Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Flora is the widow of Donald, a World War II veteran, honorably discharged in 1945 after being diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. At that time the VA found his diabetes to be service-connected and gave him a disability rating of 40%. Beginning in 1950, Donald was hospitalized at various times for complications and declining health as a result of his diabetes and repeatedly, unsuccessfully, requested increases in his disability rating. In 1961, the Director of the Compensation and Pension Service found “clear and unmistakable error” and increased the rating to 60%, effective 1961. Ultimately, Donald’s disability rating was increased to 100%, effective 1965. Donald died in 1969, from complications of diabetes. Flora was granted dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, and filed a claim under 38 U.S.C. 1311(a)(2), which provides that a surviving spouse may qualify for increased benefits if the veteran received “or was entitled to receive . . . compensation for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for a continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding death.” The VA denied the claim in 2003. Flora pursued appeals, which were ultimately rejected by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Kernea v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Mingo Logan challenged the award of benefits to claimant under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). Because the court concluded that the ALJ did not in fact apply rebuttal limitations to Mingo Logan, and the Board affirmed the ALJ's analysis, the court did not reach Mingo Logan's challenge to the standard announced by the Board to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption of entitlement to benefits. The court affirmed the Board's award of benefits because it also found that Mingo Logan's other challenges to the ALJ's factual findings lacked merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. Owen" on Justia Law

Claimant was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901-945. At issue was whether the awards of attorneys' fees properly reflected market-based evidence of counsel's hourly rate, as required by the lodestar analysis in Hensley v. Eckerhart. The court held that neither the ALJ nor the BRB abused its discretion in concluding that counsel provided sufficient market-based evidence of rates, and that the number of hours billed for attorneys' services reasonably reflected the work completed. The court also held that the award of fees for work performed by certain legal assistants was not supported fully by the record, and modified that award accordingly. View "Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application for social security disability insurance benefits. The court concluded that the ALJ met his duty to fully and fairly develop the record; the district court correctly upheld the ALJ's determination of plaintiff's residual functioning capacity (RFC); and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the ALJ used an improper standard to discount plaintiff's credibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the SSA. View "Kamann v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a due-process complaint against the DOE seeking tuition reimbursement after plaintiffs enrolled their autistic child in a private school because the DOE failed to provide the child with a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court affirmed the state review officer's determination that the hearing record did not support the impartial hearing officer's determination that the lack of a functional behavior assessment (FBA) rose to the level of denying the child a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) where the individualized education program (IEP) addressed behavioral needs. Further, the IEP's failure to include parental counseling did not deny the child a FAPE; the SRO did not rely upon impermissible retrospection and the court deferred to her analysis; and the court found plaintiffs' remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "M.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application for disability benefits and supplemental security income (SSI). The court concluded that the ALJ did not err in discounting the most severe subjective complaints of pain because the ALJ properly applied Polaski v. Heckler and provided valid reasons for discounting plaintiff and his mother's testimony; the ALJ properly weighed the opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians; the ALJ properly used the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grids") to determine whether there was substantial gainful employment plaintiff could perform; and the court agreed with the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria for Listing 1.04 or any other listing in the Adult Listing of Impairments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McDade v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Massie served on active duty in the Army, 1968-1970 and was awarded VA benefits for varicose veins and related surgery, initially at 10% and increased to 50%, disability effective in 1990. In, 2001, Massie sought an increased disability rating. He submitted a letter from a VA physician who had treated Massie for “multiple medical problems” including “chronic venous insufficiency” that had “persisted in spite of prior surgical treatment with vein stripping” and that left Massie with significant pain when he was on his feet for any period of time. The regional office increased Massie’s rating to 100%, as of the 2001 date of his filing. The Veterans Court determined that the physician’s letter, dated 1999, did not qualify as an informal claim that would entitle Massie to an earlier effective date for the 100% rating. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the letter was not a “report of examination” because it did not describe the results of a “specific, particular examination” and did not suggest that Massie’s condition had worsened. View "Massie v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Munir sent his son, O.M., to a private residential facility and a private boarding school after multiple suicide attempts, and sought reimbursement for the cost of the placements from the school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires that states receiving federal education funding ensure that disabled children receive a free appropriate public education, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1) or pay for their education elsewhere if a child require specialized services that the public institution cannot provide. The district court denied the request, reasoning that O.M. had emotional problems, but that those problems were not affecting his ability to learn. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that O.M.’s placement was to meet his mental health needs; any educational benefit he received from the placement was incidental. O.M. was an above-average student, without serious attendance problems, and socialized well in the district school. An individualized education plan offered by the district satisfied its IDEA obligations. View "Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that plaintiff did not meet the first element of Listing 12.05C for mental retardation - having a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ score of 60-70. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's condition did not medically equal Listing 12.05C. View "Phillips v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law