Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

A 2010 fire at an apartment in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of a tenant and her guest. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a smoke detector and an alternate means of egress, both of which are required under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) in which Richardson participated. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the estates of the deceased. The Third Circuit reversed. State officials’ approval and subsidization of the apartment for the Section 8 program, even though the apartment allegedly failed to comply with Section 8’s standards, did not constitute a state-created danger toward the apartment’s tenant and her guest in violation of their constitutional substantive due process rights. View "Henry v. City of Erie" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) as a violation of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) barred patients eligible for the state's Medicaid program from obtaining covered family planning services through health care providers who performed abortions in cases other than medical necessity, rape, or incest. The court concluded that the district court's entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction mooted Arizona's appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court dismissed that appeal (Case No. 12-17558), and considered only Arizona's appeal of the summary judgment order and permanent injunction (Case No. 13-15506). The court held that the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider requirement conferred a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that the Arizona statute contravenes the Medicaid Act's requirement that states give Medicaid recipients a free choice of qualified provider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Betlach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the district alleging claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the district. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reconsidering its prior order denying summary judgment where the district court found that it had committed clear error by not considering whether plaintiff gave a sufficient explanation for the conflict between her ADA claim and her Nevada Public Employees' Retirement Systems (PERS) application under the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. Under the standard set forth in Cleveland, the court concluded that plaintiff gave sufficient explanations for the inconsistencies between her ADA claim and her PERS and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, applications to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law

In a social security disability or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) must evaluate the effect of a claimant's mental impairments on her ability to work using a "special technique" prescribed by the Commissioner's regulations. At the second step of a five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the mental impairment is "severe" or "not severe." If "not," then the ALJ must determine and discuss them as part of his residual functional capacity (RFC) analysis at step four. A question that is frequently encountered in social security disability appeals cases is how much further discussion of a non-severe impairment is required at step four? The Tenth Circuit found that in assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments; the Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simply rely on his finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis. In this case, the ALJ found that Petitioner's alleged mental impairments were medically determinable but non-severe. He then used language suggesting he had excluded them from consideration as part of his RFC assessment, based on his determination of non-severity. Under the regulations, however, a finding of non-severity alone would not support a decision to prepare an RFC assessment omitting any mental restriction. The ALJ's specific conclusions he reached in this portion of his analysis were unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's affirmance of the ALJ's decision and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings at step four. View "Wells v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Middleton served on active duty from 1964 until 1990. He first sought compensation for type II diabetes mellitus in 2001. In 2002, a VA Regional Office granted service connection, assigning a disability rating of 20 percent under 38 C.F.R. 4.119. In 2009 Middleton was denied an increased rating after a VA physical examination. During his appeal, Middleton was treated with three oral hypoglycemic agents and daily injections of the drug Byetta®. In 2010, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals again denied a rating increase despite Middleton’s assertions that his diet was restricted, his activities were regulated, and he used an oral hypoglycemic agent, based on the fact that he did n not use insulin to regulate his diabetes. The Board stated that use of insulin is a necessary element for the 40-percent rating. The Veterans Court affirmed the denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court’s application of the regulations to the facts and that the Veterans Court did not err in interpreting the governing regulations View "Middleton v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease housing to Indians. Fort Belknap, a TDHE, petitioned for review of HUD's decision to withhold overpayments from future program payments. The court held that 25 U.S.C. 4161(d) allows an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to section 4161(a). In this instance, because HUD has taken no action pursuant to section 4161(a), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous." on Justia Law

After leaving coal mining, Eckman sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, in 1985. An ALJ awarded benefits in 1993; the Benefits Review Board affirmed the decision. Marmon paid benefits to Eckman until his 2002 death; his widow, Ethel, sought benefits as a dependent survivor. An ALJ denied the claim in 2005, finding that although Eckman had pneumoconiosis, Ethel failed to prove that his death was due to the disease. The Board affirmed. After Congress enacted the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, and amended the BLBA, Ethel filed a new claim. A Department of Labor district director awarded benefits. An ALJ upheld the award, finding that Ethel satisfied the familial relationship and dependency criteria for survivors under the BLBA and that, based on Eckman’s lifetime disability award and the filing date of Ethel’s claim, Ethel was entitled to benefits under section 932(l), as amended by the ACA. The Board affirmed. The Third Circuit denied the coal company’s petition for review, noting that in Ethel’s second claim, the cause of death was not at issue, her entitlement to benefits turned primarily on an administrative fact: whether her husband had been awarded benefits. View "Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir. Office of Workers Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

The Department of Veterans Affairs promulgated a rule that purported to eliminate certain procedural and appellate rights for veterans appearing before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates (NOVA) sought review. During the course of review it became clear that the new rule was invalid; the VA made assurances to NOVA and to the Federal Circuit about how the matter would be handled pending resolution. It later became clear that these assurances were not honored by the VA. The Federal Circuit ordered the VA to show cause why it should not be sanctioned. The VA, conceding error, provided a detailed remedial plan. After clarifications, NOVA indicated its satisfaction with, and agreement to, the plan, under which the VA agreed to notify relevant claimants before the Board, to vacate the affected Board decisions, and to provide affected claimants with a new hearing even if relevant deadlines would otherwise have expired. The Federal Circuit approved the plan and did not enter sanctions. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana is a municipal corporation that operates a major hospital and other facilities, including a health center operated in partnership with Citizens Health to serve the medically under-served population in Indianapolis. The health center was funded in part by a Section 330 Grant, awarded by the federal Health Resources and Services Administration, which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services. Section 330 grants fund qualifying health centers that provide primary health care services to medically under-served populations, 42 U.S.C. 254b. A In 2012, Health and Hospital decided to terminate the partnership with Citizens and relinquish the federal grant, which still had several years of funding remaining. Citizens sued Health and Hospital, HRS, and others in an effort to retain the grant funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that Citizens had no contractual, statutory, or constitutionally cognizable interest in the grant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Health and Hospital was the grantee; Citizens had no constitutionally-protected entitlement to the grant; and the terms of the contract between Health and Hospital and Citizens clear; there was no obligation to renew. View "Citizens Health Corp. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law