Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

An employee, injured on the job, returned to work and presented a specialist's note, restricting her lifting. After five days her supervisor told her that her restrictions made it impossible for her to work and advised her to seek permanent disability. She submitted copies of additional doctors' notes in an effort to be reinstated, but the company concluded that the notes contained conflicting dates, contradictory answers on whether the medical condition was work related, ambiguities about the employee's ability to lift, and illegible content. The employee did not respond to requests for clarification, but filed a Workers' Compensation lawsuit and contacted the EEOC. She then filed suit, and, during discovery, turned over new copies of the notes. After plaintiff failed to produce originals at trial, there was conflicting testimony about the existence and location of originals. The district court declared a mistrial. Plaintiff sent the original notes to the court five days later. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, based on spoliation of evidence. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. It is not clear that plaintiff intentionally withheld the documents or that the company suffered severe harm. View "Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Phillip Grimsley and Roger Mowers were retired and later rehired employees of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). As employees, they were members of the Police Officers Retirement System. As part of the rehire process, SLED required Appellants to sign a form which provided that they would take a pay cut in the amount it would cost SLED to pay "the employer portion" of retirement. According to their suit, Appellants claimed that provision was contrary to state law, which assigned the responsibility for the employer portion of the retirement to the employer. On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Appellants brought suit against SLED and the State, seeking a declaratory judgment and asserting causes of action for a violation of S.C. Code Ann. section 9-11-90 and for unlawful takings. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the South Carolina Retirement Contribution Procedures Act (Retirement Act), which Appellants challenged on appeal to the Supreme Court. Appellants additionally appealed the trial court's alternative ruling dismissing their unlawful takings claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and found the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint: "Appellants have asserted a cognizable property interest rooted in state law sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. In so finding, [the Court] also [held] the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants' unlawful takings claim." View "Grimsley v. So. Carolina Law Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

The veteran, discharged in 1966, suffered service-related loss of use of an arm and both legs and injuries to buttocks, thighs, hips, and torso. In 1967 a regional office awarded compensation at the total disability rate (38 U.S.C. 314(j) (now 1114)), additional special compensation at the rate between subsections (l) and (m), and under subsection (k); it did not award aid and attendance because then-law required a special compensation rating of (o). In 1970, the office awarded special compensation under subsections (m) and (k), retroactive to 1966. With changes in the law, his rating increased to (n). A 1979 amendment provided that a veteran is eligible for a&a if rated under subsection (o) or between (n) and (o) and under (k). In 1992, the office granted service connection for a seizure disorder. This qualified for a full-step increase to (o) (38 C.F.R. 3.350(f)(4)), and the veteran was awarded a&a effective 1991, the date of the diagnosis. The Board refused to assign an effective date before 1991. On second remand the Veterans Court affirmed the Board's rejection of a claim concerning a&a for the injuries assessed in 1966. The Federal Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as disagreement with the regional office's factual findings. View "Pimentel v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Conger appealed the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental social security income benefits. Plaintiff applied for benefits in 2005 alleging he was unable to work because of degenerative disk disease, spondylosis, arthritis, depression, and problems sleeping. His application was denied at the administrative level after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform simple and routine medium exertional work that required no more than occasional stooping and no contact with the public. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, Plaintiff filed his complaint in the district court. The district court adopted the report and affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the ALJ's RFC finding and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the district court and Commissioner's rulings. View "Conger v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathryn Johns appealed the district court’s denial of her motion for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) which followed the court's remand to the Commissioner of her claims for Social Security disability benefits. In denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that her diagnosed mental impairments were not severe apart from alcohol abuse. Plaintiff argued before the district court that the ALJ had failed to apply the correct analysis in assessing her alcoholism. Specifically, the ALJ did not first find that she was disabled, and only then could the ALJ determine whether she would still be disabled if she stopped using alcohol. The government admitted that the ALJ did not follow the specified procedure, but argued that the error was harmless because the dispositive question was the same. Ultimately the district court remanded the case back to the Commissioner. Plaintiff then moved for fees under the EAJA. The government responded by arguing that a fee award was inappropriate because it believed the error by the ALJ was harmless. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion for fees. Finding that the district court believed that application of harmless error in this case was a close call, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under those circumstances, the district court did not "cross the bounds of the rationally available choices available to it when it concluded that the Commissioner's position was substantially justified." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the denial of fees. View "Johns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The primary question in this case was whether a workplace injury that Plaintiff Nancy Petock characterized as an aggravation or worsening of an earlier compensable injury can give rise to a new three-year period in which she could demand reinstatement or reemployment. The trial court held that it could not and granted Defendant Asante's (dba Asante Health System) summary judgment motion. Although the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that an aggravation of an earlier injury cannot give rise to new reinstatement rights, it concluded that there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff had sustained a "new and separate injury" in 2005 that would give rise to those rights, and remanded the case. On review, Plaintiff argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an aggravation of an earlier injury cannot give rise to a right to reinstatement under ORS 659A.043 or a right to reemployment under ORS 659A.046. Though the Supreme Court disagreed with some of the appellate court's reasoning, it affirmed the decision to reverse the trial court for further proceedings: "Even if defendant were correct that the same facts cannot give rise to an aggravation claim and a compensable injury claim (a proposition with which [the Court] noted our disagreement), [the Court] fail[ed] to see the relevance of that proposition in the context of defendant's summary judgment motion. On this record, Plaintiff was free to argue that her 2005 injury was a compensable injury." View "Petock v. Asante" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ursula White, Bruce Reiter and Margaret Retz, one retired member and two active members of the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) challenged certain actions of the Public Employees Retirement Board (PERB) alleging that those actions violated PERB's fiduciary duty to manages PERS for the benefit of PERS members. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that PERB breached its duty when it settled "City of Eugene v. Oregon." Respondent PERB argued that it settled that case pursuant to the "PERS Reform and Stabilization Act of 2003" and by court order, and was consistent with it's charged fiduciary duties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of PERB, and Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court, which concluded that there were disputed factual issues with respect to one of the Plaintiffs' claims, and that the trial court erred in granting judgment in PERB's favor. The Court reversed that part of the trial court opinion directed at that Plaintiff, and remanded the case. View "White v. Public Employees Retirement Board" on Justia Law

