pain can evidence a disability under that section. View "Joyner v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The parties were married for 21 years. At the time of trial, husband was 51 and wife was 53. Husband was a practicing attorney with the Army Corps of Engineers. Wife worked at the Bonneville Power Administration. Both parties were beneficiaries of federal retirement benefits. Because wife was eligible for Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) benefits, she was not eligible for Social Security benefits based on her own employment. Husband's civilian federal employment was under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) and subject to Social Security taxes. The question presented in this case was whether federal law forbid a division of property by which the value of retirement benefits belonging to the nonparticipating spouse is reduced by the present value of hypothetical Social Security benefits to which that spouse would have been entitled if she had been a Social Security participant. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not violate federal law by "considering" Social Security benefits in that way, it affirmed that court's decision. View "Herald v. Steadman" on Justia Law

Norasingh, a woman in her twenties, suffers from medical and mental health problems, including congenital brain malformation, mental retardation, diabetes, asthma, and epileptic seizures. Norasingh lives with her parents and younger sister. In 2009, her parents became her limited conservators, entitled to determine her residence and make her medical and educational decisions. The conservatorship limits Norasingh’s rights to marry, enter into contracts, and control her social and sexual relationships. In 2004, she began to receive benefits from the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) Program administered by the California Department of Social Services. She was determined to be eligible for 32.90 IHSS hours, with no benefit for protective supervision. Norasingh’s mother is her paid IHSS provider and requested protective supervision hours because Norasingh was having seizures five times a day. In 2005, Contra Costa County Human Services determined that Norasingh was eligible for protective supervision, based on the opinion of one of Norasingh’s treating physicians, who stated that she had a history of wandering and poor judgment. Based on a report by a social worker, in 2011 an administrative law judge concluded that Norasingh was no longer eligible for protective supervision. The trial court affirmed. The appeals court reversed, finding that a persistent misconception regarding the scope of Norasingh’s mental impairment undermined the eligibility determination. View "Norasingh v. Lightbourne" on Justia Law