Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b).

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b).

Employer Ethan Allen, Inc. appealed the Commissioner of the Department of Labor's decision that Claimant Robin Houle's right shoulder condition was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.  Claimant experienced pain and weakness in her left shoulder and arm, and her job duties as a furniture refinisher were modified to account for her medical restrictions.  Claimant was assigned to an inventory control/stockroom clerk position where she engaged in a variety of duties.  Interspersed among these duties, claimant also wrapped finished shelves to prepare them for shipping. Claimant was initially treated for the increased symptoms in her shoulder and neck by her primary care provider.  The primary care provider referred her to an orthopedist for further evaluation.  The orthopedist suspected that her left shoulder complaints were most likely due to her repetitive work for Ethan Allen.  He attributed claimant's right shoulder pain to normal wear and tear to be expected of someone claimant's age.  Claimant was dissatisfied with this evaluation and was then referred to an orthopedic surgeon for further evaluation and treatment. In view of the competing expert medical opinions, the Commission relied on a traditional five-part test to evaluate their persuasiveness. Ethan Allen raised numerous arguments on appeal to the Supreme Court. Principal among them, Ethan Allen challenged the Commissioner's use of the five-part test to evaluate competing medical opinions, both as applied in this case and in general.  According to the Employer, the use of this test improperly shifts the burden of proof from claimant to employer, unfairly places employers at a disadvantage, and erroneously employs a "winner take all" approach to evaluating a claimant's expert testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ethan Allen failed to show that the Commissioner's findings were clearly erroneous or that her conclusions were unsupported by the findings. The Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision in this case.

Plaintiff Pamela Allen-Pentkowski appealed the Vermont Employment Security Board's (Board) determination that she was discharged from work for actions constituting misconduct, a decision which temporarily disqualified her from collecting unemployment compensation benefits.  Prior to her discharge, Plaintiff had worked for over five years at Liebert Engineering, Inc. as a computer assisted design operator. Over the course of her work for Liebert, a dispute arose when Plaintiff's work schedule changed. She claims she told her supervisor that she could make a requested change in her work hours after she had her baby, but until then, could not work an extra hour beyond 4:00 p.m. on days requested by her supervisor. In an e-mail to the company's president, Plaintiff explained she could not work the extra hour, that her supervisor would not listen to her, and that she felt harassed by his repeated insistence. Hearing an exchange between Plaintiff and the supervisor, the president came from his office and told Plaintiff that "can't is equal to refusal, refusal is reason for termination," at which point, he discharged Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed for unemployment compensation benefits but the claims adjudicator determined the nature of plaintiff's discharge from her employer was misconduct connected with her work. On appeal, plaintiff argued that her inability to work the hours requested by her employer was not misconduct within the meaning of the statute and should not disqualify her from unemployment compensation benefits.  Upon review, the Supreme Court held the employer failed to carry its burden of proof and reversed the Board's decision.

Appellant Anne Marie Morack worked for Appellee Gentex Corporation for over thirty years. In 2005, she left when swelling and pain in her hands were too overwhelming for her to continue work. She sought medical help, and notified her employer of the pain. In early 2005, Appellant applied for short-term disability, noting on her application for benefits that she did not believe her injury was work-related. After consultation with a specialist, Appellee learned that her injury was work-related. Gentex ultimately appealed the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board's decision granting Appellant's claim to the Commonwealth Court, contending that Appellant did not timely notify her supervisor of the injury nor aptly describe the injury to comply with the state workers' compensation act. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding Appellant did not aptly describe her injury nor give Gentex adequate notice. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine what constitutes sufficient notice under the Act, and to "speak to" an employer's duty to conduct reasonable investigations into the circumstances surrounding a work-related injury. Under the Act, notice is a prerequisite to receive workers' compensation benefits, and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that proper notice was given. Upon review of the applicable case law in this instance, the Court found that, "consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the Act, [the Court] made it clear that even imperfect notice can satisfy" its strictures. The Court employed a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining whether Appellant in this case both satisfied the notice and description of the injury in making her claim for benefits. In reversing the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court found that Appellant's collective communications with Gentex satisfied the notification requirements of the Act.

Plaintiff Rosemary Kilinski sought social security benefits in 1999. The Commissioner determined that she was disabled as of October 2003. In this case, Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment that upheld the Commissioner's determination that her disability onset date was in 2003 rather than 1999. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the Administrative Law Judge erred in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision.

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision.

Claimant Kevin Ressler suffered a work-related injury in 1995. He received Workers' Compensation benefits. In 2004, Claimant submitted to an independent medical evaluation (IME). The sequence of events since the IME make up the heart of this appeal. In June 2004, Claimant had surgery related with his work-related injury. In July 2004, his employer petitioned to terminate benefits as of the date of the IME. The employer also requested a supersedeas. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) denied the superseadas in August 2004. In October of that year, the insurer received the invoice for the June surgery and paid the amount by the end of January, 2005. In June 2005, the WCJ granted the employer's petition to terminate benefits. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Bard (WCAB) affirmed that decision. The insurer then requested reimbursement for the 2004 surgery from the Supersedeas Fund. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation challenged the request because Claimant's surgery predated the supersedeas request. The WCJ found that no obligation to pay arose until the bill was submitted to the insurer in October 2004. Because the obligation to pay arose after the denial of supersedeas, reimbursement was appropriate. The WCAB affirmed. The issue of whether the Supersedeas Fund may deny reimbursement of treatment rendered before the insurer requested supersedeas came before the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record and the Workers' Compensation Act, the Court concluded that the lower courts appropriately ordered reimbursement to the insurer for undue payments made after the supersedeas request and in direct response to the earlier denial. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant appealed the district court's judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of his application for disability insurance and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits, under Title II and XVI of the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court held that substantial evidence on the record supported the ALJ's finding that appellant's depression and anxiety were not severe; that the ALJ did not err in evaluating appellant's credibility; that, while the ALJ did not explicitly address the claims of appellant's girlfriend, the ALJ's error had no bearing on the outcome of appellant's case and did not require remand; and that the vocational expert's answer to a hypothetical question was not improper and constituted substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.