Justia Public Benefits Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Public Benefits
Malak v. Commissioner of Social Security
The plaintiff, Afaf Beshay Malak, applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) in 2021, citing several disabilities including pinched nerves, osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, and chronic headaches. Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration by disability examiners. Malak then had a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who followed the five-step evaluation process for disability claims. The ALJ determined that Malak had severe impairments but did not meet the criteria for a listed impairment. The ALJ assessed Malak’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and found she could perform sedentary work with certain limitations. The ALJ concluded that Malak could perform her past work as a financial institution manager and other jobs in the national economy, thus finding her not disabled.Malak appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, which denied her request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Malak then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ALJ’s denial of her DIB claim. Malak subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Malak argued that the ALJ failed to consider her medically related absences and the side effects of her treatments. The court held that the ALJ is not required to consider the time needed for medical appointments when determining RFC, as RFC assessments focus on functional limitations caused by medically determinable impairments. The court also found that the ALJ properly considered the effectiveness and side effects of Malak’s treatments, noting that the medical evidence showed positive responses to treatments without significant side effects. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the denial of Malak’s DIB claim. View "Malak v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law
Linden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Paula S. Linden applied for Social Security benefits online in September 2014 at the age of 62, which was before her full retirement age of 66. As a result, she received smaller monthly payments than she would have if she had waited until 66. Linden claimed that she applied early based on misinformation from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which allegedly told her that she would receive the same benefits as if she had applied at 66. She sought to have her benefits recalculated as if she had applied at 66.The SSA denied her request, both initially and upon reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also ruled against her, stating that the statutory provision she cited, 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5), only applied to individuals who failed to apply for benefits due to misinformation. The ALJ also found insufficient evidence that Linden received misinformation from the SSA. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Linden then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which granted summary judgment in favor of the SSA and denied Linden’s motion for summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5) precluded Linden’s recovery because the statute only applies to individuals who failed to apply for benefits due to misinformation. Since Linden did apply for benefits, she did not meet the statutory requirement. The court also found that the SSA’s regulations supported this interpretation. Additionally, the court noted that even if there was misinformation, it would not change the outcome because Linden did not fail to apply for benefits. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Linden v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law
United States v. Pontz
Kenneth Pontz was convicted by a jury of violating a federal embezzlement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, by misrepresenting his financial situation to obtain public benefits over an eight-year period. The government presented evidence that Pontz had received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits by falsely claiming he lived alone, while he actually lived with his wife, who received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. Pontz's misrepresentations allegedly began in 2004 and continued until 2020.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Pontz's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the statute of limitations barred charges for conduct occurring before June 16, 2017. The district court ruled that § 641 embezzlement was a "continuing offense," allowing the government to charge Pontz for conduct dating back to 2014. At trial, the court admitted testimony from an SSA employee, Luis Aguayo, as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, despite Pontz's objections that it was based on technical knowledge requiring expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and held that § 641 embezzlement is not a continuing offense under the standard established in Toussie v. United States. The court found that the nature of embezzlement does not involve a renewed, daily threat of harm once the elements of the crime are complete. Consequently, the government could not charge Pontz for embezzlement occurring more than five years before his indictment. The court vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders and remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy for the statute-of-limitations error. The court upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding Aguayo's testimony. View "United States v. Pontz" on Justia Law
HUDNALL V. DUDEK
John Hudnall, a former financial advisor, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming he had been unable to work since May 1, 2015, due to major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia. His application included a function report from his wife, Miyuki Sato, detailing his limitations in daily activities and self-care. Despite this, the Social Security Administration denied his application and request for reconsideration. Hudnall then sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who also denied his claim, finding him not disabled based on medical evidence and Hudnall's self-reported activities, without explicitly addressing Sato's lay evidence.Hudnall appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Social Security Administration. Hudnall then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that under the Social Security Administration's new regulations, effective March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer required to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony. The court found that these regulations, which state that ALJs are not required to articulate how they considered evidence from nonmedical sources, are within the Commissioner of Social Security's broad authority and are not arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in discounting Sato's evidence without explanation. The court resolved all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "HUDNALL V. DUDEK" on Justia Law
Bufkin v. Collins
Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed. View "Bufkin v. Collins" on Justia Law
US v. Notgrass
