Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Records indicate that the veteran's knee was injured in 1949 while he was playing football with a military team. Treatment at a field hospital in Germany included x-rays that revealed no bone or joint injury. The knee was not treated again until 1999, when the veteran claimed service-related disability. X-rays at a VA clinic showed minimal degeneration consistent with osteoarthritis. On remand, for the VA's failure to assist the veteran, instructions to the VA hospital stated "NO EXAM" and indicated a file review, but did state that an exam was allowable if necessary. The Veterans' Court upheld a second denial of benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed; the Veterans Court acted correctly in not requiring the Board to state reasons why the medical examinersâ reports were competent and sufficiently informed. The court noted that the veteran did not raise his concerns about the instructions with the Board and that it cannot review a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case under 38 U.S.C. 7292.

Plaintiff Richard Krauser appealed the district courtâs order that denied him social security and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Plaintiffâs benefits on the last step of a five-step process for determining his eligibility. Among other things, the ALJ found that Plaintiffâs ailments had not met the âper seâ disabling impairments that would have made him eligible, and considering his age, education and transferable work skills, Plaintiff could go back to work. The appeals council denied review, making the ALJâs decision ripe for the Tenth Circuit to review. Plaintiff argued that the ALJ did not properly consider all of his impairments and came to the wrong conclusion after the five-step process. The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ did not review all evidence Plaintiff submitted, particularly statements from Plaintiffâs treating physician. The Court reversed the ALJâs holding and remanded the case for further review.

Plaintiff sought disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, alleging that migraine headaches, affective mood disorder, and mayofascial back pain left her unable to work. At issue was whether the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ properly weighed physicians' opinions in determining plaintiff's residual functional capacity. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to discredit plaintiff's subjective complaints where none of her doctors reported functional or work related limitations due to her headaches and where there was no basis for her creditability. The court also held that the ALJ properly weighed the physicians' opinions in determining plaintiff's residual functional capacity.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

The Secretary of the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") petitioned the district court to enforce administrative document subpoenas after a DOL investigation into the management of respondents (collectively, "Funds"), which arose out of a $10.1 million loss of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1134(a)(1), plan assets, as a result of the Funds' investments in entities related to Bernard L. Madoff. At issue was whether the attorney-client and work product privileges protected some of the materials requested by the Secretary from disclosure and whether the district court erred in applying the fiduciary exception to override these privileges. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the Secretary's petition and held that the fiduciary exception applied to the Funds' claims of attorney-client privilege and no good cause showing was required in the ERISA context. The court also held that the Funds have failed to carry their burden to demonstrate the applicability of the work product doctrine.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, alleging that defendants discriminated against them in administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section 8") program in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, 100.204. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, and 100.204 could not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. 1983; in the analysis of plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim under the FHAA; in factual findings regarding the provision of Section 8 services to the class; in rulings on certain discovery issues; and in decertification. The court adopted the district court's findings and conclusions and held that the district court carefully considered and thoroughly discussed these issues. The court also considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit.

The plaintiff was an "excepted" (not in the competitive service or the Senior Executive Service) employee of the Veterans Canteen Service and was not preference-eligible (as a veteran or close relative). She appealed a notice of termination for misconduct. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she had been hired under 38 U.S.C. 7802(e). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute allows removal of such employees without regard to other civil service laws. Civil Service Due Process Amendments in 1990 did not extend protections to excepted, non-preference eligible employees.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.

Robert and Candy Smith are the parents of a developmentally disabled child, Justan. In April, 2009, Mrs. Smith filed an appointment petition in the Probate Court to become Justan's sole guardian and conservator. The court set forth a schedule where visitation rights were divided equally between the parents. Mr. Smith intentionally prevented his wife from having her scheduled visits with Justan in June, 2009. Mrs. Smith subsequently filed a motion for contempt. The Probate Court held hearings both on the guardianship petition and Mrs. Smithâs motion for contempt. Over her ex-husband's objection, the court admitted testimonial reports from the guardian ad litem. As a result, the Probate Court entered a judgment appointing the former Mrs. Candy Smith and Mr. Smithâs new wife, Christine, as co-guardians of Justan. Christine was to become Justanâs sole conservator. The Probate Court erroneously ordered, as part of the judgment, that at least $200 per month from Justanâs social security insurance benefits be deposited into a bank account that named as account holders Justan, Christine and the former Mrs. Smith. Mr. Smiith filed a motion for findings and conclusions of law. The court complied and issued an amended judgment containing minor changes. Mr. Smith appealed. The Supreme Court found that the portion of the Lower Courtâs decision pertaining to the fore-mentioned $200 monthly deposit conflicted with Federal statues and regulations. Mr. Smith was vested with a discretionary authority to execute Justin's social security insurance monies. The Court vacated this portion of the Probate Courtâs judgment and affirmed the remainder.

Plaintiff appealed the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") denial of his application for supplemental security income alleging that he became disabled beginning in March 20, 2005 due to depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and schizoaffective disorder. At issue was whether the factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. The court held that the ALJ did not follow the law in evaluating all the medical evidence from a licensed clinical psychologist, a licensed professional counselor, and a physician who diagnosed plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder. The court also held that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards in assessing plaintiff's credibility, and alternatively, the ALJ's adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence.