Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Dixon served in the Army, 1979-1992, including as a chemical operations specialist in the Persian Gulf, where he was exposed to pyridostigmine and “encountered smoke from oil fires, diesel, and burning trash,” and had “cutaneous exposure [to] diesel and petrochemical fuel.” In 2003, Dixon was diagnosed with sarcoid lungs and transverse myelitis, which left him temporarily paralyzed from the waist down. He sought service-connected disability benefits. In 2004 a VA regional office denied Dixon’s claim. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, Dixon filed a pro se notice of appeal, 60 days after the 120-day filing deadline, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a). The Veterans Court dismissed, concluding that it was “without jurisdiction.” In 2011 the Supreme Court held that the filing deadline is not jurisdictional. The Veterans Court issued an order allowing Dixon and others to move to recall the dismissals. Still acting pro se, Dixon sought equitable tolling, explaining that he suffered from physical and psychiatric disabilities that prevented him from filing in a timely manner, accompanied by a statement from his psychiatrist. The Veterans Court denied Dixon’s motion. Attorneys subsequently agreed to represent Dixon. The Veterans Court allowed until October 4, 2012 to move for reconsideration. The VA refused to provide a copy of the file and the earliest available appointment for reviewing the file was October 1. On that dated, VA staff monitored the review and declined requests for copies of documents. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of an extension, stating that the disability compensation system is not meant as a trap for the unwary, or a stratagem to deny compensation to a veteran who has a valid claim.View "Dixon v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Gentry has psoriasis, a chronic autoimmune condition causing patches of raised skin covered with flaky buildup of dead skin cells that crack and bleed and can interfere with sleeping, walking, sitting, standing, and using one’s hands. She also has psoriatic arthritis, an inflammatory disease that causes fatigue, stiffness and swelling in and around the joints, tenderness, pain and swelling in the tendons, swollen fingers and toes, and reduced range of motion. There is no cure for either condition. Gentry suffered severe injuries to her ankle, arm and wrist, and hip in a 1994 car accident and developed avascular necrosis and post-traumatic arthritis. She requires a brace on her leg to walk, has a limp and waddling gait, and has frequent pain in her leg and foot, back, neck, and hands. She also has deformities in her foot, ankylosing spondylitis cervical radiculopathy, cervical stenosis, lumbar spondylosis, possible sacroilitis or facet arthropathy in the low back, degenerative joint disease in the low back, chronic lumbar strain, possible herniated disc carpal tunnel syndrome, and lumbosacral/thoracic radiculopathy, among other things. In 2004, Gentry (age 29) applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42. U.S.C.401. She had worked 10 years as a pizza maker and delivery driver. She had most recently worked as a receptionist, but was discharged because her psoriasis bled on the paperwork. After Gentry’s application was denied, the case was remanded twice. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial as not supported by substantial evidence. View "Gentry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Chhibber, an internist, operated a walk‐in medical office on the south side of Chicago. For patients with insurance or Medicare coverage, Chhibber ordered an unusually high volume of diagnostic tests, including echocardiograms, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function tests, nerve conduction studies, carotid Doppler ultrasound scans and abdominal ultrasound scans. Chhibber owned the equipment and his staff performed the tests. He was charged with eight counts of making false statements relating to health care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and eight counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The government presented witnesses who had worked for Chhibber, patients who saw him, and undercover agents who presented themselves to the Clinic as persons needing medical services. Chhibber’s former employees testified that he often ordered tests before he even arrived at the office, based on phone calls with staff. Employees performed the tests themselves with little training, and the results were not reviewed by specialists; normally, the tests were not reviewed at all. Chhibber was convicted of four counts of making false statements and five counts of health care fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Chhibber" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Secretary revamped Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System, updating the diagnostic weighting used to calculate reimbursements for hospitals treating the program's beneficiaries. Plaintiffs sought review of the Secretary's decision regarding a downward prospective adjustment for hospital-specific rate payments. The district court concluded that the statutory scheme was ambiguous and deferred to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation of the adjustment provisions. Applying Chevron deference, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the statutory scheme was ambiguous and unclear. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Adirondack Medical Center, et al. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his claims for supplemental security income (SSI). At issue was whether the ALJ failed to make an adequate showing that a significant number of jobs existed in the region in which plaintiff lived or in several regions of the country. The court concluded that the ALJ did not err by defining "region" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(B) as the State of California, and 2,500 jobs in California constituted a significant number of jobs in the region. The court also concluded that 25,000 jobs also signified a significant number of jobs in several regions of the country. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gutierrez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Pierce claimed that she injured her lower back in 2004 while moving cases of glassware at her waitressing job. She quit her job and sought medical treatment. An MRI showed signs of disc degeneration. She received chiropractic and electric-shock treatments to her back. She also took prescription pain medication. After her back improved, she started a new job at a café. In March 2006 (her alleged onset date for disability), Pierce re-injured her back to the point that she could no longer sit or stand comfortably, and she had to quit her new job. The injury disrupted her sleep, caused numbness in her legs, and prevented her from being able to sit, stand, lift, or bend for long periods. She could not work for more than five hours without pain. An ALJ found that Pierce, then more than 55 years old, was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings, finding the ALJ’s assessment of Pierce’s credibility was flawed in several respects. View "Pierce v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The former miner sued in 1992 and an administrative law judge determined that he was not medically qualified for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 and indicated that Arkansas Coals was not the “responsible operator” required to pay benefits. About 17 years later, the miner filed a second claim. After finding that his medical condition had worsened and that he was now disabled, an ALJ awarded benefits and determined that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator. The Benefits Review Board and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the company’s finality, waiver, and collateral estoppel arguments; the miner was entitled to bring a second claim under 20 C.F.R. 725.309(d)(4) and the determination that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator was not “necessary” to the resolution of the initial claim. Substantial evidence supports the determination that Arkansas Coals is the responsible operator. View "Arkansas Coals, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Maynes, a miner who developed pneumoconiosis after working in Consolidated’s coal mine for 25 years, received benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, from 1997 until he died of respiratory failure in 2003. His widow sought survivors’ benefits. The then-current version of the BLBA conditioned her eligibility for benefits on proof that pneumoconiosis either caused or hastened her husband’s death. Her 2003 claim was denied. The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which amended the law so that survivors are automatically entitled to benefits if the miner received BLBA benefits during his lifetime. Congress specified that the changes would apply to claims filed after January 2005, but did not address whether persons whose claims had been denied under the previous eligibility framework, could receive benefits by filing a subsequent claim. The issue was answered in the affirmative by the Benefits Review Board and affirmed by the Third and Fourth Circuits. Although the Department of Labor, an administrative law judge, and the Benefits Review Board agreed Maynes was entitled to benefits, they disagreed about the appropriate commencement date for benefits. The Sixth Circuit rejected Consolidated’s appeal, upholding the 2009 commencement date. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Maynes" on Justia Law

Rebecca Mays appealed the denial of her application for disability benefits. After careful consideration of the Social Security Administration's decision and the district court order affirming the Administration's decision, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error. View "Mays v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that LINA violated the disability insurance policy's terms and ERISA requirements - in part because LINA ignored the SSA process and the information it generated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LINA. Because LINA did not have the evidence presented to the SSA when it denied her last appeal - and in fact could not have had that evidence when it initially denied her claim - the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand plaintiff's claims to LINA for its consideration of the evidence presented to the SSA. View "Melech v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, et al." on Justia Law