Rhonda and Robert Notgrass fraudulently obtained benefits from the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program by falsely claiming unemployment due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Robert, a minister, and Rhonda, his wife, were ineligible for these benefits as Robert was fired for reasons unrelated to the pandemic, and Rhonda had not lost her job. They both pleaded guilty to misdemeanors and were sentenced to probation by the district court.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia sentenced the Notgrasses to five years of probation, including several conditions. The Notgrasses appealed four of these conditions: obtaining permission before leaving their judicial district, prohibition on possessing dangerous weapons, registering with an unemployment agency, and Robert's participation in a supervised mental-health treatment program. They argued that these conditions were both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that the Notgrasses' appellate waiver did not cover challenges to probation conditions, allowing the appeal to proceed. On the merits, the court found that the district court had adequately explained the conditions in light of the Notgrasses' objections. The travel-permission and weapons prohibition conditions were standard and self-evident, while the unemployment registration and mental-health treatment conditions were tailored to the Notgrasses' specific circumstances. The court held that all four conditions were reasonably related to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and were not an abuse of discretion.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentences, finding the probation conditions both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "US v. Notgrass" on Justia Law
Marlar v. Gearhart
Dan Lee Gearhart and Kristin A. Marlar divorced in September 2018, with Gearhart ordered to pay monthly child support. Gearhart applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits for himself and his children, which were approved after the divorce, with payments retroactive to August 2018. The children’s benefits were paid to Marlar as their representative payee. Gearhart stopped making child support payments, believing the SSDI payments covered his obligation. In May 2022, Gearhart petitioned the magistrate court to credit the SSDI payments against his child support arrearage, effectively reducing it to $0.00. Marlar opposed this, arguing it constituted a retroactive modification of child support.The magistrate court credited the SSDI payments against Gearhart’s arrearage, eliminating his outstanding balance. Marlar appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate court’s decision, concluding that Idaho Code section 32-709 prohibited retroactive modification of child support. The district court remanded the case with instructions to deny the application of SSDI payments as a credit against Gearhart’s arrearage.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Idaho Code section 32-709 did not apply to Gearhart’s petition because he was not seeking a modification of his child support obligation but rather a credit for SSDI payments already made. The court concluded that section 32-709(2) did not limit the magistrate court’s discretion to credit SSDI benefits against the child support arrearage. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the magistrate court’s judgment crediting the SSDI payments against Gearhart’s arrearage. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Marlar v. Gearhart" on Justia Law
Luo v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
The petitioner, Lin Luo, sought review of a final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) that determined her ineligible for unemployment benefits from April 5, 2023, to June 28, 2023. Luo was terminated from her position at the American Chemical Society (ACS) and received post-termination payments under an Agreement and General Release. The OAH administrative law judge (ALJ) classified these payments as severance pay, which disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits. Luo argued that the payments were settlement payments for sexual harassment claims, not severance pay.The Department of Employment Services (DOES) initially found Luo ineligible for benefits for a slightly different period. Luo appealed to OAH, where the ALJ held a hearing and excluded Luo's evidence of her harassment claims, citing the parol evidence rule. The ALJ concluded that the Agreement's language unambiguously indicated the payments were severance pay, based on Luo's years of service and lack of advance notice of termination. The ALJ also noted that the Agreement included a release of claims against ACS and found that Luo signed the Agreement without fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the ALJ erred in not considering parol evidence regarding the nature of the payments. The court noted that the parol evidence rule does not preclude evidence showing that factual recitals in an agreement are untrue. The court concluded that the ALJ should have considered Luo's testimony and evidence about her harassment claims to determine the parties' intent regarding the payments. The court vacated the OAH orders and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider this evidence. View "Luo v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law
Williams v. Reed
Several unemployed workers in Alabama applied for unemployment benefits and claimed that the Alabama Department of Labor unlawfully delayed processing their claims. They sued the Alabama Secretary of Labor in state court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, arguing that the delays violated their due process and federal statutory rights. They sought a court order to expedite the processing of their claims. The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claimants had not satisfied the administrative-exhaustion requirement under Alabama law. The state trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.The claimants appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that §1983 did not preempt the state's administrative-exhaustion requirement, effectively preventing the claimants from suing to expedite the administrative process until they had completed it.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that state courts may not deny §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds when the application of a state exhaustion requirement effectively immunizes state officials from such claims. The Court reasoned that Alabama's exhaustion requirement, as applied, prevented claimants from challenging delays in the administrative process, thus immunizing state officials from §1983 suits. The Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Williams v. Reed" on Justia Law
Ken Lick Coal Co. v. OWCP
Ken Lick Coal Company employed Bob Reed from 1973 to 1986, during which he was exposed to coal dust. Reed later worked for Green Valley Hydro Seeding & Reclamation and JPR, where he continued to be exposed to coal dust. Reed developed breathing problems and filed three claims for black-lung benefits. His first claim in 1986 was denied. His second claim in 2007 was initially granted but later denied by an administrative law judge who found Reed did not have pneumoconiosis. Reed's third claim in 2018 was pursued by his widow after his death.The district director awarded benefits and designated Ken Lick as the responsible operator. An administrative law judge upheld this decision, finding Reed had over 15 years of coal-mine employment, including his work with Green Valley and JPR. The judge also found that Ken Lick had stipulated to being the responsible operator during Reed's second claim, which the judge deemed binding in the third claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the administrative law judge erred in treating Ken Lick's prior stipulation as binding. The court found that the stipulation was a legal conclusion rather than a factual one, and thus, the judge had the authority to disregard it. The court noted that the administrative law judge would not have required Ken Lick to pay the benefits but for the stipulation. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit granted Ken Lick's petition for review and transferred the liability for Reed's claim to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. View "Ken Lick Coal Co. v. OWCP" on Justia Law