After Employee was unable to successfully complete her necessary training, Employer gave her the option to resign immediately or to be placed on a thirty-day unpaid leave of absence. Employee opted to resign immediately and thereafter sought unemployment insurance benefits. The Department of Workforce Development denied Employee's application for benefits on the grounds the Employee voluntarily left employment and did so without good cause. An ALJ concluded (1) Employee did not voluntarily quit her position but was constructively discharged, and (2) Employee was disqualified from receiving benefits because she had breached a duty reasonably owed to her employer, which breach constituted just cause for her termination. The Unemployment Insurance Review Board adopted and approved the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Employee's claim, holding (1) the Board's finding that Employee breached a duty reasonably owed to Employer was reasonable; and (2) it was reasonable for the Board to find that Employee was discharged for just cause and was therefore ineligible for benefits. View "Recker v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev. Review Bd." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and its agent, the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (DDSN), "properly ceased Mental Retardation/Related Disability services to" Appellant Jane Doe, a twenty-eight-year-old woman with undeniable cognitive and adaptive deficits. Based on a legal standard that the "onset of Mental Retardation must be before the age of eighteen (18) years according to accepted psychological doctrine[,]" the Hearing Officer concluded Doe was not mentally retarded. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirmed this legal determination, as well as the Hearing Officer's factual findings. Because the decision of the Hearing Officer and ALC was controlled by an error of law, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case: "DDSN could have promulgated regulations incorporating […] additional criteria as part of the definition of mental retardation. But no such steps were taken. Rather, South Carolina adopted a broad definition of mental retardation […] using language that parallels the SSI definition, and in Regulation 88-210, DDSN interpreted that definition in a manner consistent with the SSA. DDSN's interpretation of section 44-20-30 in its policy guidelines directly conflicts with Regulation 88-210 and should be disregarded." View "Doe v. South Carolina Dept. Health Human Svcs." on Justia Law

This case involved A.S., a California minor, who was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding A.S.'s educational placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court held as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding A.S.'s education at an out-of-state residential treatment facility was the school district in which the student's parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resided. The court held that A.S. had no parent under the 2005 version of section 56028 and thus, from July 28, 2006, when A.S. was placed at the out-of-state facility, until October 9, 2007, when an amended version of section 56028 took effect, California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for A.S.'s education. The California Department of Education (CDE) was therefore responsible by default. The court held that A.S. did have a parent under the 2007 and 2009 versions of section 56028. CDE therefore was not responsible for A.S.'s out-of-state education after October 10, 2007, when the 2007 version of section 56028 took effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. View "Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. CA Dept. of Educ., et al" on Justia Law