Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries

Minn. Stat. 125A.06(d), by its plain language, does not impose a heightened standard that burdens school districts with an absolute obligation to guarantee that each blind student will use the Braille instruction provided to attain a specific level of proficiency. I.Z.M. filed suit against the District, alleging claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and non-IDEA claims for relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the District's motions for judgment on the administrative record on the IDEA claim and for summary judgment on the non-IDEA claims. In this case, the ALJ cited the state regulation and expressly concluded that the District took all reasonable steps to provide instructional materials in accessible formats in a timely manner. In regard to the non-IDEA claims, the district court used the correct standard and correctly concluded that I.Z.M. failed to present evidence of bad faith or gross misjudgment View "I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools" on Justia Law

Johnson served in the Army, 1970-1971. In 2008, the VA granted Johnson a 30% rating for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a 10% rating for tinea corporis, a skin condition which Johnson described as jungle rot under Diagnostic Code (DC) 7806. The Board of Veterans Appeals increased his PTSD rating to 70% and remanded with respect to his skin condition. After several rounds of review, the Board denied Johnson’s request for an increased rating for tinea corporis in 2014, finding that Johnson’s skin condition affected only a limited area of his body, and his topical corticosteroid treatment of that area did not qualify as a “systemic therapy” under DC 7806. The Veterans Court held that DC 7806 unambiguously defines a topical corticosteroid treatment as “systemic therapy” rather than “topical therapy.” The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Veterans Court gave an overly broad reading of the term “systemic therapy” in DC 7806 that encompasses any and all forms of topical corticosteroid treatment. The court noted that Johnson did not challenge factual findings that his use of topical corticosteroids affected only the area to which he applied treatment and did not affect his body as a whole, and reinstated the Board’s findings. View "Johnson v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of relators' qui tam action alleging that the College violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, by knowingly providing false progress reports on students in order to keep grant monies. The panel held that the Tribe is not a "person" under the FCA. The panel remanded for further jurisdictional factfinding on whether the College was an arm of the Tribe that shares the Tribe's status for purposes of the FCA. View "United States ex rel Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of disability benefits and held that the ALJ did not follow the appropriate methodology for weighing a treating physician's medical opinion. In this case, the panel explained that the ALJ should have credited the treating physician's opinion and found that plaintiff was disabled, and the district court erred by developing its own reasons to discount the treating physician's opinion, rather than reviewing the ALJ's reasons for substantial evidence. The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's symptoms were not as severe as she testified, particularly in light of the extensive medical record objectively verifying her claims. Because each of the "credit-as-true" factors in Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014), was satisfied, remand for the calculation and award of benefits was warranted. View "Trevizo v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Dawn McGee, who was receiving public assistance in the form of SNAP benefits, and Helge Naber were an unmarried couple living together with their five collective children. When the Department of Health and Human Services learned that Naber was living with McGee it sent McGee a notice requesting income information for Naber. McGee did not send the requested information, and the Department terminated McGee’s benefits. The Board of Public Assistance and district court upheld the Department’s determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department was required to terminate McGee’s SNAP benefits when the household, including Naber, refused to provide the income information that the Department requested. View "McGee v. State Department of Public Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that the ALJ clearly considered the Polaski factors in accessing plaintiff's subjective complaints and substantial evidence supported her determination that plaintiff's statements concerning her symptoms were not entirely credible. Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's residual functioning capacity determination that plaintiff was able to perform medium work. View "Bryant v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Claimant sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims held that the claimant's combined injuries rendered the claimant permanently totally disabled and awarded benefits. The Multiple Injury Trust Fund appealed. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding claimant ineligible to claim benefits against the Multiple Injury Trust Fund as the claimant was not a "physically impaired person" at the time of the claimant's second on-the-job injury. The dispositive issue presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review was whether claimant met the statutory definition of a "physically impaired person" at the time of the claimant's second on-the-job injury for purposes of determining eligibility for Multiple Injury Trust Fund benefits. As a corollary, the Court considered whether a duly-executed settlement agreement (memorialized on a form prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Court) constituted an adjudication of the claimant's disabilities. The Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Garrett" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's application for supplemental security income. The court held that a reasonable mind could find that the record supports the ALJ's determination that plaintiff did not meet Listing 11.17A; the ALJ reasonably found, based on the record as a whole, that plaintiff did not exhibit the deficits in adaptive functioning needed to meet Listing 12.05C; and the ALJ had ample reason to discount the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician and to rely instead on the opinions of the state agency medical consultants, which were more consistent with the medical evidence. View "Vance v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Richard Culbertson was counsel for the four plaintiffs in these consolidated Social Security disability benefits cases. At issue in this appeal was the attorney's fees for Culbertson under 42 U.S.C. 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in its interpretation and application of Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1970) and by imposing a 24% cap on section 406 fees; it was necessary for the district court to add the requested section 406(b) fee together with his EAJA award; and the district court did not abuse its discretion and did not exceed its authority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Maxmed sought judicial review of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' determination that the Medicaid program overpaid Maxmed by almost $800,000 for home health care services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. The Fifth Circuit held that the failure to record the random numbers used in the sample did not necessarily invalidate the extrapolation methodology; the Secretary did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting the challenge to the independence of the sampling units; Congress clearly envisioned extrapolation in overpayment determinations involving home health agencies like Maxmed, and the Secretary's reliance on extrapolation as a tool was justified; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maxmed's motion to amend or alter the judgment; and the district court properly rejected Maxmed's due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary. View "Maxmed Healthcare, Inc. v. Price" on Justia Law